## Summary Axios versions `1.7.0` through `1.15.x` did not enforce configured request and response size limits when requests were sent with the `fetch` adapter. Applications that selected `adapter: 'fetch'`, or ran in environments where axios resolved to the fetch adapter, could receive or send bodies larger than `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` despite those limits being explicitly configured. This can cause resource exhaustion in server-side usage when a malicious or compromised server returns an oversized response, when an attacker can supply a large `data:` URL, or when an application forwards attacker-controlled request bodies through axios while relying on `maxBodyLength` as a boundary. ## Impact The impact is availability-only. Affected applications may process, buffer, or transmit data beyond the configured limit, potentially exhausting memory, CPU, or network resources. This does not affect axios’s default unlimited behaviour by itself: `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` default to `-1`. The vulnerability exists when an application has configured finite limits and expects axios to enforce them. Server-side runtimes are the primary concern. Browser impact is generally constrained by the browser process and browser fetch behavior, and should not be described as server process exhaustion. ## Affected Functionality Affected functionality includes requests using the built-in `fetch` adapter with finite `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` values. Relevant configurations include: - `adapter: 'fetch'` - `adapter: ['fetch', ...]` when `fetch` is selected - environments where neither `xhr` nor `http` is available and axios falls back to `fetch` - custom fetch environments configured through `env.fetch` Unaffected functionality includes: - Node.js default `http` adapter enforcement - versions before the fetch adapter was introduced - configurations that do not rely on finite axios size limits ## Technical Details In vulnerable versions, `lib/adapters/fetch.js` destructured request config without `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength`. The adapter dispatched `fetch()` and then materialized the response through `text()`, `arrayBuffer()`, `blob()`, or related resolvers without checking the configured response limit. The fix in `e5540dc` added: - `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` reads in `lib/adapters/fetch.js` - upfront `data:` URL decoded-size checks - outbound body-size checks before dispatch - `Content-Length` response pre-checks - streaming response enforcement - fallback checks for environments without `ReadableStream` - regression tests in `tests/unit/adapters/fetch.test.js` ## Proof of Concept of Attack ```js import http from 'node:http'; import axios from 'axios'; const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { let received = 0; req.on('data', chunk => { received += chunk.length; }); req.on('end', () => { res.end(JSON.stringify({ received })); }); }); await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, resolve)); const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/`; await axios.post(url, 'A'.repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024), { adapter: 'fetch', maxBodyLength: 1024 }); // Vulnerable versions succeed and the server receives 2097152 bytes. // Fixed versions reject with ERR_BAD_REQUEST. server.close(); ``` ## Workarounds Use the Node.js `http` adapter for server-side requests where finite size limits are security-relevant. Validate or cap attacker-controlled request bodies before passing them to axios. Reject or strictly allowlist attacker-controlled URL schemes, especially `data:` URLs, before calling axios. <details> <summary>Original Report</summary> ### Summary When Axios is used with adapter: 'fetch', configured body/response size limits are not enforced. This allows oversized uploads/downloads (including data: URLs) despite explicit limits, which can lead to memory/resource exhaustion in server-side usage. ### Details maxBodyLength and maxContentLength are not applied in the fetch adapter flow: - lib/adapters/fetch.js (146-160): config destructuring does not include these controls. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (220-234): request is dispatched with fetch() without request-size enforcement. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (267-283): response is materialized via text(), arrayBuffer(), blob(), etc. without response-size checks. By contrast, the HTTP adapter enforces both limits. ### PoC Environment: - Axios main at commit f7a4ee2 - Node v24.2.0 Steps: 1. Start an HTTP server that counts received bytes and echoes {received}. 2. Send 2 MiB with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxBodyLength: 1024 3. Request a 4 KiB data: URL with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxContentLength: 16 Expected secure behavior: both requests rejected. Observed: - Upload: success, server received 2097152 - data: response: success, length 4096 ### Impact Type: DoS / resource exhaustion due to limit bypass. Impacted: applications using Axios fetch adapter as a server-side security control boundary for untrusted request/response sizes. </details> ---
## Summary Axios versions `1.7.0` through `1.15.x` did not enforce configured request and response size limits when requests were sent with the `fetch` adapter. Applications that selected `adapter: 'fetch'`, or ran in environments where axios resolved to the fetch adapter, could receive or send bodies larger than `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` despite those limits being explicitly configured. This can cause resource exhaustion in server-side usage when a malicious or compromised server returns an oversized response, when an attacker can supply a large `data:` URL, or when an application forwards attacker-controlled request bodies through axios while relying on `maxBodyLength` as a boundary. ## Impact The impact is availability-only. Affected applications may process, buffer, or transmit data beyond the configured limit, potentially exhausting memory, CPU, or network resources. This does not affect axios’s default unlimited behaviour by itself: `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` default to `-1`. The vulnerability exists when an application has configured finite limits and expects axios to enforce them. Server-side runtimes are the primary concern. Browser impact is generally constrained by the browser process and browser fetch behavior, and should not be described as server process exhaustion. ## Affected Functionality Affected functionality includes requests using the built-in `fetch` adapter with finite `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` values. Relevant configurations include: - `adapter: 'fetch'` - `adapter: ['fetch', ...]` when `fetch` is selected - environments where neither `xhr` nor `http` is available and axios falls back to `fetch` - custom fetch environments configured through `env.fetch` Unaffected functionality includes: - Node.js default `http` adapter enforcement - versions before the fetch adapter was introduced - configurations that do not rely on finite axios size limits ## Technical Details In vulnerable versions, `lib/adapters/fetch.js` destructured request config without `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength`. The adapter dispatched `fetch()` and then materialized the response through `text()`, `arrayBuffer()`, `blob()`, or related resolvers without checking the configured response limit. The fix in `e5540dc` added: - `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` reads in `lib/adapters/fetch.js` - upfront `data:` URL decoded-size checks - outbound body-size checks before dispatch - `Content-Length` response pre-checks - streaming response enforcement - fallback checks for environments without `ReadableStream` - regression tests in `tests/unit/adapters/fetch.test.js` ## Proof of Concept of Attack ```js import http from 'node:http'; import axios from 'axios'; const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { let received = 0; req.on('data', chunk => { received += chunk.length; }); req.on('end', () => { res.end(JSON.stringify({ received })); }); }); await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, resolve)); const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/`; await axios.post(url, 'A'.repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024), { adapter: 'fetch', maxBodyLength: 1024 }); // Vulnerable versions succeed and the server receives 2097152 bytes. // Fixed versions reject with ERR_BAD_REQUEST. server.close(); ``` ## Workarounds Use the Node.js `http` adapter for server-side requests where finite size limits are security-relevant. Validate or cap attacker-controlled request bodies before passing them to axios. Reject or strictly allowlist attacker-controlled URL schemes, especially `data:` URLs, before calling axios. <details> <summary>Original Report</summary> ### Summary When Axios is used with adapter: 'fetch', configured body/response size limits are not enforced. This allows oversized uploads/downloads (including data: URLs) despite explicit limits, which can lead to memory/resource exhaustion in server-side usage. ### Details maxBodyLength and maxContentLength are not applied in the fetch adapter flow: - lib/adapters/fetch.js (146-160): config destructuring does not include these controls. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (220-234): request is dispatched with fetch() without request-size enforcement. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (267-283): response is materialized via text(), arrayBuffer(), blob(), etc. without response-size checks. By contrast, the HTTP adapter enforces both limits. ### PoC Environment: - Axios main at commit f7a4ee2 - Node v24.2.0 Steps: 1. Start an HTTP server that counts received bytes and echoes {received}. 2. Send 2 MiB with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxBodyLength: 1024 3. Request a 4 KiB data: URL with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxContentLength: 16 Expected secure behavior: both requests rejected. Observed: - Upload: success, server received 2097152 - data: response: success, length 4096 ### Impact Type: DoS / resource exhaustion due to limit bypass. Impacted: applications using Axios fetch adapter as a server-side security control boundary for untrusted request/response sizes. </details> ---
Update axios to 1.16.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Axios affects axios (npm). Severity is high. ## Summary Axios versions `1.7.0` through `1.15.x` did not enforce configured request and response size limits when requests were sent with the `fetch` adapter. Applications that selected `adapter: 'fetch'`, or ran in environments where axios resolved to the fetch adapter, could receive or send bodies larger than `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` despite those limits being explicitly configured. This can cause resource exhaustion in server-side usage when a malicious or compromised server returns an oversized response, when an attacker can supply a large `data:` URL, or when an application forwards attacker-controlled request bodies through axios while relying on `maxBodyLength` as a boundary. ## Impact The impact is availability-only. Affected applications may process, buffer, or transmit data beyond the configured limit, potentially exhausting memory, CPU, or network resources. This does not affect axios’s default unlimited behaviour by itself: `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` default to `-1`. The vulnerability exists when an application has configured finite limits and expects axios to enforce them. Server-side runtimes are the primary concern. Browser impact is generally constrained by the browser process and browser fetch behavior, and should not be described as server process exhaustion. ## Affected Functionality Affected functionality includes requests using the built-in `fetch` adapter with finite `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` values. Relevant configurations include: - `adapter: 'fetch'` - `adapter: ['fetch', ...]` when `fetch` is selected - environments where neither `xhr` nor `http` is available and axios falls back to `fetch` - custom fetch environments configured through `env.fetch` Unaffected functionality includes: - Node.js default `http` adapter enforcement - versions before the fetch adapter was introduced - configurations that do not rely on finite axios size limits ## Technical Details In vulnerable versions, `lib/adapters/fetch.js` destructured request config without `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength`. The adapter dispatched `fetch()` and then materialized the response through `text()`, `arrayBuffer()`, `blob()`, or related resolvers without checking the configured response limit. The fix in `e5540dc` added: - `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` reads in `lib/adapters/fetch.js` - upfront `data:` URL decoded-size checks - outbound body-size checks before dispatch - `Content-Length` response pre-checks - streaming response enforcement - fallback checks for environments without `ReadableStream` - regression tests in `tests/unit/adapters/fetch.test.js` ## Proof of Concept of Attack ```js import http from 'node:http'; import axios from 'axios'; const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { let received = 0; req.on('data', chunk => { received += chunk.length; }); req.on('end', () => { res.end(JSON.stringify({ received })); }); }); await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, resolve)); const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/`; await axios.post(url, 'A'.repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024), { adapter: 'fetch', maxBodyLength: 1024 }); // Vulnerable versions succeed and the server receives 2097152 bytes. // Fixed versions reject with ERR_BAD_REQUEST. server.close(); ``` ## Workarounds Use the Node.js `http` adapter for server-side requests where finite size limits are security-relevant. Validate or cap attacker-controlled request bodies before passing them to axios. Reject or strictly allowlist attacker-controlled URL schemes, especially `data:` URLs, before calling axios. <details> <summary>Original Report</summary> ### Summary When Axios is used with adapter: 'fetch', configured body/response size limits are not enforced. This allows oversized uploads/downloads (including data: URLs) despite explicit limits, which can lead to memory/resource exhaustion in server-side usage. ### Details maxBodyLength and maxContentLength are not applied in the fetch adapter flow: - lib/adapters/fetch.js (146-160): config destructuring does not include these controls. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (220-234): request is dispatched with fetch() without request-size enforcement. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (267-283): response is materialized via text(), arrayBuffer(), blob(), etc. without response-size checks. By contrast, the HTTP adapter enforces both limits. ### PoC Environment: - Axios main at commit f7a4ee2 - Node v24.2.0 Steps: 1. Start an HTTP server that counts received bytes and echoes {received}. 2. Send 2 MiB with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxBodyLength: 1024 3. Request a 4 KiB data: URL with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxContentLength: 16 Expected secure behavior: both requests rejected. Observed: - Upload: success, server received 2097152 - data: response: success, length 4096 ### Impact Type: DoS / resource exhaustion due to limit bypass. Impacted: applications using Axios fetch adapter as a server-side security control boundary for untrusted request/response sizes. </details> ---
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| axiosnpm | >=1.7.0,<1.16.0 | 1.16.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate axios to 1.16.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanAllocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling in Axios affects axios (npm). Severity is high. ## Summary Axios versions `1.7.0` through `1.15.x` did not enforce configured request and response size limits when requests were sent with the `fetch` adapter. Applications that selected `adapter: 'fetch'`, or ran in environments where axios resolved to the fetch adapter, could receive or send bodies larger than `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` despite those limits being explicitly configured. This can cause resource exhaustion in server-side usage when a malicious or compromised server returns an oversized response, when an attacker can supply a large `data:` URL, or when an application forwards attacker-controlled request bodies through axios while relying on `maxBodyLength` as a boundary. ## Impact The impact is availability-only. Affected applications may process, buffer, or transmit data beyond the configured limit, potentially exhausting memory, CPU, or network resources. This does not affect axios’s default unlimited behaviour by itself: `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` default to `-1`. The vulnerability exists when an application has configured finite limits and expects axios to enforce them. Server-side runtimes are the primary concern. Browser impact is generally constrained by the browser process and browser fetch behavior, and should not be described as server process exhaustion. ## Affected Functionality Affected functionality includes requests using the built-in `fetch` adapter with finite `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength` values. Relevant configurations include: - `adapter: 'fetch'` - `adapter: ['fetch', ...]` when `fetch` is selected - environments where neither `xhr` nor `http` is available and axios falls back to `fetch` - custom fetch environments configured through `env.fetch` Unaffected functionality includes: - Node.js default `http` adapter enforcement - versions before the fetch adapter was introduced - configurations that do not rely on finite axios size limits ## Technical Details In vulnerable versions, `lib/adapters/fetch.js` destructured request config without `maxContentLength` or `maxBodyLength`. The adapter dispatched `fetch()` and then materialized the response through `text()`, `arrayBuffer()`, `blob()`, or related resolvers without checking the configured response limit. The fix in `e5540dc` added: - `maxContentLength` and `maxBodyLength` reads in `lib/adapters/fetch.js` - upfront `data:` URL decoded-size checks - outbound body-size checks before dispatch - `Content-Length` response pre-checks - streaming response enforcement - fallback checks for environments without `ReadableStream` - regression tests in `tests/unit/adapters/fetch.test.js` ## Proof of Concept of Attack ```js import http from 'node:http'; import axios from 'axios'; const server = http.createServer((req, res) => { let received = 0; req.on('data', chunk => { received += chunk.length; }); req.on('end', () => { res.end(JSON.stringify({ received })); }); }); await new Promise(resolve => server.listen(0, resolve)); const url = `http://127.0.0.1:${server.address().port}/`; await axios.post(url, 'A'.repeat(2 * 1024 * 1024), { adapter: 'fetch', maxBodyLength: 1024 }); // Vulnerable versions succeed and the server receives 2097152 bytes. // Fixed versions reject with ERR_BAD_REQUEST. server.close(); ``` ## Workarounds Use the Node.js `http` adapter for server-side requests where finite size limits are security-relevant. Validate or cap attacker-controlled request bodies before passing them to axios. Reject or strictly allowlist attacker-controlled URL schemes, especially `data:` URLs, before calling axios. <details> <summary>Original Report</summary> ### Summary When Axios is used with adapter: 'fetch', configured body/response size limits are not enforced. This allows oversized uploads/downloads (including data: URLs) despite explicit limits, which can lead to memory/resource exhaustion in server-side usage. ### Details maxBodyLength and maxContentLength are not applied in the fetch adapter flow: - lib/adapters/fetch.js (146-160): config destructuring does not include these controls. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (220-234): request is dispatched with fetch() without request-size enforcement. - lib/adapters/fetch.js (267-283): response is materialized via text(), arrayBuffer(), blob(), etc. without response-size checks. By contrast, the HTTP adapter enforces both limits. ### PoC Environment: - Axios main at commit f7a4ee2 - Node v24.2.0 Steps: 1. Start an HTTP server that counts received bytes and echoes {received}. 2. Send 2 MiB with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxBodyLength: 1024 3. Request a 4 KiB data: URL with: - adapter: 'fetch' - maxContentLength: 16 Expected secure behavior: both requests rejected. Observed: - Upload: success, server received 2097152 - data: response: success, length 4096 ### Impact Type: DoS / resource exhaustion due to limit bypass. Impacted: applications using Axios fetch adapter as a server-side security control boundary for untrusted request/response sizes. </details> ---
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| axiosnpm | >=1.7.0,<1.16.0 | 1.16.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard