Answer in brief
CVE-2026-44572 records a Low severity vulnerability in Next.js's Middleware / Proxy redirects can be cache-poisoned. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps next (npm), next (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps next (npm), next (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| nextnpm | >=12.2.0,<15.5.16 | 15.5.16 |
| nextnpm | >=16.0.0,<16.2.5 | 16.2.5 |
Published upstream
May 11, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
May 14, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 25, 2026
### Impact Next.js uses the `x-nextjs-data` request header for internal data requests. On affected versions, an external client could send this header on a normal request to a path handled by middleware that returns a redirect. When that happened, the middleware/proxy could treat the request as a data request and replace the standard `Location` redirect header with the internal `x-nextjs-redirect` header. Browsers do not follow `x-nextjs-redirect`, so the response became an unusable redirect for normal clients. If the application was deployed behind a CDN or reverse proxy that caches 3xx responses without varying on this header, a single attacker request could poison the cached redirect response for the affected path. Subsequent visitors could then receive a cached redirect response without a `Location` header, causing a denial of service for that redirect path until the cache entry expired or was purged. ### Affected scenarios This affects applications that: - use middleware or proxy redirects - are deployed behind a caching CDN or reverse proxy - allow 3xx responses on those paths to be cached without differentiating internal data requests from normal requests ### Fix The fix stops trusting `x-nextjs-data` by itself for middleware redirect handling. A request is now treated as an internal data request only when it is validated as such by internal routing state, preserving legitimate data-request redirect behavior while preventing external header injection from changing normal redirect responses. ### Workarounds Before upgrading, users can reduce risk by: - configuring the CDN or reverse proxy to vary its cache key on `x-nextjs-data` for affected responses
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.