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  4. CVE 2026 44646 liquidjss render tag silently bypasses per render
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Back to active CVEs
Medium · CVSS 5.3CVE-2026-44646GHSA-9X9P-QF8F-MVJG

LiquidJS's `{% render %}` tag silently bypasses per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true` via `Context.spawn()`CVE-2026-44646

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-44646 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in LiquidJS's `{% render %}` tag silently bypasses per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true` via `Context.spawn()`. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps liquidjs (npm), liquidjs (npm), liquidjs (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published May 27, 2026Updated Oct 27, 2026Source checked Oct 27, 2026First seen by HOL Jun 22, 2026Material review Oct 27, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium · CVSS 5.3
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
3 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps liquidjs (npm), liquidjs (npm), liquidjs (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
liquidjsnpm<=10.25.7Not reported
liquidjsnpm<10.26.010.26.0
liquidjsnpm>=0 <10.26.010.26.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for liquidjs, liquidjs, liquidjs.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update liquidjs to 10.26.0; liquidjs to 10.26.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    May 27, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Oct 27, 2026

    Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jun 22, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

## Summary `Context.spawn()` in liquidjs creates a child `Context` for the `{% render %}` tag but does not propagate the parent context's resolved `ownPropertyOnly` value. The new context re-derives `ownPropertyOnly` from `opts.ownPropertyOnly` (the instance-level option), silently discarding any `RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly` override that was supplied to `parseAndRender()`. As a result, a developer who runs a Liquid instance with the backwards-compatible `ownPropertyOnly:false` and then locks down an untrusted render with `parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true })` still leaks prototype-chain properties from inside any `{% render %}` partial. This is a distinct exploit surface from the previously identified array-filter variants (`where`, `reject`, `group_by`, `find`, `find_index`, `has`) — the underlying root cause in `Context.spawn()` is shared, but `{% render %}` is a separately reachable sink that needs no filter usage. ## Details The bug is in `Context.spawn()`: ```ts // src/context/context.ts:105-114 public spawn (scope = {}) { return new Context(scope, this.opts, { sync: this.sync, globals: this.globals, strictVariables: this.strictVariables // <-- ownPropertyOnly is missing here }, { renderLimit: this.renderLimit, memoryLimit: this.memoryLimit }) } ``` The constructor resolves `ownPropertyOnly` as: ```ts // src/context/context.ts:47 this.ownPropertyOnly = renderOptions.ownPropertyOnly ?? opts.ownPropertyOnly ``` Because `spawn()` passes a `RenderOptions` object with no `ownPropertyOnly`, the child context falls back to `opts.ownPropertyOnly` (the instance-level option), throwing away any per-render override that the parent context had applied. `this.opts` is the raw normalized instance options object; it is not mutated to reflect render-time overrides. The `{% render %}` tag at `src/tags/render.ts:51-77` calls `spawn()` to build the partial's isolated scope: ```ts * render (ctx: Context, emitter: Emitter): Generator<unknown, void, unknown> { const { liquid, hash } = this const filepath = (yield renderFilePath(this['file'], ctx, liquid)) as string assert(filepath, () => `illegal file path "${filepath}"`) const childCtx = ctx.spawn() // <-- ownPropertyOnly lost here const scope = childCtx.bottom() __assign(scope, yield hash.render(ctx)) ... const templates = (yield liquid._parsePartialFile(filepath, childCtx.sync, this['currentFile'])) as Template[] yield liquid.renderer.renderTemplates(templates, childCtx, emitter) } ``` All template variable lookups inside the partial then go through `childCtx.readProperty()` (`src/context/context.ts:123-135`), which calls `readJSProperty(obj, key, this.ownPropertyOnly)`. With `childCtx.ownPropertyOnly === false` (inherited from `opts`), the protective check at `src/context/context.ts:138-141` is skipped and prototype-chain properties are returned to the template: ```ts export function readJSProperty (obj: Scope, key: PropertyKey, ownPropertyOnly: boolean) { if (ownPropertyOnly && !hasOwnProperty.call(obj, key) && !(obj instanceof Drop)) return undefined return obj[key] } ``` The `{% include %}` tag is **not** affected: it does not call `spawn()`; it pushes onto the parent context's scope stack (`src/tags/include.ts:40`), so the parent's resolved `ownPropertyOnly` continues to apply. Trust model / why this matters: `RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly` is documented (`src/liquid-options.ts:108-111`) as "Same as `ownPropertyOnly` on LiquidOptions, but only for current `render()` call". It exists precisely so that developers running a non-strict instance can lock down individual untrusted renders. That contract is broken — the override is silently dropped at every partial boundary. ## PoC ```bash mkdir -p /tmp/render-poc printf '{{ user.passwordHash }}' > /tmp/render-poc/_user.liquid node -e " const { Liquid } = require('./dist/liquid.node.js'); const liquid = new Liquid({ ownPropertyOnly: false, root: '/tmp/render-poc' }); class User { constructor(n){ this.name = n; } } User.prototype.passwordHash = 'bcrypt\$secret'; const u = new User('alice'); liquid.parseAndRender( 'Direct:[{{ user.passwordHash }}] Render:[{% render \"_user.liquid\", user: user %}]', { user: u }, { ownPropertyOnly: true } ).then(console.log); " ``` Verified output on liquidjs 10.25.7: ``` Direct:[] Render:[bcrypt$secret] ``` The top-level expression `{{ user.passwordHash }}` is correctly blocked by the per-render `ownPropertyOnly:true`, but the same expression inside the partial loaded by `{% render %}` returns the prototype-chain property — proof that `Context.spawn()` discarded the override. ## Impact - **Information disclosure**: Any prototype-chain property of objects passed into a `{% render %}` partial — including secrets, hashes, internal state, framework-injected helpers — becomes readable from inside the partial template, even when the developer used the documented per-render lockdown. - **Realistic threat model**: Applications that maintain `ownPropertyOnly:false` for backwards compatibility (or because their data layer relies on prototype methods) and lock down untrusted-template renders with `parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly:true })` are protected at the top level but silently exposed inside any partial. User-controllable template content (CMS snippets, theme partials, email templates) that uses `{% render %}` becomes an info-leak primitive. - **Distinct from existing CVE-2022-25948**: the prior advisory only covered direct use of `ownPropertyOnly:false`; this is a failure of the documented mitigation (`ownPropertyOnly:true` per-render override), not a missing setting. - **Distinct from the array-filter variant**: same `spawn()` root cause, but exploitable without invoking `where/reject/group_by/find/find_index/has` — only requires that the template uses `{% render %}` (a basic templating feature) and that one of the rendered values has prototype-chain properties. ## Recommended Fix Propagate `ownPropertyOnly` (and any other security-relevant render options) inside `Context.spawn()`: ```ts // src/context/context.ts public spawn (scope = {}) { return new Context(scope, this.opts, { sync: this.sync, globals: this.globals, strictVariables: this.strictVariables, ownPropertyOnly: this.ownPropertyOnly // <-- propagate resolved per-render value }, { renderLimit: this.renderLimit, memoryLimit: this.memoryLimit }) } ``` Passing `this.ownPropertyOnly` (the resolved value, not `this.opts.ownPropertyOnly`) ensures any `RenderOptions.ownPropertyOnly` override flows into spawned child contexts. This single change closes both the `{% render %}` pathway documented here and the array-filter pathway tracked separately. A regression test should assert that a partial rendered via `{% render %}` honours `parseAndRender(..., { ownPropertyOnly: true })` against an object with prototype-chain properties.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Secret Exfiltration
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
CWE-693
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Oct 27, 2026
References
7 linked sources
Open source record