## Description The normal `download_your_data` flow requires the requester to be logged in as the export owner, but the resulting Active Storage blob redirect URL can be replayed without authentication by anyone who obtains it. ## Technical description This private export flow turns an authenticated, user-scoped download into a reusable bearer link because the protected Decidim endpoint redirects to the underlying Active Storage blob URL. `Decidim::DownloadYourDataController#download_file` correctly scopes the export record to `current_user`, so the wrapper route itself is not directly accessible to another user. However, once the owner performs that authenticated GET request, the response redirects to a signed Active Storage URL that is no longer bound to the user session. Anyone who learns that URL can replay it and retrieve the file without being logged in as the export owner. Because the blob redirect URL is delivered through a GET request and appears in the redirect chain, it is more likely to leak through browser history, logs, proxy tooling, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, or other client-side handling of URLs. Reproduction steps: Step 1. Generate or locate a completed export in the Web UI. 1. Sign in as `[email protected]` at `http://localhost:3001/users/sign_in`. 2. Open `http://localhost:3001/download_your_data`. 3. Request a new export from the page and wait until the export becomes downloadable. 4. Open the completed export entry from the list and copy its wrapper URL, for example `http://localhost:3001/download_your_data/download?uuid=07286e61-932d-46d4-bd74-bcd1340c503f `. Step 2. Download through the authenticated wrapper route. 1. While still signed in as [email protected], open the wrapper URL in the browser. 2. Confirm that this Decidim route requires the owner session and is not directly usable when logged out or when logged in as another user. Step 3. Capture the final bearer URL in the redirect chain. 1. In DevTools Network or Burp, inspect the redirect sequence for the wrapper request. 2. Copy the Active Storage redirect URL, typically matching `http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>`. 3. Note that the Active Storage redirect URL is no longer protected by the Decidim ownership check. Step 4. Replay the final file URL without authentication. 1. Open a private window or separate browser with no Decidim session. 2. Paste the copied `http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>` URL. 3. Confirm the export file still downloads even though you are not logged in as the export owner. ### Impact Personal data exports can be retrieved through leakage channels such as browser history, logs, referrers, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, intercepted email content, or other client-side disclosure of the GET URL. ### Patches See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16680 ### Workarounds Disable Private Downloads URLs ### Reference OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control ### Credits This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the [Decidim Association](https://decidim.org) and made by [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) against Decidim financed by [NGI](https://ngi.eu/).
## Description The normal `download_your_data` flow requires the requester to be logged in as the export owner, but the resulting Active Storage blob redirect URL can be replayed without authentication by anyone who obtains it. ## Technical description This private export flow turns an authenticated, user-scoped download into a reusable bearer link because the protected Decidim endpoint redirects to the underlying Active Storage blob URL. `Decidim::DownloadYourDataController#download_file` correctly scopes the export record to `current_user`, so the wrapper route itself is not directly accessible to another user. However, once the owner performs that authenticated GET request, the response redirects to a signed Active Storage URL that is no longer bound to the user session. Anyone who learns that URL can replay it and retrieve the file without being logged in as the export owner. Because the blob redirect URL is delivered through a GET request and appears in the redirect chain, it is more likely to leak through browser history, logs, proxy tooling, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, or other client-side handling of URLs. Reproduction steps: Step 1. Generate or locate a completed export in the Web UI. 1. Sign in as `[email protected]` at `http://localhost:3001/users/sign_in`. 2. Open `http://localhost:3001/download_your_data`. 3. Request a new export from the page and wait until the export becomes downloadable. 4. Open the completed export entry from the list and copy its wrapper URL, for example `http://localhost:3001/download_your_data/download?uuid=07286e61-932d-46d4-bd74-bcd1340c503f `. Step 2. Download through the authenticated wrapper route. 1. While still signed in as [email protected], open the wrapper URL in the browser. 2. Confirm that this Decidim route requires the owner session and is not directly usable when logged out or when logged in as another user. Step 3. Capture the final bearer URL in the redirect chain. 1. In DevTools Network or Burp, inspect the redirect sequence for the wrapper request. 2. Copy the Active Storage redirect URL, typically matching `http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>`. 3. Note that the Active Storage redirect URL is no longer protected by the Decidim ownership check. Step 4. Replay the final file URL without authentication. 1. Open a private window or separate browser with no Decidim session. 2. Paste the copied `http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>` URL. 3. Confirm the export file still downloads even though you are not logged in as the export owner. ### Impact Personal data exports can be retrieved through leakage channels such as browser history, logs, referrers, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, intercepted email content, or other client-side disclosure of the GET URL. ### Patches See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16680 ### Workarounds Disable Private Downloads URLs ### Reference OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control ### Credits This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the [Decidim Association](https://decidim.org) and made by [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) against Decidim financed by [NGI](https://ngi.eu/).
Update decidim-core to 0.30.9; decidim-core to 0.31.5; decidim-core to 0.32.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanDecidim: Private exports can be downloaded through reusable links affects decidim-core (rubygems), decidim-core (rubygems), decidim-core (rubygems). Severity is medium. ## Description The normal `download_your_data` flow requires the requester to be logged in as the export owner, but the resulting Active Storage blob redirect URL can be replayed without authentication by anyone who obtains it. ## Technical description This private export flow turns an authenticated, user-scoped download into a reusable bearer link because the protected Decidim endpoint redirects to the underlying Active Storage blob URL. `Decidim::DownloadYourDataController#download_file` correctly scopes the export record to `current_user`, so the wrapper route itself is not directly accessible to another user. However, once the owner performs that authenticated GET request, the response redirects to a signed Active Storage URL that is no longer bound to the user session. Anyone who learns that URL can replay it and retrieve the file without being logged in as the export owner. Because the blob redirect URL is delivered through a GET request and appears in the redirect chain, it is more likely to leak through browser history, logs, proxy tooling, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, or other client-side handling of URLs. Reproduction steps: Step 1. Generate or locate a completed export in the Web UI. 1. Sign in as `[email protected]` at `http://localhost:3001/users/sign_in`. 2. Open `http://localhost:3001/download_your_data`. 3. Request a new export from the page and wait until the export becomes downloadable. 4. Open the completed export entry from the list and copy its wrapper URL, for example `http://localhost:3001/download_your_data/download?uuid=07286e61-932d-46d4-bd74-bcd1340c503f `. Step 2. Download through the authenticated wrapper route. 1. While still signed in as [email protected], open the wrapper URL in the browser. 2. Confirm that this Decidim route requires the owner session and is not directly usable when logged out or when logged in as another user. Step 3. Capture the final bearer URL in the redirect chain. 1. In DevTools Network or Burp, inspect the redirect sequence for the wrapper request. 2. Copy the Active Storage redirect URL, typically matching `http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>`. 3. Note that the Active Storage redirect URL is no longer protected by the Decidim ownership check. Step 4. Replay the final file URL without authentication. 1. Open a private window or separate browser with no Decidim session. 2. Paste the copied `http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>` URL. 3. Confirm the export file still downloads even though you are not logged in as the export owner. ### Impact Personal data exports can be retrieved through leakage channels such as browser history, logs, referrers, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, intercepted email content, or other client-side disclosure of the GET URL. ### Patches See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16680 ### Workarounds Disable Private Downloads URLs ### Reference OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control ### Credits This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the [Decidim Association](https://decidim.org) and made by [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) against Decidim financed by [NGI](https://ngi.eu/).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in rubygems. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| decidim-corerubygems | <0.30.9 | 0.30.9 |
| decidim-corerubygems | >=0.31.0.rc1,<0.31.5 | 0.31.5 |
| decidim-corerubygems | >=0.32.0.rc1,<0.32.0 | 0.32.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate decidim-core to 0.30.9; decidim-core to 0.31.5; decidim-core to 0.32.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanDecidim: Private exports can be downloaded through reusable links affects decidim-core (rubygems), decidim-core (rubygems), decidim-core (rubygems). Severity is medium. ## Description The normal `download_your_data` flow requires the requester to be logged in as the export owner, but the resulting Active Storage blob redirect URL can be replayed without authentication by anyone who obtains it. ## Technical description This private export flow turns an authenticated, user-scoped download into a reusable bearer link because the protected Decidim endpoint redirects to the underlying Active Storage blob URL. `Decidim::DownloadYourDataController#download_file` correctly scopes the export record to `current_user`, so the wrapper route itself is not directly accessible to another user. However, once the owner performs that authenticated GET request, the response redirects to a signed Active Storage URL that is no longer bound to the user session. Anyone who learns that URL can replay it and retrieve the file without being logged in as the export owner. Because the blob redirect URL is delivered through a GET request and appears in the redirect chain, it is more likely to leak through browser history, logs, proxy tooling, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, or other client-side handling of URLs. Reproduction steps: Step 1. Generate or locate a completed export in the Web UI. 1. Sign in as `[email protected]` at `http://localhost:3001/users/sign_in`. 2. Open `http://localhost:3001/download_your_data`. 3. Request a new export from the page and wait until the export becomes downloadable. 4. Open the completed export entry from the list and copy its wrapper URL, for example `http://localhost:3001/download_your_data/download?uuid=07286e61-932d-46d4-bd74-bcd1340c503f `. Step 2. Download through the authenticated wrapper route. 1. While still signed in as [email protected], open the wrapper URL in the browser. 2. Confirm that this Decidim route requires the owner session and is not directly usable when logged out or when logged in as another user. Step 3. Capture the final bearer URL in the redirect chain. 1. In DevTools Network or Burp, inspect the redirect sequence for the wrapper request. 2. Copy the Active Storage redirect URL, typically matching `http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>`. 3. Note that the Active Storage redirect URL is no longer protected by the Decidim ownership check. Step 4. Replay the final file URL without authentication. 1. Open a private window or separate browser with no Decidim session. 2. Paste the copied `http://localhost:3001/rails/active_storage/blobs/redirect/<SIGNED_ID>/<FILENAME>` URL. 3. Confirm the export file still downloads even though you are not logged in as the export owner. ### Impact Personal data exports can be retrieved through leakage channels such as browser history, logs, referrers, screenshots, copied links, support transcripts, intercepted email content, or other client-side disclosure of the GET URL. ### Patches See https://github.com/decidim/decidim/pull/16680 ### Workarounds Disable Private Downloads URLs ### Reference OWASP A01:2021 Broken Access Control ### Credits This issue was discovered in a security audit organized by the [Decidim Association](https://decidim.org) and made by [Radically Open Security](https://www.radicallyopensecurity.com/) against Decidim financed by [NGI](https://ngi.eu/).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in rubygems. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| decidim-corerubygems | <0.30.9 | 0.30.9 |
| decidim-corerubygems | >=0.31.0.rc1,<0.31.5 | 0.31.5 |
| decidim-corerubygems | >=0.32.0.rc1,<0.32.0 | 0.32.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard