### Summary `ui.restructured_text()` renders reStructuredText server-side with Docutils without disabling file insertion directives. When a NiceGUI application passes attacker-controlled content to `ui.restructured_text()`, an attacker can use standard Docutils directives (`include`, `csv-table` with `:file:`, `raw` with `:file:`) to read local files readable by the NiceGUI server process. Applications that only pass trusted static strings to `ui.restructured_text()` are not affected. ### Details The affected component is the reStructuredText renderer: - File: `nicegui/elements/restructured_text.py` - Function: `prepare_content()` `prepare_content()` renders user-supplied reStructuredText through Docutils: ```python html = publish_parts( remove_indentation(content), writer_name='html4', settings_overrides={'syntax_highlight': 'short'}, ) ``` The Docutils call only sets `syntax_highlight`. It does not disable file insertion or raw directives, so Docutils processes directives that read local files and embed their contents into the generated HTML before it is returned to the browser. Frontend sanitization cannot prevent this because the file has already been read server-side. A minimal vulnerable usage pattern is any page that forwards untrusted input into `ui.restructured_text()`, e.g. content taken from query parameters, form fields, or other user-controlled sources. ### Impact Local file disclosure. An attacker who can supply reStructuredText content can read files accessible to the NiceGUI server process. Depending on deployment, this may expose: - application `.env` files - database URLs, API tokens, session/storage secrets - OAuth or cloud credentials - Docker or Kubernetes mounted secrets - application source files - logs and other process-readable files The confirmed impact is confidentiality loss through arbitrary local file read. Applications are only impacted when they pass untrusted or user-controlled reStructuredText into `ui.restructured_text()`. ### Recommended fix Disable unsafe Docutils features in `prepare_content()`: ```python html = publish_parts( remove_indentation(content), writer_name='html4', settings_overrides={ 'syntax_highlight': 'short', 'file_insertion_enabled': False, 'raw_enabled': False, '_disable_config': True, }, ) ``` This blocks the `include`, `csv-table :file:`, and `raw :file:` directives as well as local `docutils.conf` overrides.
### Summary `ui.restructured_text()` renders reStructuredText server-side with Docutils without disabling file insertion directives. When a NiceGUI application passes attacker-controlled content to `ui.restructured_text()`, an attacker can use standard Docutils directives (`include`, `csv-table` with `:file:`, `raw` with `:file:`) to read local files readable by the NiceGUI server process. Applications that only pass trusted static strings to `ui.restructured_text()` are not affected. ### Details The affected component is the reStructuredText renderer: - File: `nicegui/elements/restructured_text.py` - Function: `prepare_content()` `prepare_content()` renders user-supplied reStructuredText through Docutils: ```python html = publish_parts( remove_indentation(content), writer_name='html4', settings_overrides={'syntax_highlight': 'short'}, ) ``` The Docutils call only sets `syntax_highlight`. It does not disable file insertion or raw directives, so Docutils processes directives that read local files and embed their contents into the generated HTML before it is returned to the browser. Frontend sanitization cannot prevent this because the file has already been read server-side. A minimal vulnerable usage pattern is any page that forwards untrusted input into `ui.restructured_text()`, e.g. content taken from query parameters, form fields, or other user-controlled sources. ### Impact Local file disclosure. An attacker who can supply reStructuredText content can read files accessible to the NiceGUI server process. Depending on deployment, this may expose: - application `.env` files - database URLs, API tokens, session/storage secrets - OAuth or cloud credentials - Docker or Kubernetes mounted secrets - application source files - logs and other process-readable files The confirmed impact is confidentiality loss through arbitrary local file read. Applications are only impacted when they pass untrusted or user-controlled reStructuredText into `ui.restructured_text()`. ### Recommended fix Disable unsafe Docutils features in `prepare_content()`: ```python html = publish_parts( remove_indentation(content), writer_name='html4', settings_overrides={ 'syntax_highlight': 'short', 'file_insertion_enabled': False, 'raw_enabled': False, '_disable_config': True, }, ) ``` This blocks the `include`, `csv-table :file:`, and `raw :file:` directives as well as local `docutils.conf` overrides.
Update nicegui to 3.12.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNiceGUI: Local file disclosure via Docutils file insertion in ui.restructured_text() affects nicegui (pip). Severity is high. ### Summary `ui.restructured_text()` renders reStructuredText server-side with Docutils without disabling file insertion directives. When a NiceGUI application passes attacker-controlled content to `ui.restructured_text()`, an attacker can use standard Docutils directives (`include`, `csv-table` with `:file:`, `raw` with `:file:`) to read local files readable by the NiceGUI server process. Applications that only pass trusted static strings to `ui.restructured_text()` are not affected. ### Details The affected component is the reStructuredText renderer: - File: `nicegui/elements/restructured_text.py` - Function: `prepare_content()` `prepare_content()` renders user-supplied reStructuredText through Docutils: ```python html = publish_parts( remove_indentation(content), writer_name='html4', settings_overrides={'syntax_highlight': 'short'}, ) ``` The Docutils call only sets `syntax_highlight`. It does not disable file insertion or raw directives, so Docutils processes directives that read local files and embed their contents into the generated HTML before it is returned to the browser. Frontend sanitization cannot prevent this because the file has already been read server-side. A minimal vulnerable usage pattern is any page that forwards untrusted input into `ui.restructured_text()`, e.g. content taken from query parameters, form fields, or other user-controlled sources. ### Impact Local file disclosure. An attacker who can supply reStructuredText content can read files accessible to the NiceGUI server process. Depending on deployment, this may expose: - application `.env` files - database URLs, API tokens, session/storage secrets - OAuth or cloud credentials - Docker or Kubernetes mounted secrets - application source files - logs and other process-readable files The confirmed impact is confidentiality loss through arbitrary local file read. Applications are only impacted when they pass untrusted or user-controlled reStructuredText into `ui.restructured_text()`. ### Recommended fix Disable unsafe Docutils features in `prepare_content()`: ```python html = publish_parts( remove_indentation(content), writer_name='html4', settings_overrides={ 'syntax_highlight': 'short', 'file_insertion_enabled': False, 'raw_enabled': False, '_disable_config': True, }, ) ``` This blocks the `include`, `csv-table :file:`, and `raw :file:` directives as well as local `docutils.conf` overrides.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| niceguipip | <=3.11.1 | 3.12.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate nicegui to 3.12.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNiceGUI: Local file disclosure via Docutils file insertion in ui.restructured_text() affects nicegui (pip). Severity is high. ### Summary `ui.restructured_text()` renders reStructuredText server-side with Docutils without disabling file insertion directives. When a NiceGUI application passes attacker-controlled content to `ui.restructured_text()`, an attacker can use standard Docutils directives (`include`, `csv-table` with `:file:`, `raw` with `:file:`) to read local files readable by the NiceGUI server process. Applications that only pass trusted static strings to `ui.restructured_text()` are not affected. ### Details The affected component is the reStructuredText renderer: - File: `nicegui/elements/restructured_text.py` - Function: `prepare_content()` `prepare_content()` renders user-supplied reStructuredText through Docutils: ```python html = publish_parts( remove_indentation(content), writer_name='html4', settings_overrides={'syntax_highlight': 'short'}, ) ``` The Docutils call only sets `syntax_highlight`. It does not disable file insertion or raw directives, so Docutils processes directives that read local files and embed their contents into the generated HTML before it is returned to the browser. Frontend sanitization cannot prevent this because the file has already been read server-side. A minimal vulnerable usage pattern is any page that forwards untrusted input into `ui.restructured_text()`, e.g. content taken from query parameters, form fields, or other user-controlled sources. ### Impact Local file disclosure. An attacker who can supply reStructuredText content can read files accessible to the NiceGUI server process. Depending on deployment, this may expose: - application `.env` files - database URLs, API tokens, session/storage secrets - OAuth or cloud credentials - Docker or Kubernetes mounted secrets - application source files - logs and other process-readable files The confirmed impact is confidentiality loss through arbitrary local file read. Applications are only impacted when they pass untrusted or user-controlled reStructuredText into `ui.restructured_text()`. ### Recommended fix Disable unsafe Docutils features in `prepare_content()`: ```python html = publish_parts( remove_indentation(content), writer_name='html4', settings_overrides={ 'syntax_highlight': 'short', 'file_insertion_enabled': False, 'raw_enabled': False, '_disable_config': True, }, ) ``` This blocks the `include`, `csv-table :file:`, and `raw :file:` directives as well as local `docutils.conf` overrides.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| niceguipip | <=3.11.1 | 3.12.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard