Answer in brief
CVE-2026-45698 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Netatalk has Integer Underflow → Stack Buffer Overflow in deletedir(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Netatalk/netatalk (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Netatalk/netatalk (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Netatalk/netatalkgeneric | >= 3.1.19, < 4.4.3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 17, 2026
Netatalk is a Free and Open Source file server suite for Unix-like operating systems. In versions 3.1.19 through 4.4.2, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in the deletedir() function of Netatalk's afpd daemon due to an integer underflow in the calculation of the remaining buffer size used for path construction. deletedir() is a utility function called when a file operation crosses a device boundary inside an AFP shared volume, which the standard library's renameat() cannot handle. The function attempts to prevent buffer overflows by tracking available space in a size_t remain variable. However, the arithmetic used to compute remain results in an unsigned integer underflow, causing the variable to become SIZE_MAX. Because of this, the subsequent boundary check always evaluates as safe, allowing an unbounded strcpy() operation to copy attacker-controlled filenames into a nearly full stack buffer. Version 4.4.3 patches the issue.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-45698 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in Netatalk has Integer Underflow → Stack Buffer Overflow in deletedir(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Netatalk/netatalk (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Netatalk/netatalk (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Netatalk/netatalkgeneric | >= 3.1.19, < 4.4.3 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 17, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 17, 2026
Netatalk is a Free and Open Source file server suite for Unix-like operating systems. In versions 3.1.19 through 4.4.2, a stack-based buffer overflow exists in the deletedir() function of Netatalk's afpd daemon due to an integer underflow in the calculation of the remaining buffer size used for path construction. deletedir() is a utility function called when a file operation crosses a device boundary inside an AFP shared volume, which the standard library's renameat() cannot handle. The function attempts to prevent buffer overflows by tracking available space in a size_t remain variable. However, the arithmetic used to compute remain results in an unsigned integer underflow, causing the variable to become SIZE_MAX. Because of this, the subsequent boundary check always evaluates as safe, allowing an unbounded strcpy() operation to copy attacker-controlled filenames into a nearly full stack buffer. Version 4.4.3 patches the issue.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.