## Summary Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters. During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported. If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster. ## Severity - **Attack Vector:** Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys. - **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API. - **Privileges Required:** Low: the role `Reader` is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - **User Interaction:** Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist. - **Scope:** Changed: the leaked CA private keys let an attacker directly get full control on Kubernetes or Talos, beyond the limitations enforced by Omni. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High: full cluster CA private keys (Kubernetes, Talos, etcd, service account) are exposed. - **Integrity Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. - **Availability Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. ## Impact - Any Reader-level account can exfiltrate the complete CA private key hierarchy (Kubernetes CA, etcd CA, service account key) of the imported clusters whose secrets are not yet rotated ("tainted" imported clusters). - With the Kubernetes CA private key, an attacker can sign certificates for any Kubernetes user or group, including `system:masters`, achieving cluster-admin access to the imported cluster entirely outside Omni's control plane. - Impact scope extends beyond Omni to every Kubernetes workload, credential, and secret stored in the affected imported cluster. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).
## Summary Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters. During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported. If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster. ## Severity - **Attack Vector:** Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys. - **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API. - **Privileges Required:** Low: the role `Reader` is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - **User Interaction:** Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist. - **Scope:** Changed: the leaked CA private keys let an attacker directly get full control on Kubernetes or Talos, beyond the limitations enforced by Omni. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High: full cluster CA private keys (Kubernetes, Talos, etcd, service account) are exposed. - **Integrity Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. - **Availability Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. ## Impact - Any Reader-level account can exfiltrate the complete CA private key hierarchy (Kubernetes CA, etcd CA, service account key) of the imported clusters whose secrets are not yet rotated ("tainted" imported clusters). - With the Kubernetes CA private key, an attacker can sign certificates for any Kubernetes user or group, including `system:masters`, achieving cluster-admin access to the imported cluster entirely outside Omni's control plane. - Impact scope extends beyond Omni to every Kubernetes workload, credential, and secret stored in the affected imported cluster. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).
Update github.com/siderolabs/omni to 1.6.6; github.com/siderolabs/omni to 1.7.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOmni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService affects github.com/siderolabs/omni (go), github.com/siderolabs/omni (go). Severity is high. ## Summary Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters. During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported. If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster. ## Severity - **Attack Vector:** Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys. - **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API. - **Privileges Required:** Low: the role `Reader` is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - **User Interaction:** Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist. - **Scope:** Changed: the leaked CA private keys let an attacker directly get full control on Kubernetes or Talos, beyond the limitations enforced by Omni. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High: full cluster CA private keys (Kubernetes, Talos, etcd, service account) are exposed. - **Integrity Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. - **Availability Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. ## Impact - Any Reader-level account can exfiltrate the complete CA private key hierarchy (Kubernetes CA, etcd CA, service account key) of the imported clusters whose secrets are not yet rotated ("tainted" imported clusters). - With the Kubernetes CA private key, an attacker can sign certificates for any Kubernetes user or group, including `system:masters`, achieving cluster-admin access to the imported cluster entirely outside Omni's control plane. - Impact scope extends beyond Omni to every Kubernetes workload, credential, and secret stored in the affected imported cluster. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/siderolabs/omnigo | >=1.3.0,<1.6.6 | 1.6.6 |
| github.com/siderolabs/omnigo | >=1.7.0,<1.7.3 | 1.7.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/siderolabs/omni to 1.6.6; github.com/siderolabs/omni to 1.7.3 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOmni: Reader-level users can retrieve imported cluster CA keys via ResourceService affects github.com/siderolabs/omni (go), github.com/siderolabs/omni (go). Severity is high. ## Summary Omni supports importing standalone Talos clusters. During this process, an ImportedClusterSecrets resource is created, which contains the full CA secrets bundle for the cluster being imported. If these secrets are not rotated by the importing actor, an authenticated Omni user with Reader access can read this resource and gain full access to the Talos, Kubernetes and etcd APIs of the cluster. ## Severity - **Attack Vector:** Adjacent: the attacker needs to be in the same network to be able to access Talos/Kubernetes APIs with the compromised keys. - **Attack Complexity:** High: the attacker needs a deep understanding of Omni's internals. The resource is only created for imported clusters, and is normally not represented to users via any high-level API. - **Privileges Required:** Low: the role `Reader` is sufficient for the attacker to be able to read an imported cluster's secrets. - **User Interaction:** Required: another user must have imported a cluster to Omni for this vulnerability to exist. - **Scope:** Changed: the leaked CA private keys let an attacker directly get full control on Kubernetes or Talos, beyond the limitations enforced by Omni. - **Confidentiality Impact:** High: full cluster CA private keys (Kubernetes, Talos, etcd, service account) are exposed. - **Integrity Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. - **Availability Impact:** High: with the CA keys the attacker has full control on Kubernetes and Talos of the compromised (imported) cluster, and modify the workloads on it. ## Impact - Any Reader-level account can exfiltrate the complete CA private key hierarchy (Kubernetes CA, etcd CA, service account key) of the imported clusters whose secrets are not yet rotated ("tainted" imported clusters). - With the Kubernetes CA private key, an attacker can sign certificates for any Kubernetes user or group, including `system:masters`, achieving cluster-admin access to the imported cluster entirely outside Omni's control plane. - Impact scope extends beyond Omni to every Kubernetes workload, credential, and secret stored in the affected imported cluster. ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/siderolabs/omnigo | >=1.3.0,<1.6.6 | 1.6.6 |
| github.com/siderolabs/omnigo | >=1.7.0,<1.7.3 | 1.7.3 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard