Answer in brief
CVE-2026-45956 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in drm/exynos: vidi: use priv->vidi_dev for ctx lookup in vidi_connection_ioctl(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <2987642c5213508c6c9e718324c0d5289a92c474 || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <65d1213baffa363f2eb1117b1dc7acc573b890f8 || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <875fa28690e93ed5296c31d3344556c6bb867234 || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <21ca24ba51a2c28bcc4df9d7e5a40b0eb66ab76d || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <b5fc86d753dd4c281a943b92f0eef02d31af03d7 || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <a540f767642f75240a6c35f6a65b69e44cfcea9d || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <d3968a0d85b211e197f2f4f06268a7031079e0d0 | 2987642c5213508c6c9e718324c0d5289a92c474, 65d1213baffa363f2eb1117b1dc7acc573b890f8, 875fa28690e93ed5296c31d3344556c6bb867234, 21ca24ba51a2c28bcc4df9d7e5a40b0eb66ab76d, b5fc86d753dd4c281a943b92f0eef02d31af03d7, a540f767642f75240a6c35f6a65b69e44cfcea9d, d3968a0d85b211e197f2f4f06268a7031079e0d0 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.3 | Not reported |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <2987642c5213508c6c9e718324c0d5289a92c474 || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <65d1213baffa363f2eb1117b1dc7acc573b890f8 || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <875fa28690e93ed5296c31d3344556c6bb867234 || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <21ca24ba51a2c28bcc4df9d7e5a40b0eb66ab76d || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <e1aed617eb80b49eac2f8c7bb7a0990f641dd59b || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <b5fc86d753dd4c281a943b92f0eef02d31af03d7 || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <a540f767642f75240a6c35f6a65b69e44cfcea9d || >=cf67cc9a29ac19c98bc4fa0e6d14b0c1f592d322 <d3968a0d85b211e197f2f4f06268a7031079e0d0 | 2987642c5213508c6c9e718324c0d5289a92c474, 65d1213baffa363f2eb1117b1dc7acc573b890f8, 875fa28690e93ed5296c31d3344556c6bb867234, 21ca24ba51a2c28bcc4df9d7e5a40b0eb66ab76d, e1aed617eb80b49eac2f8c7bb7a0990f641dd59b, b5fc86d753dd4c281a943b92f0eef02d31af03d7, a540f767642f75240a6c35f6a65b69e44cfcea9d, d3968a0d85b211e197f2f4f06268a7031079e0d0 |
Published upstream
May 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 21, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/exynos: vidi: use priv->vidi_dev for ctx lookup in vidi_connection_ioctl() vidi_connection_ioctl() retrieves the driver_data from drm_dev->dev to obtain a struct vidi_context pointer. However, drm_dev->dev is the exynos-drm master device, and the driver_data contained therein is not the vidi component device, but a completely different device. This can lead to various bugs, ranging from null pointer dereferences and garbage value accesses to, in unlucky cases, out-of-bounds errors, use-after-free errors, and more. To resolve this issue, we need to store/delete the vidi device pointer in exynos_drm_private->vidi_dev during bind/unbind, and then read this exynos_drm_private->vidi_dev within ioctl() to obtain the correct struct vidi_context pointer.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.