Answer in brief
CVE-2026-46015 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-46015 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <7aa7933a5607b1e5b56f322d17265c1d0ea02c51 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <14e9bb6eba8f59dcc637702e4744ae5e30660d76 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <ab5fdcd535645f6dbe6e9e21d96a08d141e88b4b || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <bebd058ef40c67a81fe6d9ee8beaa4ede90e0704 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <83bb57635d7cbafde32f865b577ecfd969f02337 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <12625b4da84caf4d84a04988710a7b9bcf702b18 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <3864c6ba1e041bc75342353a70fa2a2c6f909923 | 7aa7933a5607b1e5b56f322d17265c1d0ea02c51, 14e9bb6eba8f59dcc637702e4744ae5e30660d76, ab5fdcd535645f6dbe6e9e21d96a08d141e88b4b, bebd058ef40c67a81fe6d9ee8beaa4ede90e0704, 83bb57635d7cbafde32f865b577ecfd969f02337, 12625b4da84caf4d84a04988710a7b9bcf702b18, 3864c6ba1e041bc75342353a70fa2a2c6f909923 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.14 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group, the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely. Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration in inet_csk_listen_stop(). However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept() or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref. Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add() dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path. The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK, where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches nsk directly.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <7aa7933a5607b1e5b56f322d17265c1d0ea02c51 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <14e9bb6eba8f59dcc637702e4744ae5e30660d76 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <ab5fdcd535645f6dbe6e9e21d96a08d141e88b4b || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <bebd058ef40c67a81fe6d9ee8beaa4ede90e0704 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <83bb57635d7cbafde32f865b577ecfd969f02337 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <12625b4da84caf4d84a04988710a7b9bcf702b18 || >=54b92e84193749c9968aff2dd46e3b0f42643e18 <3864c6ba1e041bc75342353a70fa2a2c6f909923 | 7aa7933a5607b1e5b56f322d17265c1d0ea02c51, 14e9bb6eba8f59dcc637702e4744ae5e30660d76, ab5fdcd535645f6dbe6e9e21d96a08d141e88b4b, bebd058ef40c67a81fe6d9ee8beaa4ede90e0704, 83bb57635d7cbafde32f865b577ecfd969f02337, 12625b4da84caf4d84a04988710a7b9bcf702b18, 3864c6ba1e041bc75342353a70fa2a2c6f909923 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.14 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: call sk_data_ready() after listener migration When inet_csk_listen_stop() migrates an established child socket from a closing listener to another socket in the same SO_REUSEPORT group, the target listener gets a new accept-queue entry via inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add(), but that path never notifies the target listener's waiters. A nonblocking accept() still works because it checks the queue directly, but poll()/epoll_wait() waiters and blocking accept() callers can also remain asleep indefinitely. Call READ_ONCE(nsk->sk_data_ready)(nsk) after a successful migration in inet_csk_listen_stop(). However, after inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() succeeds, the ref acquired in reuseport_migrate_sock() is effectively transferred to nreq->rsk_listener. Another CPU can then dequeue nreq via accept() or listener shutdown, hit reqsk_put(), and drop that listener ref. Since listeners are SOCK_RCU_FREE, wrap the post-queue_add() dereferences of nsk in rcu_read_lock()/rcu_read_unlock(), which also covers the existing sock_net(nsk) access in that path. The reqsk_timer_handler() path does not need the same changes for two reasons: half-open requests become readable only after the final ACK, where tcp_child_process() already wakes the listener; and once nreq is visible via inet_ehash_insert(), the success path no longer touches nsk directly.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.