Answer in brief
CVE-2026-46043 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-46043 records a Unknown severity vulnerability in RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <c4376c672c3648d5bdc31dfffc329d07164f93c4 || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <5fedefec757192dcaad29a664ac332c7601be144 || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <2c0d71ef12f46c57d37bc571f3f2797db7eb50cc || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <2fd4f8b749309a61c3f3f88ee8891d94f79e1240 || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <f83519a4c122c9c7a850a2197648a9ff4c67c520 || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <9b924f3a26b21330a837cfe72e819b6393bbeeaa || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <e8ee0e792d475b1067c199ef0af1b6221fa6f43d || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <7244491dab347f648e661da96dc0febadd9daec3 | c4376c672c3648d5bdc31dfffc329d07164f93c4, 5fedefec757192dcaad29a664ac332c7601be144, 2c0d71ef12f46c57d37bc571f3f2797db7eb50cc, 2fd4f8b749309a61c3f3f88ee8891d94f79e1240, f83519a4c122c9c7a850a2197648a9ff4c67c520, 9b924f3a26b21330a837cfe72e819b6393bbeeaa, e8ee0e792d475b1067c199ef0af1b6221fa6f43d, 7244491dab347f648e661da96dc0febadd9daec3 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.8 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <c4376c672c3648d5bdc31dfffc329d07164f93c4 || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <5fedefec757192dcaad29a664ac332c7601be144 || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <2c0d71ef12f46c57d37bc571f3f2797db7eb50cc || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <2fd4f8b749309a61c3f3f88ee8891d94f79e1240 || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <f83519a4c122c9c7a850a2197648a9ff4c67c520 || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <9b924f3a26b21330a837cfe72e819b6393bbeeaa || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <e8ee0e792d475b1067c199ef0af1b6221fa6f43d || >=8700e3e7c4857d28ebaa824509934556da0b3e76 <7244491dab347f648e661da96dc0febadd9daec3 | c4376c672c3648d5bdc31dfffc329d07164f93c4, 5fedefec757192dcaad29a664ac332c7601be144, 2c0d71ef12f46c57d37bc571f3f2797db7eb50cc, 2fd4f8b749309a61c3f3f88ee8891d94f79e1240, f83519a4c122c9c7a850a2197648a9ff4c67c520, 9b924f3a26b21330a837cfe72e819b6393bbeeaa, e8ee0e792d475b1067c199ef0af1b6221fa6f43d, 7244491dab347f648e661da96dc0febadd9daec3 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 4.8 | Not reported |
Published upstream
May 27, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 5, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.