Answer in brief
CVE-2026-46274 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in io-wq: check that the predecessor is hashed in io_wq_remove_pending(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <d6bda9df0c0a3080804181464d5c0f4d78a4e769 || >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <5a20ebf0c81b61f5ea3b1b529c100cad69b9f603 || >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <252c5051dba9c709b6a72f2866f93e5e618b3f06 || >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <d376c131af7c7739a87ff037ed2fdb67c2542c8a || >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <d6a2d7b04b5a093021a7a0e2e69e9d5237dfa8cc || 13f35a2c0fd5c6a4fcd8903542b053bcc914fcf5 || >=5.8.6 <5.9 | d6bda9df0c0a3080804181464d5c0f4d78a4e769, 5a20ebf0c81b61f5ea3b1b529c100cad69b9f603, 252c5051dba9c709b6a72f2866f93e5e618b3f06, d376c131af7c7739a87ff037ed2fdb67c2542c8a, d6a2d7b04b5a093021a7a0e2e69e9d5237dfa8cc, 5.9 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.9 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jun 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 7, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io-wq: check that the predecessor is hashed in io_wq_remove_pending() io_wq_remove_pending() needs to fix up wq->hash_tail[] if the cancelled work was the tail of its hash bucket. When doing this, it checks whether the preceding entry in acct->work_list has the same hash value, but never checks that the predecessor is hashed at all. io_get_work_hash() is simply atomic_read(&work->flags) >> IO_WQ_HASH_SHIFT, and the hash bits are never set for non-hashed work, so it returns 0. Thus, when a hashed bucket-0 work is cancelled while a non-hashed work is its list predecessor, the check spuriously passes and a pointer to the non-hashed io_kiocb is stored in wq->hash_tail[0]. Because non-hashed work is dequeued via the fast path in io_get_next_work(), which never touches hash_tail[], the stale pointer is never cleared. Therefore, after the non-hashed io_kiocb completes and is freed back to req_cachep, wq->hash_tail[0] is a dangling pointer. The io_wq is per-task (tctx->io_wq) and survives ring open/close, so the dangling pointer persists for the lifetime of the task; the next hashed bucket-0 enqueue dereferences it in io_wq_insert_work() and wq_list_add_after() writes through freed memory. Add the missing io_wq_is_hashed() check so a non-hashed predecessor never inherits a hash_tail[] slot.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-46274 records a High severity (CVSS 7.8) vulnerability in io-wq: check that the predecessor is hashed in io_wq_remove_pending(). The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Linux/Linux (generic), Linux/Linux (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <d6bda9df0c0a3080804181464d5c0f4d78a4e769 || >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <5a20ebf0c81b61f5ea3b1b529c100cad69b9f603 || >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <252c5051dba9c709b6a72f2866f93e5e618b3f06 || >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <d376c131af7c7739a87ff037ed2fdb67c2542c8a || >=204361a77f4018627addd4a06877448f088ddfc0 <d6a2d7b04b5a093021a7a0e2e69e9d5237dfa8cc || 13f35a2c0fd5c6a4fcd8903542b053bcc914fcf5 || >=5.8.6 <5.9 | d6bda9df0c0a3080804181464d5c0f4d78a4e769, 5a20ebf0c81b61f5ea3b1b529c100cad69b9f603, 252c5051dba9c709b6a72f2866f93e5e618b3f06, d376c131af7c7739a87ff037ed2fdb67c2542c8a, d6a2d7b04b5a093021a7a0e2e69e9d5237dfa8cc, 5.9 |
| Linux/Linuxgeneric | 5.9 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Jun 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 5, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 7, 2026
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io-wq: check that the predecessor is hashed in io_wq_remove_pending() io_wq_remove_pending() needs to fix up wq->hash_tail[] if the cancelled work was the tail of its hash bucket. When doing this, it checks whether the preceding entry in acct->work_list has the same hash value, but never checks that the predecessor is hashed at all. io_get_work_hash() is simply atomic_read(&work->flags) >> IO_WQ_HASH_SHIFT, and the hash bits are never set for non-hashed work, so it returns 0. Thus, when a hashed bucket-0 work is cancelled while a non-hashed work is its list predecessor, the check spuriously passes and a pointer to the non-hashed io_kiocb is stored in wq->hash_tail[0]. Because non-hashed work is dequeued via the fast path in io_get_next_work(), which never touches hash_tail[], the stale pointer is never cleared. Therefore, after the non-hashed io_kiocb completes and is freed back to req_cachep, wq->hash_tail[0] is a dangling pointer. The io_wq is per-task (tctx->io_wq) and survives ring open/close, so the dangling pointer persists for the lifetime of the task; the next hashed bucket-0 enqueue dereferences it in io_wq_insert_work() and wq_list_add_after() writes through freed memory. Add the missing io_wq_is_hashed() check so a non-hashed predecessor never inherits a hash_tail[] slot.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.