Answer in brief
CVE-2026-46384 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in iskorotkov/avro: Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps iskorotkov/avro (generic), github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-46384 records a High severity (CVSS 7.5) vulnerability in iskorotkov/avro: Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps iskorotkov/avro (generic), github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps iskorotkov/avro (generic), github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| iskorotkov/avrogeneric | < 2.33.0 | Not reported |
| github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2go | <2.33.0 | 2.33.0 |
Published upstream
May 29, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 11, 2026
iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized int before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (GOARCH=386, arm, mips, wasm, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-make panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in arrayDecoder.Decode / mapDecoder.Decode / mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode (wraps at math.MaxInt64 on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses MaxSliceAllocSize / MaxMapAllocSize), math.MinInt negation in block-header handling, and make([]byte, size) with a negative size in OCF block reads — all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
CVSS is 7.5. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps iskorotkov/avro (generic), github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2 (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| iskorotkov/avrogeneric | < 2.33.0 | Not reported |
| github.com/iskorotkov/avro/v2go | <2.33.0 | 2.33.0 |
Published upstream
May 29, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 10, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 11, 2026
iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized int before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (GOARCH=386, arm, mips, wasm, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-make panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in arrayDecoder.Decode / mapDecoder.Decode / mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode (wraps at math.MaxInt64 on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses MaxSliceAllocSize / MaxMapAllocSize), math.MinInt negation in block-header handling, and make([]byte, size) with a negative size in OCF block reads — all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.