### Summary The URL checking logic in local-deep-research has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. ### Details The current project uses `validate_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks. <img width="1173" height="1107" alt="QQ20260430-212334-30-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/52b356aa-9ad3-4b1d-a472-39a2ada3ea23" /> However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in `safe_get`, `validate_url` is first used to perform an SSRF check, and then `requests.get` is used to send the actual request. <img width="1164" height="1089" alt="QQ20260430-212431-30-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f3decb16-4daa-49e0-861c-273a913487a0" /> The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to: - urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public) - requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal) Below is a test code I wrote following the code. ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Standalone demo: import project via absolute path and call safe_get.""" from __future__ import annotations import importlib.util import enum import sys import types from pathlib import Path # Hardcoded absolute path to the project's "src" directory. SRC_ROOT = Path( r"d:\BaiduNetdiskDownload\local-deep-research-main\local-deep-research-main\src" ) # Python 3.10 compatibility: # project constants import StrEnum (available in Python 3.11+). if not hasattr(enum, "StrEnum"): class _CompatStrEnum(str, enum.Enum): pass enum.StrEnum = _CompatStrEnum # type: ignore[attr-defined] def _load_safe_get(): """Load safe_get directly from file, bypassing package __init__ imports.""" ldr_pkg_name = "local_deep_research" security_pkg_name = "local_deep_research.security" # Build lightweight package modules so relative imports in safe_requests.py # resolve without executing package __init__.py files. if ldr_pkg_name not in sys.modules: ldr_pkg = types.ModuleType(ldr_pkg_name) ldr_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research")] # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules[ldr_pkg_name] = ldr_pkg if security_pkg_name not in sys.modules: security_pkg = types.ModuleType(security_pkg_name) security_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security")] # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules[security_pkg_name] = security_pkg module_name = "local_deep_research.security.safe_requests" module_path = SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security" / "safe_requests.py" spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, module_path) if spec is None or spec.loader is None: raise ImportError(f"Cannot load module from {module_path}") module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) sys.modules[module_name] = module spec.loader.exec_module(module) return module.safe_get safe_get = _load_safe_get() def main() -> None: # Hardcoded URL for demonstration. url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666" # url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1" safe_get(url, timeout=15) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` When an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666/`, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it. <img width="1694" height="503" alt="QQ20260430-212723-30-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/366f684d-9191-4acb-b6a2-b2c3c54f0223" /> However, when an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1`, the detection logic resolves the host to `1.1.1.1`, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to `http://127.0.0.1:6666`, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack. <img width="2424" height="477" alt="QQ20260430-212833-30-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd175e34-d833-44c5-981b-59cfad3406c3" /> ### PoC ``` http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 ``` ### Impact SSRF --- ## Maintainer note (2026-05-15) Thanks @Fushuling and @RacerZ-fighting for the detailed report. The remediation spans four PRs, all merged to `main` and shipped in **v1.6.10**: **#3873** (merged 2026-05-08) — the load-bearing fix for the parser-differential bypass: - New `RFC_FORBIDDEN_URL_CHARS_RE` in `security/ssrf_validator.py` rejects URLs containing backslash, ASCII control bytes, or whitespace — RFC 3986 forbids these and their presence signals a parser-differential attempt. - Host extraction switched from `urllib.parse.urlparse(url).hostname` to `urllib3.util.parse_url(url).host`. `urllib3` is the parser `requests` uses internally, so the validator and the HTTP client now agree on the destination by construction — closing the `\@` divergence that drove the PoC. - Same two-layer defence applied to `NotificationURLValidator.validate_service_url`. - 53 new tests across `test_ssrf_validator.py`, `test_notification_validator.py`, `test_safe_requests.py`, and `test_ssrf_redirect_bypass.py`, including the advisory PoC `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` and the post-prepare canonical form `http://127.0.0.1:6666/%[email protected]`. **#3882** (merged 2026-05-08) — hardens the metadata-IP block and redacts userinfo from log output so rejected URLs don't leak credentials to logs. **#3889** (merged 2026-05-09) — locks in real-world URL fixtures and behavior invariants from #3873/#3882 as regression tests. **#3932** (merged 2026-05-10) — blocks IPv6 transition prefixes (`2002::/16` 6to4, `64:ff9b::/96` NAT64, `2001::/32` Teredo, `100::/64` discard) so private IPv4 destinations cannot be reached via an IPv6-wrapped form. NAT64 has an operator opt-in (`LDR_SECURITY_ALLOW_NAT64=true`) for IPv6-only deployments, but cloud metadata IPs remain blocked regardless. ### Affected versions - **The specific parser-differential bypass** described above exists from **v1.3.0** (when `validate_url` was first introduced) through **v1.6.9**. The validator used `urlparse(url).hostname` for that entire span. - **Versions before v1.3.0** had no SSRF validator at all — requests went directly to `requests.get()` without any host check. Those versions are vulnerable to SSRF via this URL and any other internal address; the parser-differential trick is unnecessary. In both cases the remediation is the same: **upgrade to v1.6.10 or later.**
### Summary The URL checking logic in local-deep-research has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. ### Details The current project uses `validate_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks. <img width="1173" height="1107" alt="QQ20260430-212334-30-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/52b356aa-9ad3-4b1d-a472-39a2ada3ea23" /> However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in `safe_get`, `validate_url` is first used to perform an SSRF check, and then `requests.get` is used to send the actual request. <img width="1164" height="1089" alt="QQ20260430-212431-30-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f3decb16-4daa-49e0-861c-273a913487a0" /> The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to: - urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public) - requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal) Below is a test code I wrote following the code. ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Standalone demo: import project via absolute path and call safe_get.""" from __future__ import annotations import importlib.util import enum import sys import types from pathlib import Path # Hardcoded absolute path to the project's "src" directory. SRC_ROOT = Path( r"d:\BaiduNetdiskDownload\local-deep-research-main\local-deep-research-main\src" ) # Python 3.10 compatibility: # project constants import StrEnum (available in Python 3.11+). if not hasattr(enum, "StrEnum"): class _CompatStrEnum(str, enum.Enum): pass enum.StrEnum = _CompatStrEnum # type: ignore[attr-defined] def _load_safe_get(): """Load safe_get directly from file, bypassing package __init__ imports.""" ldr_pkg_name = "local_deep_research" security_pkg_name = "local_deep_research.security" # Build lightweight package modules so relative imports in safe_requests.py # resolve without executing package __init__.py files. if ldr_pkg_name not in sys.modules: ldr_pkg = types.ModuleType(ldr_pkg_name) ldr_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research")] # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules[ldr_pkg_name] = ldr_pkg if security_pkg_name not in sys.modules: security_pkg = types.ModuleType(security_pkg_name) security_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security")] # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules[security_pkg_name] = security_pkg module_name = "local_deep_research.security.safe_requests" module_path = SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security" / "safe_requests.py" spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, module_path) if spec is None or spec.loader is None: raise ImportError(f"Cannot load module from {module_path}") module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) sys.modules[module_name] = module spec.loader.exec_module(module) return module.safe_get safe_get = _load_safe_get() def main() -> None: # Hardcoded URL for demonstration. url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666" # url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1" safe_get(url, timeout=15) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` When an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666/`, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it. <img width="1694" height="503" alt="QQ20260430-212723-30-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/366f684d-9191-4acb-b6a2-b2c3c54f0223" /> However, when an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1`, the detection logic resolves the host to `1.1.1.1`, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to `http://127.0.0.1:6666`, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack. <img width="2424" height="477" alt="QQ20260430-212833-30-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd175e34-d833-44c5-981b-59cfad3406c3" /> ### PoC ``` http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 ``` ### Impact SSRF --- ## Maintainer note (2026-05-15) Thanks @Fushuling and @RacerZ-fighting for the detailed report. The remediation spans four PRs, all merged to `main` and shipped in **v1.6.10**: **#3873** (merged 2026-05-08) — the load-bearing fix for the parser-differential bypass: - New `RFC_FORBIDDEN_URL_CHARS_RE` in `security/ssrf_validator.py` rejects URLs containing backslash, ASCII control bytes, or whitespace — RFC 3986 forbids these and their presence signals a parser-differential attempt. - Host extraction switched from `urllib.parse.urlparse(url).hostname` to `urllib3.util.parse_url(url).host`. `urllib3` is the parser `requests` uses internally, so the validator and the HTTP client now agree on the destination by construction — closing the `\@` divergence that drove the PoC. - Same two-layer defence applied to `NotificationURLValidator.validate_service_url`. - 53 new tests across `test_ssrf_validator.py`, `test_notification_validator.py`, `test_safe_requests.py`, and `test_ssrf_redirect_bypass.py`, including the advisory PoC `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` and the post-prepare canonical form `http://127.0.0.1:6666/%[email protected]`. **#3882** (merged 2026-05-08) — hardens the metadata-IP block and redacts userinfo from log output so rejected URLs don't leak credentials to logs. **#3889** (merged 2026-05-09) — locks in real-world URL fixtures and behavior invariants from #3873/#3882 as regression tests. **#3932** (merged 2026-05-10) — blocks IPv6 transition prefixes (`2002::/16` 6to4, `64:ff9b::/96` NAT64, `2001::/32` Teredo, `100::/64` discard) so private IPv4 destinations cannot be reached via an IPv6-wrapped form. NAT64 has an operator opt-in (`LDR_SECURITY_ALLOW_NAT64=true`) for IPv6-only deployments, but cloud metadata IPs remain blocked regardless. ### Affected versions - **The specific parser-differential bypass** described above exists from **v1.3.0** (when `validate_url` was first introduced) through **v1.6.9**. The validator used `urlparse(url).hostname` for that entire span. - **Versions before v1.3.0** had no SSRF validator at all — requests went directly to `requests.get()` without any host check. Those versions are vulnerable to SSRF via this URL and any other internal address; the parser-differential trick is unnecessary. In both cases the remediation is the same: **upgrade to v1.6.10 or later.**
Update local-deep-research to 1.6.10 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanlocal-deep-research has an SSRF bypass in `safe_get` affects local-deep-research (pip). Severity is medium. ### Summary The URL checking logic in local-deep-research has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. ### Details The current project uses `validate_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks. <img width="1173" height="1107" alt="QQ20260430-212334-30-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/52b356aa-9ad3-4b1d-a472-39a2ada3ea23" /> However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in `safe_get`, `validate_url` is first used to perform an SSRF check, and then `requests.get` is used to send the actual request. <img width="1164" height="1089" alt="QQ20260430-212431-30-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f3decb16-4daa-49e0-861c-273a913487a0" /> The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to: - urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public) - requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal) Below is a test code I wrote following the code. ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Standalone demo: import project via absolute path and call safe_get.""" from __future__ import annotations import importlib.util import enum import sys import types from pathlib import Path # Hardcoded absolute path to the project's "src" directory. SRC_ROOT = Path( r"d:\BaiduNetdiskDownload\local-deep-research-main\local-deep-research-main\src" ) # Python 3.10 compatibility: # project constants import StrEnum (available in Python 3.11+). if not hasattr(enum, "StrEnum"): class _CompatStrEnum(str, enum.Enum): pass enum.StrEnum = _CompatStrEnum # type: ignore[attr-defined] def _load_safe_get(): """Load safe_get directly from file, bypassing package __init__ imports.""" ldr_pkg_name = "local_deep_research" security_pkg_name = "local_deep_research.security" # Build lightweight package modules so relative imports in safe_requests.py # resolve without executing package __init__.py files. if ldr_pkg_name not in sys.modules: ldr_pkg = types.ModuleType(ldr_pkg_name) ldr_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research")] # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules[ldr_pkg_name] = ldr_pkg if security_pkg_name not in sys.modules: security_pkg = types.ModuleType(security_pkg_name) security_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security")] # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules[security_pkg_name] = security_pkg module_name = "local_deep_research.security.safe_requests" module_path = SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security" / "safe_requests.py" spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, module_path) if spec is None or spec.loader is None: raise ImportError(f"Cannot load module from {module_path}") module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) sys.modules[module_name] = module spec.loader.exec_module(module) return module.safe_get safe_get = _load_safe_get() def main() -> None: # Hardcoded URL for demonstration. url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666" # url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1" safe_get(url, timeout=15) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` When an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666/`, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it. <img width="1694" height="503" alt="QQ20260430-212723-30-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/366f684d-9191-4acb-b6a2-b2c3c54f0223" /> However, when an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1`, the detection logic resolves the host to `1.1.1.1`, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to `http://127.0.0.1:6666`, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack. <img width="2424" height="477" alt="QQ20260430-212833-30-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd175e34-d833-44c5-981b-59cfad3406c3" /> ### PoC ``` http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 ``` ### Impact SSRF --- ## Maintainer note (2026-05-15) Thanks @Fushuling and @RacerZ-fighting for the detailed report. The remediation spans four PRs, all merged to `main` and shipped in **v1.6.10**: **#3873** (merged 2026-05-08) — the load-bearing fix for the parser-differential bypass: - New `RFC_FORBIDDEN_URL_CHARS_RE` in `security/ssrf_validator.py` rejects URLs containing backslash, ASCII control bytes, or whitespace — RFC 3986 forbids these and their presence signals a parser-differential attempt. - Host extraction switched from `urllib.parse.urlparse(url).hostname` to `urllib3.util.parse_url(url).host`. `urllib3` is the parser `requests` uses internally, so the validator and the HTTP client now agree on the destination by construction — closing the `\@` divergence that drove the PoC. - Same two-layer defence applied to `NotificationURLValidator.validate_service_url`. - 53 new tests across `test_ssrf_validator.py`, `test_notification_validator.py`, `test_safe_requests.py`, and `test_ssrf_redirect_bypass.py`, including the advisory PoC `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` and the post-prepare canonical form `http://127.0.0.1:6666/%[email protected]`. **#3882** (merged 2026-05-08) — hardens the metadata-IP block and redacts userinfo from log output so rejected URLs don't leak credentials to logs. **#3889** (merged 2026-05-09) — locks in real-world URL fixtures and behavior invariants from #3873/#3882 as regression tests. **#3932** (merged 2026-05-10) — blocks IPv6 transition prefixes (`2002::/16` 6to4, `64:ff9b::/96` NAT64, `2001::/32` Teredo, `100::/64` discard) so private IPv4 destinations cannot be reached via an IPv6-wrapped form. NAT64 has an operator opt-in (`LDR_SECURITY_ALLOW_NAT64=true`) for IPv6-only deployments, but cloud metadata IPs remain blocked regardless. ### Affected versions - **The specific parser-differential bypass** described above exists from **v1.3.0** (when `validate_url` was first introduced) through **v1.6.9**. The validator used `urlparse(url).hostname` for that entire span. - **Versions before v1.3.0** had no SSRF validator at all — requests went directly to `requests.get()` without any host check. Those versions are vulnerable to SSRF via this URL and any other internal address; the parser-differential trick is unnecessary. In both cases the remediation is the same: **upgrade to v1.6.10 or later.**
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| local-deep-researchpip | <1.6.10 | 1.6.10 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate local-deep-research to 1.6.10 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanlocal-deep-research has an SSRF bypass in `safe_get` affects local-deep-research (pip). Severity is medium. ### Summary The URL checking logic in local-deep-research has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks. ### Details The current project uses `validate_url` to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks. <img width="1173" height="1107" alt="QQ20260430-212334-30-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/52b356aa-9ad3-4b1d-a472-39a2ada3ea23" /> However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. For example, in `safe_get`, `validate_url` is first used to perform an SSRF check, and then `requests.get` is used to send the actual request. <img width="1164" height="1089" alt="QQ20260430-212431-30-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f3decb16-4daa-49e0-861c-273a913487a0" /> The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` points to: - urlparse() treats \ as a regular character and @ as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as `1.1.1.1` (public) - requests treats \ as a path character, connecting to `127.0.0.1` (internal) Below is a test code I wrote following the code. ``` #!/usr/bin/env python3 """Standalone demo: import project via absolute path and call safe_get.""" from __future__ import annotations import importlib.util import enum import sys import types from pathlib import Path # Hardcoded absolute path to the project's "src" directory. SRC_ROOT = Path( r"d:\BaiduNetdiskDownload\local-deep-research-main\local-deep-research-main\src" ) # Python 3.10 compatibility: # project constants import StrEnum (available in Python 3.11+). if not hasattr(enum, "StrEnum"): class _CompatStrEnum(str, enum.Enum): pass enum.StrEnum = _CompatStrEnum # type: ignore[attr-defined] def _load_safe_get(): """Load safe_get directly from file, bypassing package __init__ imports.""" ldr_pkg_name = "local_deep_research" security_pkg_name = "local_deep_research.security" # Build lightweight package modules so relative imports in safe_requests.py # resolve without executing package __init__.py files. if ldr_pkg_name not in sys.modules: ldr_pkg = types.ModuleType(ldr_pkg_name) ldr_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research")] # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules[ldr_pkg_name] = ldr_pkg if security_pkg_name not in sys.modules: security_pkg = types.ModuleType(security_pkg_name) security_pkg.__path__ = [str(SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security")] # type: ignore[attr-defined] sys.modules[security_pkg_name] = security_pkg module_name = "local_deep_research.security.safe_requests" module_path = SRC_ROOT / "local_deep_research" / "security" / "safe_requests.py" spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, module_path) if spec is None or spec.loader is None: raise ImportError(f"Cannot load module from {module_path}") module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) sys.modules[module_name] = module spec.loader.exec_module(module) return module.safe_get safe_get = _load_safe_get() def main() -> None: # Hardcoded URL for demonstration. url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666" # url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1" safe_get(url, timeout=15) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` When an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666/`, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it. <img width="1694" height="503" alt="QQ20260430-212723-30-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/366f684d-9191-4acb-b6a2-b2c3c54f0223" /> However, when an attacker uses `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1`, the detection logic resolves the host to `1.1.1.1`, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to `http://127.0.0.1:6666`, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack. <img width="2424" height="477" alt="QQ20260430-212833-30-4" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/bd175e34-d833-44c5-981b-59cfad3406c3" /> ### PoC ``` http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 ``` ### Impact SSRF --- ## Maintainer note (2026-05-15) Thanks @Fushuling and @RacerZ-fighting for the detailed report. The remediation spans four PRs, all merged to `main` and shipped in **v1.6.10**: **#3873** (merged 2026-05-08) — the load-bearing fix for the parser-differential bypass: - New `RFC_FORBIDDEN_URL_CHARS_RE` in `security/ssrf_validator.py` rejects URLs containing backslash, ASCII control bytes, or whitespace — RFC 3986 forbids these and their presence signals a parser-differential attempt. - Host extraction switched from `urllib.parse.urlparse(url).hostname` to `urllib3.util.parse_url(url).host`. `urllib3` is the parser `requests` uses internally, so the validator and the HTTP client now agree on the destination by construction — closing the `\@` divergence that drove the PoC. - Same two-layer defence applied to `NotificationURLValidator.validate_service_url`. - 53 new tests across `test_ssrf_validator.py`, `test_notification_validator.py`, `test_safe_requests.py`, and `test_ssrf_redirect_bypass.py`, including the advisory PoC `http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1` and the post-prepare canonical form `http://127.0.0.1:6666/%[email protected]`. **#3882** (merged 2026-05-08) — hardens the metadata-IP block and redacts userinfo from log output so rejected URLs don't leak credentials to logs. **#3889** (merged 2026-05-09) — locks in real-world URL fixtures and behavior invariants from #3873/#3882 as regression tests. **#3932** (merged 2026-05-10) — blocks IPv6 transition prefixes (`2002::/16` 6to4, `64:ff9b::/96` NAT64, `2001::/32` Teredo, `100::/64` discard) so private IPv4 destinations cannot be reached via an IPv6-wrapped form. NAT64 has an operator opt-in (`LDR_SECURITY_ALLOW_NAT64=true`) for IPv6-only deployments, but cloud metadata IPs remain blocked regardless. ### Affected versions - **The specific parser-differential bypass** described above exists from **v1.3.0** (when `validate_url` was first introduced) through **v1.6.9**. The validator used `urlparse(url).hostname` for that entire span. - **Versions before v1.3.0** had no SSRF validator at all — requests went directly to `requests.get()` without any host check. Those versions are vulnerable to SSRF via this URL and any other internal address; the parser-differential trick is unnecessary. In both cases the remediation is the same: **upgrade to v1.6.10 or later.**
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| local-deep-researchpip | <1.6.10 | 1.6.10 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
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