Answer in brief
CVE-2026-47065 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.8) vulnerability in Apache MINA: Critical Deserialization Allow-list Bypass via resolveProxyClass. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps org.apache.mina:mina-core (maven), org.apache.mina:mina-core (maven), org.apache.mina:mina-core (maven), org.apache.mina:mina-core (maven) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.8. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps org.apache.mina:mina-core (maven), org.apache.mina:mina-core (maven), org.apache.mina:mina-core (maven), org.apache.mina:mina-core (maven) and additional mapped packages. Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| org.apache.mina:mina-coremaven | >=2.2.0,<2.2.8 | 2.2.8 |
| org.apache.mina:mina-coremaven | >=2.1.0,<2.1.13 | 2.1.13 |
| org.apache.mina:mina-coremaven | <2.0.29 | 2.0.29 |
| org.apache.mina:mina-coremaven | >=2.2.0 <2.2.8 | 2.2.8 |
| org.apache.mina:mina-coremaven | >=2.1.0 <2.1.13 | 2.1.13 |
| org.apache.mina:mina-coremaven | >=0 <2.0.29 | 2.0.29 |
Published upstream
Jun 3, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 10, 2026
Evidence: source:osv:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 30, 2026
ZDRES-232: resolveProxyClass Not Overridden - acceptMatchers Filter Bypass via java.lang.reflect.Proxy Assessment: Fully addressed. When the serialised stream contains a TC_PROXYCLASSDESC (the marker for a java.lang.reflect.Proxy ), JDK’s ObjectInputStream.readProxyDesc() is dispatched. JDK then calls the default ObjectInputStream.resolveProxyClass(interfaces) implementation, which performs Class.forName(intf, false, latestUserDefinedLoader()) for EACH interface name and constructs the proxy class — bypassing the accepted classes list . ZDRES-233: Class.forName(name, initialize=true, classLoader) in readClassDescriptor Triggers Static Initialiser of Allow-Listed Classes Assessment: Fully addressed. For ANY class on the allow-list, deserialising a stream that names it triggers the class’s (static initialiser) BEFORE any instance is constructed. This means an attacker who supplies a class name on the allow-list (e.g., the developer wrote accept(“com.myapp.*") , attacker supplies com.myapp.SomeClass ) causes <clinit> of SomeClass — and many real-world classes have side-effecting static initialisers Both issues have been fixed.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.