## Summary The `PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables` endpoint, which writes the system-wide `.env.global` file used for variable substitution in every project's compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like `REGISTRY`, `IMAGE`, `DATABASE_URL`, or `SECRET_KEY` that other users reference via `${VAR}` in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. ## Details The endpoint is registered at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:374`: ```go huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "updateGlobalVariables", Method: "PUT", Path: "/environments/{id}/templates/variables", ... Security: []map[string][]string{ {"BearerAuth": {}}, {"ApiKeyAuth": {}}, }, }, h.UpdateGlobalVariables) ``` The handler at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:889` performs no role check: ```go func (h *TemplateHandler) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, input *UpdateGlobalVariablesInput) (*UpdateGlobalVariablesOutput, error) { if h.templateService == nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("service not available") } if input.EnvironmentID != "0" { return h.updateGlobalVariablesForRemoteEnvironmentInternal(ctx, input) } if err := h.templateService.UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx, input.Body.Variables); err != nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError((&common.GlobalVariablesUpdateError{Err: err}).Error()) } ... } ``` This is anomalous compared to every other admin-sensitive handler in the codebase, all of which begin with `if err := checkAdmin(ctx); err != nil { return nil, err }` (see `users.go`, `events.go`, `swarm.go`, `settings.go`, `apikeys.go`, `environments.go`, `notifications.go`, `container_registries.go`, `git_repositories.go`, `system.go`). The helper exists at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/helpers.go:12` but is never invoked from `templates.go`. The auth middleware at `backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:192-254` only validates that *some* authenticated user is present (Bearer JWT, API key, or environment access token); it does not enforce roles. Role enforcement is the responsibility of each handler. That this endpoint is intended to be admin-only is evidenced by the UI customization search at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/customize.go:82-91` and `:106-114`, which explicitly hides the `variables` and `registries` categories from non-admin users: ```go if !humamw.IsAdminFromContext(ctx) { filtered := []category.Category{} for _, cat := range results.Results { if cat.ID != "registries" && cat.ID != "variables" { filtered = append(filtered, cat) } } results.Results = filtered ... } ``` The corresponding `container_registries.go` handlers all enforce admin via `checkAdmin()` (e.g. `container_registries.go:273,329,360,387,442`); the equivalent enforcement for the global-variables write was forgotten. The service layer at `backend/internal/services/template_service.go:1107` writes attacker-supplied keys/values to `<projectsDirectory>/.env.global`: ```go func (s *TemplateService) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, vars []env.Variable) error { envPath, err := s.getGlobalVariablesPath(ctx) ... for _, v := range vars { if strings.TrimSpace(v.Key) == "" { continue } key := strings.TrimSpace(v.Key) value := strings.TrimSpace(v.Value) if strings.ContainsAny(value, " \t\n\r#") { value = fmt.Sprintf(`"%s"`, strings.ReplaceAll(value, `"`, `\"`)) } _, _ = fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "%s=%s\n", key, value) } if err := projects.WriteFileWithPerm(envPath, builder.String(), common.FilePerm); err != nil { ... } } ``` That file is then loaded for every project at deploy time via `backend/pkg/projects/env.go:65-82` (`EnvLoader.LoadEnvironment` → `loadAndMergeGlobalEnv`): ```go if strings.TrimSpace(l.projectsDir) != "" { globalEnvPath := filepath.Join(l.projectsDir, GlobalEnvFileName) if err := l.loadAndMergeGlobalEnv(ctx, globalEnvPath, envMap, injectionVars); err != nil ... } ``` `loadAndMergeGlobalEnv` (`env.go:94-125`) populates both `envMap` (used by compose-go for `${VAR}` substitution in compose files) and `injectionVars` (auto-injected into containers). The result: a single non-admin write to the global variables endpoint changes the resolved compose state of every project on the host. Additionally, the key field is only `strings.TrimSpace`'d (`template_service.go:1128`); embedded newlines inside the key are not removed, so a key like `"FOO\nINJECTED"` will write two lines into `.env.global`, allowing arbitrary key injection and overwrite of variables an attacker did not include in their request body. ## Impact - **Cross-project supply-chain RCE on the Docker host.** Compose files commonly reference `${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE}:${TAG}`. By pointing `REGISTRY` (or `IMAGE`) at an attacker-controlled registry, the next deploy of any affected project pulls and runs attacker code with whatever privileges Arcane gives that container (commonly Docker socket access, host volume mounts, etc.). - **Credential theft from other users' projects.** Variables like `DATABASE_URL`, `SMTP_HOST`, `WEBHOOK_URL`, `S3_ENDPOINT` can be redirected to attacker-controlled servers; the next deploy will hand the new connection strings to applications that then submit credentials/data to the attacker. - **Cross-tenant integrity and availability.** A single non-admin user can corrupt `.env.global` to break every project on the instance. - **Bypass of intended privilege boundary.** The UI explicitly hides the variables and registries surfaces from non-admins, indicating these are admin-only controls; this finding closes the gap between the documented privilege model and the API enforcement. The privilege delta is significant: the project clearly distinguishes admin from non-admin users (separate roles, admin-only UI categories, `checkAdmin()` enforced on dozens of other endpoints), yet this endpoint grants a non-admin the ability to execute attacker-controlled images on the host on behalf of every other tenant.
## Summary The `PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables` endpoint, which writes the system-wide `.env.global` file used for variable substitution in every project's compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like `REGISTRY`, `IMAGE`, `DATABASE_URL`, or `SECRET_KEY` that other users reference via `${VAR}` in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. ## Details The endpoint is registered at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:374`: ```go huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "updateGlobalVariables", Method: "PUT", Path: "/environments/{id}/templates/variables", ... Security: []map[string][]string{ {"BearerAuth": {}}, {"ApiKeyAuth": {}}, }, }, h.UpdateGlobalVariables) ``` The handler at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:889` performs no role check: ```go func (h *TemplateHandler) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, input *UpdateGlobalVariablesInput) (*UpdateGlobalVariablesOutput, error) { if h.templateService == nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("service not available") } if input.EnvironmentID != "0" { return h.updateGlobalVariablesForRemoteEnvironmentInternal(ctx, input) } if err := h.templateService.UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx, input.Body.Variables); err != nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError((&common.GlobalVariablesUpdateError{Err: err}).Error()) } ... } ``` This is anomalous compared to every other admin-sensitive handler in the codebase, all of which begin with `if err := checkAdmin(ctx); err != nil { return nil, err }` (see `users.go`, `events.go`, `swarm.go`, `settings.go`, `apikeys.go`, `environments.go`, `notifications.go`, `container_registries.go`, `git_repositories.go`, `system.go`). The helper exists at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/helpers.go:12` but is never invoked from `templates.go`. The auth middleware at `backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:192-254` only validates that *some* authenticated user is present (Bearer JWT, API key, or environment access token); it does not enforce roles. Role enforcement is the responsibility of each handler. That this endpoint is intended to be admin-only is evidenced by the UI customization search at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/customize.go:82-91` and `:106-114`, which explicitly hides the `variables` and `registries` categories from non-admin users: ```go if !humamw.IsAdminFromContext(ctx) { filtered := []category.Category{} for _, cat := range results.Results { if cat.ID != "registries" && cat.ID != "variables" { filtered = append(filtered, cat) } } results.Results = filtered ... } ``` The corresponding `container_registries.go` handlers all enforce admin via `checkAdmin()` (e.g. `container_registries.go:273,329,360,387,442`); the equivalent enforcement for the global-variables write was forgotten. The service layer at `backend/internal/services/template_service.go:1107` writes attacker-supplied keys/values to `<projectsDirectory>/.env.global`: ```go func (s *TemplateService) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, vars []env.Variable) error { envPath, err := s.getGlobalVariablesPath(ctx) ... for _, v := range vars { if strings.TrimSpace(v.Key) == "" { continue } key := strings.TrimSpace(v.Key) value := strings.TrimSpace(v.Value) if strings.ContainsAny(value, " \t\n\r#") { value = fmt.Sprintf(`"%s"`, strings.ReplaceAll(value, `"`, `\"`)) } _, _ = fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "%s=%s\n", key, value) } if err := projects.WriteFileWithPerm(envPath, builder.String(), common.FilePerm); err != nil { ... } } ``` That file is then loaded for every project at deploy time via `backend/pkg/projects/env.go:65-82` (`EnvLoader.LoadEnvironment` → `loadAndMergeGlobalEnv`): ```go if strings.TrimSpace(l.projectsDir) != "" { globalEnvPath := filepath.Join(l.projectsDir, GlobalEnvFileName) if err := l.loadAndMergeGlobalEnv(ctx, globalEnvPath, envMap, injectionVars); err != nil ... } ``` `loadAndMergeGlobalEnv` (`env.go:94-125`) populates both `envMap` (used by compose-go for `${VAR}` substitution in compose files) and `injectionVars` (auto-injected into containers). The result: a single non-admin write to the global variables endpoint changes the resolved compose state of every project on the host. Additionally, the key field is only `strings.TrimSpace`'d (`template_service.go:1128`); embedded newlines inside the key are not removed, so a key like `"FOO\nINJECTED"` will write two lines into `.env.global`, allowing arbitrary key injection and overwrite of variables an attacker did not include in their request body. ## Impact - **Cross-project supply-chain RCE on the Docker host.** Compose files commonly reference `${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE}:${TAG}`. By pointing `REGISTRY` (or `IMAGE`) at an attacker-controlled registry, the next deploy of any affected project pulls and runs attacker code with whatever privileges Arcane gives that container (commonly Docker socket access, host volume mounts, etc.). - **Credential theft from other users' projects.** Variables like `DATABASE_URL`, `SMTP_HOST`, `WEBHOOK_URL`, `S3_ENDPOINT` can be redirected to attacker-controlled servers; the next deploy will hand the new connection strings to applications that then submit credentials/data to the attacker. - **Cross-tenant integrity and availability.** A single non-admin user can corrupt `.env.global` to break every project on the instance. - **Bypass of intended privilege boundary.** The UI explicitly hides the variables and registries surfaces from non-admins, indicating these are admin-only controls; this finding closes the gap between the documented privilege model and the API enforcement. The privilege delta is significant: the project clearly distinguishes admin from non-admin users (separate roles, admin-only UI categories, `checkAdmin()` enforced on dozens of other endpoints), yet this endpoint grants a non-admin the ability to execute attacker-controlled images on the host on behalf of every other tenant.
Update github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend to 1.19.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanArcane: Missing admin authorization on global variables endpoint affects github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend (go). Severity is high. ## Summary The `PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables` endpoint, which writes the system-wide `.env.global` file used for variable substitution in every project's compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like `REGISTRY`, `IMAGE`, `DATABASE_URL`, or `SECRET_KEY` that other users reference via `${VAR}` in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. ## Details The endpoint is registered at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:374`: ```go huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "updateGlobalVariables", Method: "PUT", Path: "/environments/{id}/templates/variables", ... Security: []map[string][]string{ {"BearerAuth": {}}, {"ApiKeyAuth": {}}, }, }, h.UpdateGlobalVariables) ``` The handler at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:889` performs no role check: ```go func (h *TemplateHandler) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, input *UpdateGlobalVariablesInput) (*UpdateGlobalVariablesOutput, error) { if h.templateService == nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("service not available") } if input.EnvironmentID != "0" { return h.updateGlobalVariablesForRemoteEnvironmentInternal(ctx, input) } if err := h.templateService.UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx, input.Body.Variables); err != nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError((&common.GlobalVariablesUpdateError{Err: err}).Error()) } ... } ``` This is anomalous compared to every other admin-sensitive handler in the codebase, all of which begin with `if err := checkAdmin(ctx); err != nil { return nil, err }` (see `users.go`, `events.go`, `swarm.go`, `settings.go`, `apikeys.go`, `environments.go`, `notifications.go`, `container_registries.go`, `git_repositories.go`, `system.go`). The helper exists at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/helpers.go:12` but is never invoked from `templates.go`. The auth middleware at `backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:192-254` only validates that *some* authenticated user is present (Bearer JWT, API key, or environment access token); it does not enforce roles. Role enforcement is the responsibility of each handler. That this endpoint is intended to be admin-only is evidenced by the UI customization search at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/customize.go:82-91` and `:106-114`, which explicitly hides the `variables` and `registries` categories from non-admin users: ```go if !humamw.IsAdminFromContext(ctx) { filtered := []category.Category{} for _, cat := range results.Results { if cat.ID != "registries" && cat.ID != "variables" { filtered = append(filtered, cat) } } results.Results = filtered ... } ``` The corresponding `container_registries.go` handlers all enforce admin via `checkAdmin()` (e.g. `container_registries.go:273,329,360,387,442`); the equivalent enforcement for the global-variables write was forgotten. The service layer at `backend/internal/services/template_service.go:1107` writes attacker-supplied keys/values to `<projectsDirectory>/.env.global`: ```go func (s *TemplateService) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, vars []env.Variable) error { envPath, err := s.getGlobalVariablesPath(ctx) ... for _, v := range vars { if strings.TrimSpace(v.Key) == "" { continue } key := strings.TrimSpace(v.Key) value := strings.TrimSpace(v.Value) if strings.ContainsAny(value, " \t\n\r#") { value = fmt.Sprintf(`"%s"`, strings.ReplaceAll(value, `"`, `\"`)) } _, _ = fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "%s=%s\n", key, value) } if err := projects.WriteFileWithPerm(envPath, builder.String(), common.FilePerm); err != nil { ... } } ``` That file is then loaded for every project at deploy time via `backend/pkg/projects/env.go:65-82` (`EnvLoader.LoadEnvironment` → `loadAndMergeGlobalEnv`): ```go if strings.TrimSpace(l.projectsDir) != "" { globalEnvPath := filepath.Join(l.projectsDir, GlobalEnvFileName) if err := l.loadAndMergeGlobalEnv(ctx, globalEnvPath, envMap, injectionVars); err != nil ... } ``` `loadAndMergeGlobalEnv` (`env.go:94-125`) populates both `envMap` (used by compose-go for `${VAR}` substitution in compose files) and `injectionVars` (auto-injected into containers). The result: a single non-admin write to the global variables endpoint changes the resolved compose state of every project on the host. Additionally, the key field is only `strings.TrimSpace`'d (`template_service.go:1128`); embedded newlines inside the key are not removed, so a key like `"FOO\nINJECTED"` will write two lines into `.env.global`, allowing arbitrary key injection and overwrite of variables an attacker did not include in their request body. ## Impact - **Cross-project supply-chain RCE on the Docker host.** Compose files commonly reference `${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE}:${TAG}`. By pointing `REGISTRY` (or `IMAGE`) at an attacker-controlled registry, the next deploy of any affected project pulls and runs attacker code with whatever privileges Arcane gives that container (commonly Docker socket access, host volume mounts, etc.). - **Credential theft from other users' projects.** Variables like `DATABASE_URL`, `SMTP_HOST`, `WEBHOOK_URL`, `S3_ENDPOINT` can be redirected to attacker-controlled servers; the next deploy will hand the new connection strings to applications that then submit credentials/data to the attacker. - **Cross-tenant integrity and availability.** A single non-admin user can corrupt `.env.global` to break every project on the instance. - **Bypass of intended privilege boundary.** The UI explicitly hides the variables and registries surfaces from non-admins, indicating these are admin-only controls; this finding closes the gap between the documented privilege model and the API enforcement. The privilege delta is significant: the project clearly distinguishes admin from non-admin users (separate roles, admin-only UI categories, `checkAdmin()` enforced on dozens of other endpoints), yet this endpoint grants a non-admin the ability to execute attacker-controlled images on the host on behalf of every other tenant.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backendgo | <=1.19.1 | 1.19.2 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend to 1.19.2 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanArcane: Missing admin authorization on global variables endpoint affects github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backend (go). Severity is high. ## Summary The `PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables` endpoint, which writes the system-wide `.env.global` file used for variable substitution in every project's compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like `REGISTRY`, `IMAGE`, `DATABASE_URL`, or `SECRET_KEY` that other users reference via `${VAR}` in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. ## Details The endpoint is registered at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:374`: ```go huma.Register(api, huma.Operation{ OperationID: "updateGlobalVariables", Method: "PUT", Path: "/environments/{id}/templates/variables", ... Security: []map[string][]string{ {"BearerAuth": {}}, {"ApiKeyAuth": {}}, }, }, h.UpdateGlobalVariables) ``` The handler at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/templates.go:889` performs no role check: ```go func (h *TemplateHandler) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, input *UpdateGlobalVariablesInput) (*UpdateGlobalVariablesOutput, error) { if h.templateService == nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError("service not available") } if input.EnvironmentID != "0" { return h.updateGlobalVariablesForRemoteEnvironmentInternal(ctx, input) } if err := h.templateService.UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx, input.Body.Variables); err != nil { return nil, huma.Error500InternalServerError((&common.GlobalVariablesUpdateError{Err: err}).Error()) } ... } ``` This is anomalous compared to every other admin-sensitive handler in the codebase, all of which begin with `if err := checkAdmin(ctx); err != nil { return nil, err }` (see `users.go`, `events.go`, `swarm.go`, `settings.go`, `apikeys.go`, `environments.go`, `notifications.go`, `container_registries.go`, `git_repositories.go`, `system.go`). The helper exists at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/helpers.go:12` but is never invoked from `templates.go`. The auth middleware at `backend/internal/huma/middleware/auth.go:192-254` only validates that *some* authenticated user is present (Bearer JWT, API key, or environment access token); it does not enforce roles. Role enforcement is the responsibility of each handler. That this endpoint is intended to be admin-only is evidenced by the UI customization search at `backend/internal/huma/handlers/customize.go:82-91` and `:106-114`, which explicitly hides the `variables` and `registries` categories from non-admin users: ```go if !humamw.IsAdminFromContext(ctx) { filtered := []category.Category{} for _, cat := range results.Results { if cat.ID != "registries" && cat.ID != "variables" { filtered = append(filtered, cat) } } results.Results = filtered ... } ``` The corresponding `container_registries.go` handlers all enforce admin via `checkAdmin()` (e.g. `container_registries.go:273,329,360,387,442`); the equivalent enforcement for the global-variables write was forgotten. The service layer at `backend/internal/services/template_service.go:1107` writes attacker-supplied keys/values to `<projectsDirectory>/.env.global`: ```go func (s *TemplateService) UpdateGlobalVariables(ctx context.Context, vars []env.Variable) error { envPath, err := s.getGlobalVariablesPath(ctx) ... for _, v := range vars { if strings.TrimSpace(v.Key) == "" { continue } key := strings.TrimSpace(v.Key) value := strings.TrimSpace(v.Value) if strings.ContainsAny(value, " \t\n\r#") { value = fmt.Sprintf(`"%s"`, strings.ReplaceAll(value, `"`, `\"`)) } _, _ = fmt.Fprintf(&builder, "%s=%s\n", key, value) } if err := projects.WriteFileWithPerm(envPath, builder.String(), common.FilePerm); err != nil { ... } } ``` That file is then loaded for every project at deploy time via `backend/pkg/projects/env.go:65-82` (`EnvLoader.LoadEnvironment` → `loadAndMergeGlobalEnv`): ```go if strings.TrimSpace(l.projectsDir) != "" { globalEnvPath := filepath.Join(l.projectsDir, GlobalEnvFileName) if err := l.loadAndMergeGlobalEnv(ctx, globalEnvPath, envMap, injectionVars); err != nil ... } ``` `loadAndMergeGlobalEnv` (`env.go:94-125`) populates both `envMap` (used by compose-go for `${VAR}` substitution in compose files) and `injectionVars` (auto-injected into containers). The result: a single non-admin write to the global variables endpoint changes the resolved compose state of every project on the host. Additionally, the key field is only `strings.TrimSpace`'d (`template_service.go:1128`); embedded newlines inside the key are not removed, so a key like `"FOO\nINJECTED"` will write two lines into `.env.global`, allowing arbitrary key injection and overwrite of variables an attacker did not include in their request body. ## Impact - **Cross-project supply-chain RCE on the Docker host.** Compose files commonly reference `${REGISTRY}/${IMAGE}:${TAG}`. By pointing `REGISTRY` (or `IMAGE`) at an attacker-controlled registry, the next deploy of any affected project pulls and runs attacker code with whatever privileges Arcane gives that container (commonly Docker socket access, host volume mounts, etc.). - **Credential theft from other users' projects.** Variables like `DATABASE_URL`, `SMTP_HOST`, `WEBHOOK_URL`, `S3_ENDPOINT` can be redirected to attacker-controlled servers; the next deploy will hand the new connection strings to applications that then submit credentials/data to the attacker. - **Cross-tenant integrity and availability.** A single non-admin user can corrupt `.env.global` to break every project on the instance. - **Bypass of intended privilege boundary.** The UI explicitly hides the variables and registries surfaces from non-admins, indicating these are admin-only controls; this finding closes the gap between the documented privilege model and the API enforcement. The privilege delta is significant: the project clearly distinguishes admin from non-admin users (separate roles, admin-only UI categories, `checkAdmin()` enforced on dozens of other endpoints), yet this endpoint grants a non-admin the ability to execute attacker-controlled images on the host on behalf of every other tenant.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/getarcaneapp/arcane/backendgo | <=1.19.1 | 1.19.2 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard