### Summary A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace's integration through the `testConnection` endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller's permission check matched any base in any workspace. ### Details The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in `RootScopes.BYPASS` scope and checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped to the integration's workspace by joining on `fk_workspace_id`, and the controller rejects requests where the integration's workspace differs from the request's workspace. ### Impact Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint, including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace's credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace was sufficient. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@DongyangLyu](https://github.com/DongyangLyu).
Update nocodb to 2026.05.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNocoDB: Cross-Workspace Integration Use in Connection Test affects nocodb (npm). Severity is medium. ### Summary A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace's integration through the `testConnection` endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller's permission check matched any base in any workspace. ### Details The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in `RootScopes.BYPASS` scope and checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped to the integration's workspace by joining on `fk_workspace_id`, and the controller rejects requests where the integration's workspace differs from the request's workspace. ### Impact Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint, including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace's credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace was sufficient. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@DongyangLyu](https://github.com/DongyangLyu).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
### Summary A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace's integration through the `testConnection` endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller's permission check matched any base in any workspace. ### Details The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in `RootScopes.BYPASS` scope and checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped to the integration's workspace by joining on `fk_workspace_id`, and the controller rejects requests where the integration's workspace differs from the request's workspace. ### Impact Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint, including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace's credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace was sufficient. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@DongyangLyu](https://github.com/DongyangLyu).
Update nocodb to 2026.05.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNocoDB: Cross-Workspace Integration Use in Connection Test affects nocodb (npm). Severity is medium. ### Summary A user in one workspace could exercise another workspace's integration through the `testConnection` endpoint by supplying its ID, because the integration was fetched in a bypass scope and the caller's permission check matched any base in any workspace. ### Details The connection-test endpoint fetched the integration in `RootScopes.BYPASS` scope and checked only that the integration was non-private and that the caller held an owner/creator role on any base in any workspace. The permission lookup is now scoped to the integration's workspace by joining on `fk_workspace_id`, and the controller rejects requests where the integration's workspace differs from the request's workspace. ### Impact Cross-tenant access to integration configuration through the connection-test endpoint, including the ability to drive the resolved database with the other workspace's credentials. Authentication with creator-or-owner role on any base in any workspace was sufficient. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@DongyangLyu](https://github.com/DongyangLyu).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|
| nocodbnpm | <=2026.05.0 | 2026.05.1 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|
| nocodbnpm | <=2026.05.0 | 2026.05.1 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard