### Summary A low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP `readAttachment` tool did not verify the file's ownership. ### Details The MCP `readAttachment` tool accepts caller-supplied `path`/`url` values and streams the file via the storage adapter. The handler now looks up the path in `nc_file_references` and requires a non-deleted row whose `base_id` matches the caller's MCP context before streaming; otherwise it returns `Attachment is not accessible from this MCP context`. The lookup tolerates both `download/uploads/...` and `uploads/...` styles. ### Impact Arbitrary read against shared storage scoped to attachments the caller's MCP context should not see. Exploitation requires an MCP token and a known attachment path. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).
Update nocodb to 2026.05.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNocoDB: Missing Ownership Check in MCP Attachment Read affects nocodb (npm). Severity is low. ### Summary A low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP `readAttachment` tool did not verify the file's ownership. ### Details The MCP `readAttachment` tool accepts caller-supplied `path`/`url` values and streams the file via the storage adapter. The handler now looks up the path in `nc_file_references` and requires a non-deleted row whose `base_id` matches the caller's MCP context before streaming; otherwise it returns `Attachment is not accessible from this MCP context`. The lookup tolerates both `download/uploads/...` and `uploads/...` styles. ### Impact Arbitrary read against shared storage scoped to attachments the caller's MCP context should not see. Exploitation requires an MCP token and a known attachment path. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A low vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package |
|---|
### Summary A low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP `readAttachment` tool did not verify the file's ownership. ### Details The MCP `readAttachment` tool accepts caller-supplied `path`/`url` values and streams the file via the storage adapter. The handler now looks up the path in `nc_file_references` and requires a non-deleted row whose `base_id` matches the caller's MCP context before streaming; otherwise it returns `Attachment is not accessible from this MCP context`. The lookup tolerates both `download/uploads/...` and `uploads/...` styles. ### Impact Arbitrary read against shared storage scoped to attachments the caller's MCP context should not see. Exploitation requires an MCP token and a known attachment path. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).
Update nocodb to 2026.05.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanNocoDB: Missing Ownership Check in MCP Attachment Read affects nocodb (npm). Severity is low. ### Summary A low-privilege MCP token holder with knowledge of an attachment path could read any file in shared storage, including attachments belonging to other bases and workspaces, because the MCP `readAttachment` tool did not verify the file's ownership. ### Details The MCP `readAttachment` tool accepts caller-supplied `path`/`url` values and streams the file via the storage adapter. The handler now looks up the path in `nc_file_references` and requires a non-deleted row whose `base_id` matches the caller's MCP context before streaming; otherwise it returns `Attachment is not accessible from this MCP context`. The lookup tolerates both `download/uploads/...` and `uploads/...` styles. ### Impact Arbitrary read against shared storage scoped to attachments the caller's MCP context should not see. Exploitation requires an MCP token and a known attachment path. ### Credit This issue was reported by [@helwor-01](https://github.com/helwor-01).
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A low vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package |
|---|
| Affected range |
|---|
| Fixed version |
|---|
| nocodbnpm | <=2026.05.0 | 2026.05.1 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard| Affected range |
|---|
| Fixed version |
|---|
| nocodbnpm | <=2026.05.0 | 2026.05.1 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard