## Summary **Description** A Protection Mechanism Failure (CWE-693) in OpenAM's server-side scripting sandbox allows an authenticated script author execute operating-system commands from the OpenAM JVM with the default class allow and deny lists. This impacts OpenAM Community Edition through version 16.0.6. This issue was patched in version 16.1.1. ## Impact An authenticated user (for example, a realm admin) who can create or edit server-side scripts for an executed context can run OS commands as the OpenAM application server admin. For a sub-realm `RealmAdmin`, this crosses the documented boundary from realm-scoped administration to JVM/host execution, effectively compromising the whole OpenAM process and every realm it serves. The sandbox is the only code-level defense between a realm script author and arbitrary JVM/OS execution. ## Patch This has been patched in OpenAM Community Edition version 16.1.1. Users are encouraged to update to the latest release.
Update org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-scripting to 16.1.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOpenAM Authenticated RCE via Groovy Sandbox Escape affects org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-scripting (maven). Severity is high. ## Summary **Description** A Protection Mechanism Failure (CWE-693) in OpenAM's server-side scripting sandbox allows an authenticated script author execute operating-system commands from the OpenAM JVM with the default class allow and deny lists. This impacts OpenAM Community Edition through version 16.0.6. This issue was patched in version 16.1.1. ## Impact An authenticated user (for example, a realm admin) who can create or edit server-side scripts for an executed context can run OS commands as the OpenAM application server admin. For a sub-realm `RealmAdmin`, this crosses the documented boundary from realm-scoped administration to JVM/host execution, effectively compromising the whole OpenAM process and every realm it serves. The sandbox is the only code-level defense between a realm script author and arbitrary JVM/OS execution. ## Patch This has been patched in OpenAM Community Edition version 16.1.1. Users are encouraged to update to the latest release.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in maven. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
## Summary **Description** A Protection Mechanism Failure (CWE-693) in OpenAM's server-side scripting sandbox allows an authenticated script author execute operating-system commands from the OpenAM JVM with the default class allow and deny lists. This impacts OpenAM Community Edition through version 16.0.6. This issue was patched in version 16.1.1. ## Impact An authenticated user (for example, a realm admin) who can create or edit server-side scripts for an executed context can run OS commands as the OpenAM application server admin. For a sub-realm `RealmAdmin`, this crosses the documented boundary from realm-scoped administration to JVM/host execution, effectively compromising the whole OpenAM process and every realm it serves. The sandbox is the only code-level defense between a realm script author and arbitrary JVM/OS execution. ## Patch This has been patched in OpenAM Community Edition version 16.1.1. Users are encouraged to update to the latest release.
Update org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-scripting to 16.1.1 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanOpenAM Authenticated RCE via Groovy Sandbox Escape affects org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-scripting (maven). Severity is high. ## Summary **Description** A Protection Mechanism Failure (CWE-693) in OpenAM's server-side scripting sandbox allows an authenticated script author execute operating-system commands from the OpenAM JVM with the default class allow and deny lists. This impacts OpenAM Community Edition through version 16.0.6. This issue was patched in version 16.1.1. ## Impact An authenticated user (for example, a realm admin) who can create or edit server-side scripts for an executed context can run OS commands as the OpenAM application server admin. For a sub-realm `RealmAdmin`, this crosses the documented boundary from realm-scoped administration to JVM/host execution, effectively compromising the whole OpenAM process and every realm it serves. The sandbox is the only code-level defense between a realm script author and arbitrary JVM/OS execution. ## Patch This has been patched in OpenAM Community Edition version 16.1.1. Users are encouraged to update to the latest release.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in maven. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|
| org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-scriptingmaven | <=16.0.6 | 16.1.1 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|
| org.openidentityplatform.openam:openam-scriptingmaven | <=16.0.6 | 16.1.1 |
|---|
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard