### Summary `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled `amount` POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes `$paymentSuccess = true`, and then calls `YPTWallet::addBalance()` without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the `AuthorizeNet` and `YPTWallet` plugins are enabled. ### Details Affected file: `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` Relevant code: ```php $amount = isset($_POST['amount']) ? floatval($_POST['amount']) : 0; $userData = isset($_POST['userData']) ? $_POST['userData'] : []; if ($amount <= 0) { echo json_encode(['error' => 'Invalid amount']); exit; } // TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API // Example: Call Authorize.Net API here // $result = $plugin->chargePayment($amount, $userData); // Simulate payment success for now $paymentSuccess = true; $users_id = @User::getId(); if ($paymentSuccess && !empty($users_id)) { $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("YPTWallet"); if ($walletPlugin) { $walletPlugin->addBalance($users_id, $amount, 'Authorize.Net one-time payment'); echo json_encode(['success' => true, 'result' => 'Payment processed and wallet updated']); exit; } } ``` Vulnerable flow: 1. `$_POST['amount']` is read from the client. 2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero. 3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed. 4. `$paymentSuccess` is hardcoded to true. 5. The logged-in user's wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount. There is no verification of: - Authorize.Net transaction ID - payment token - webhook signature - pending payment record - expected server-side amount - currency - duplicate transaction/replay state ### PoC Prerequisites: - AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled - YPTWallet plugin enabled - Attacker has any valid user account Steps: 1. Log in as a low-privileged user. 2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance. 3. Send the following request with the user's authenticated session cookie: ``` curl -i -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_session>' \ -X POST 'https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php' \ --data 'amount=9999&userData[note]=poc' ``` 4. The endpoint returns: ``` {"success":true,"result":"Payment processed and wallet updated"} ``` 5. Refresh the wallet page. 6. The wallet balance is increased by 9999. No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required. ### Impact A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance. Depending on the target site's configuration, this may allow the attacker to: - purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment - abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet - transfer fake funds to other users - manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows - bypass monetization controls ### Recommended fix - Remove or disable `processPayment.json.php` if it is obsolete. - Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied `amount` alone. - Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow. - Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling `addBalance()`. - Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.
### Summary `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled `amount` POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes `$paymentSuccess = true`, and then calls `YPTWallet::addBalance()` without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the `AuthorizeNet` and `YPTWallet` plugins are enabled. ### Details Affected file: `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` Relevant code: ```php $amount = isset($_POST['amount']) ? floatval($_POST['amount']) : 0; $userData = isset($_POST['userData']) ? $_POST['userData'] : []; if ($amount <= 0) { echo json_encode(['error' => 'Invalid amount']); exit; } // TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API // Example: Call Authorize.Net API here // $result = $plugin->chargePayment($amount, $userData); // Simulate payment success for now $paymentSuccess = true; $users_id = @User::getId(); if ($paymentSuccess && !empty($users_id)) { $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("YPTWallet"); if ($walletPlugin) { $walletPlugin->addBalance($users_id, $amount, 'Authorize.Net one-time payment'); echo json_encode(['success' => true, 'result' => 'Payment processed and wallet updated']); exit; } } ``` Vulnerable flow: 1. `$_POST['amount']` is read from the client. 2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero. 3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed. 4. `$paymentSuccess` is hardcoded to true. 5. The logged-in user's wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount. There is no verification of: - Authorize.Net transaction ID - payment token - webhook signature - pending payment record - expected server-side amount - currency - duplicate transaction/replay state ### PoC Prerequisites: - AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled - YPTWallet plugin enabled - Attacker has any valid user account Steps: 1. Log in as a low-privileged user. 2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance. 3. Send the following request with the user's authenticated session cookie: ``` curl -i -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_session>' \ -X POST 'https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php' \ --data 'amount=9999&userData[note]=poc' ``` 4. The endpoint returns: ``` {"success":true,"result":"Payment processed and wallet updated"} ``` 5. Refresh the wallet page. 6. The wallet balance is increased by 9999. No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required. ### Impact A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance. Depending on the target site's configuration, this may allow the attacker to: - purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment - abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet - transfer fake funds to other users - manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows - bypass monetization controls ### Recommended fix - Remove or disable `processPayment.json.php` if it is obsolete. - Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied `amount` alone. - Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow. - Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling `addBalance()`. - Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.
Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanWWBN AVideo: Authenticated wallet credit bypass in AuthorizeNet processPayment endpoint affects WWBN/AVideo (composer). Severity is high. ### Summary `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled `amount` POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes `$paymentSuccess = true`, and then calls `YPTWallet::addBalance()` without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the `AuthorizeNet` and `YPTWallet` plugins are enabled. ### Details Affected file: `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` Relevant code: ```php $amount = isset($_POST['amount']) ? floatval($_POST['amount']) : 0; $userData = isset($_POST['userData']) ? $_POST['userData'] : []; if ($amount <= 0) { echo json_encode(['error' => 'Invalid amount']); exit; } // TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API // Example: Call Authorize.Net API here // $result = $plugin->chargePayment($amount, $userData); // Simulate payment success for now $paymentSuccess = true; $users_id = @User::getId(); if ($paymentSuccess && !empty($users_id)) { $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("YPTWallet"); if ($walletPlugin) { $walletPlugin->addBalance($users_id, $amount, 'Authorize.Net one-time payment'); echo json_encode(['success' => true, 'result' => 'Payment processed and wallet updated']); exit; } } ``` Vulnerable flow: 1. `$_POST['amount']` is read from the client. 2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero. 3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed. 4. `$paymentSuccess` is hardcoded to true. 5. The logged-in user's wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount. There is no verification of: - Authorize.Net transaction ID - payment token - webhook signature - pending payment record - expected server-side amount - currency - duplicate transaction/replay state ### PoC Prerequisites: - AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled - YPTWallet plugin enabled - Attacker has any valid user account Steps: 1. Log in as a low-privileged user. 2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance. 3. Send the following request with the user's authenticated session cookie: ``` curl -i -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_session>' \ -X POST 'https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php' \ --data 'amount=9999&userData[note]=poc' ``` 4. The endpoint returns: ``` {"success":true,"result":"Payment processed and wallet updated"} ``` 5. Refresh the wallet page. 6. The wallet balance is increased by 9999. No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required. ### Impact A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance. Depending on the target site's configuration, this may allow the attacker to: - purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment - abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet - transfer fake funds to other users - manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows - bypass monetization controls ### Recommended fix - Remove or disable `processPayment.json.php` if it is obsolete. - Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied `amount` alone. - Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow. - Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling `addBalance()`. - Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| WWBN/AVideocomposer | <=29.0 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardMonitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanWWBN AVideo: Authenticated wallet credit bypass in AuthorizeNet processPayment endpoint affects WWBN/AVideo (composer). Severity is high. ### Summary `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` credits the logged-in user's wallet based only on the attacker-controlled `amount` POST parameter. The endpoint contains a TODO for real Authorize.Net charging, hardcodes `$paymentSuccess = true`, and then calls `YPTWallet::addBalance()` without validating any Authorize.Net transaction, webhook signature, hosted payment token, nonce, or server-side payment record. This allows any logged-in user to add arbitrary funds to their own AVideo wallet when the `AuthorizeNet` and `YPTWallet` plugins are enabled. ### Details Affected file: `plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php` Relevant code: ```php $amount = isset($_POST['amount']) ? floatval($_POST['amount']) : 0; $userData = isset($_POST['userData']) ? $_POST['userData'] : []; if ($amount <= 0) { echo json_encode(['error' => 'Invalid amount']); exit; } // TODO: Implement payment logic using Authorize.Net API // Example: Call Authorize.Net API here // $result = $plugin->chargePayment($amount, $userData); // Simulate payment success for now $paymentSuccess = true; $users_id = @User::getId(); if ($paymentSuccess && !empty($users_id)) { $walletPlugin = AVideoPlugin::loadPluginIfEnabled("YPTWallet"); if ($walletPlugin) { $walletPlugin->addBalance($users_id, $amount, 'Authorize.Net one-time payment'); echo json_encode(['success' => true, 'result' => 'Payment processed and wallet updated']); exit; } } ``` Vulnerable flow: 1. `$_POST['amount']` is read from the client. 2. The endpoint only checks that the amount is greater than zero. 3. The real Authorize.Net charge is not performed. 4. `$paymentSuccess` is hardcoded to true. 5. The logged-in user's wallet is credited with the client-supplied amount. There is no verification of: - Authorize.Net transaction ID - payment token - webhook signature - pending payment record - expected server-side amount - currency - duplicate transaction/replay state ### PoC Prerequisites: - AVideo with AuthorizeNet plugin enabled - YPTWallet plugin enabled - Attacker has any valid user account Steps: 1. Log in as a low-privileged user. 2. Open the wallet page and record the current balance. 3. Send the following request with the user's authenticated session cookie: ``` curl -i -s -b 'PHPSESSID=<user_session>' \ -X POST 'https://target.example/plugin/AuthorizeNet/processPayment.json.php' \ --data 'amount=9999&userData[note]=poc' ``` 4. The endpoint returns: ``` {"success":true,"result":"Payment processed and wallet updated"} ``` 5. Refresh the wallet page. 6. The wallet balance is increased by 9999. No Authorize.Net hosted payment page, card payment, transaction confirmation, webhook, or server-side payment validation is required. ### Impact A normal authenticated user can mint arbitrary wallet balance. Depending on the target site's configuration, this may allow the attacker to: - purchase paid videos or subscriptions without payment - abuse any feature backed by YPTWallet - transfer fake funds to other users - manipulate accounting or payout-related workflows - bypass monetization controls ### Recommended fix - Remove or disable `processPayment.json.php` if it is obsolete. - Never credit wallet balance from client-supplied `amount` alone. - Use the existing Authorize.Net hosted token / webhook / transaction reconciliation flow. - Require a verified Authorize.Net transaction ID and server-side amount lookup before calling `addBalance()`. - Add regression tests proving arbitrary POSTs cannot credit a wallet.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| WWBN/AVideocomposer | <=29.0 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard