Recommended action

Update twig/twig to 3.26.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

hol-guard supply-chain scan

What this means

Twig: XSS in profiler HtmlDumper via unescaped template and profile names affects twig/twig (composer). Severity is medium. ### Description `Twig\Profiler\Dumper\HtmlDumper` writes `Profile::getTemplate()` and `Profile::getName()` straight into its HTML output without escaping: ```php protected function formatTemplate(Profile $profile, $prefix): string { return \sprintf('%s└ <span style="background-color: %s">%s</span>', $prefix, self::$colors['template'], $profile->getTemplate()); } ``` The template name comes from the loader (the array key for `ArrayLoader`, a row id for a database-backed loader, etc.). When that name is attacker-controlled, the profiler dump emits arbitrary HTML, and any browser that renders it executes the injected markup. This is an output-encoding bug in profiler/debug tooling, not a sandbox escape. ### Resolution `HtmlDumper` now runs both `Profile::getTemplate()` and `Profile::getName()` through `htmlspecialchars()` before inserting them into the HTML output. ### Credits Twig would like to thank El Kharoubi Iosif for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for fixing it.

AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.

Affected software

Recommended action

Update twig/twig to 3.26.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.

hol-guard supply-chain scan

What this means

Twig: XSS in profiler HtmlDumper via unescaped template and profile names affects twig/twig (composer). Severity is medium. ### Description `Twig\Profiler\Dumper\HtmlDumper` writes `Profile::getTemplate()` and `Profile::getName()` straight into its HTML output without escaping: ```php protected function formatTemplate(Profile $profile, $prefix): string { return \sprintf('%s└ <span style="background-color: %s">%s</span>', $prefix, self::$colors['template'], $profile->getTemplate()); } ``` The template name comes from the loader (the array key for `ArrayLoader`, a row id for a database-backed loader, etc.). When that name is attacker-controlled, the profiler dump emits arbitrary HTML, and any browser that renders it executes the injected markup. This is an output-encoding bug in profiler/debug tooling, not a sandbox escape. ### Resolution `HtmlDumper` now runs both `Profile::getTemplate()` and `Profile::getName()` through `htmlspecialchars()` before inserting them into the HTML output. ### Credits Twig would like to thank El Kharoubi Iosif for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for fixing it.

AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.

Affected software