### Summary Arc's user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. ### Impact Any authenticated user, including a token with `permissions: []`, can read arbitrary local files via: ``` POST /api/v1/query Authorization: Bearer <token> {"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"} ``` Confirmed reachable targets: - `auth.db` — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows. - `arc.toml` — S3 secrets, TLS keys. - `/proc/self/environ` — environment-variable secrets. - Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths. - SSRF when `httpfs` is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — `read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...')` reaches instance metadata IPs. ### Patches Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer: 1. `SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...]` enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp). 2. `SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false` (one-way at runtime). 3. Verified by reading back the flag. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. ### Workarounds - Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules. - Temporary mitigation: add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go` pending 2026.06.1. ### Credits Reported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.
### Summary Arc's user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. ### Impact Any authenticated user, including a token with `permissions: []`, can read arbitrary local files via: ``` POST /api/v1/query Authorization: Bearer <token> {"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"} ``` Confirmed reachable targets: - `auth.db` — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows. - `arc.toml` — S3 secrets, TLS keys. - `/proc/self/environ` — environment-variable secrets. - Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths. - SSRF when `httpfs` is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — `read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...')` reaches instance metadata IPs. ### Patches Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer: 1. `SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...]` enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp). 2. `SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false` (one-way at runtime). 3. Verified by reading back the flag. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. ### Workarounds - Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules. - Temporary mitigation: add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go` pending 2026.06.1. ### Credits Reported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.
Update github.com/basekick-labs/arc to 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanArc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks affects github.com/basekick-labs/arc (go). Severity is high. ### Summary Arc's user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. ### Impact Any authenticated user, including a token with `permissions: []`, can read arbitrary local files via: ``` POST /api/v1/query Authorization: Bearer <token> {"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"} ``` Confirmed reachable targets: - `auth.db` — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows. - `arc.toml` — S3 secrets, TLS keys. - `/proc/self/environ` — environment-variable secrets. - Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths. - SSRF when `httpfs` is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — `read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...')` reaches instance metadata IPs. ### Patches Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer: 1. `SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...]` enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp). 2. `SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false` (one-way at runtime). 3. Verified by reading back the flag. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. ### Workarounds - Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules. - Temporary mitigation: add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go` pending 2026.06.1. ### Credits Reported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/basekick-labs/arcgo | <0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 | 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/basekick-labs/arc to 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanArc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks affects github.com/basekick-labs/arc (go). Severity is high. ### Summary Arc's user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. ### Impact Any authenticated user, including a token with `permissions: []`, can read arbitrary local files via: ``` POST /api/v1/query Authorization: Bearer <token> {"sql": "SELECT * FROM read_csv_auto('/etc/passwd', header=false, columns={'l':'VARCHAR'}) LIMIT 5"} ``` Confirmed reachable targets: - `auth.db` — bcrypt hashes for every API token, plus legacy SHA-256 rows. - `arc.toml` — S3 secrets, TLS keys. - `/proc/self/environ` — environment-variable secrets. - Cross-tenant Parquet files — bypasses RBAC because the tenant scope is enforced at the table layer, not on raw file paths. - SSRF when `httpfs` is loaded (any S3-backed deployment) — `read_csv_auto('http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/...')` reaches instance metadata IPs. ### Patches Fixed in 2026.06.1 (PR #442) via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer: 1. `SET GLOBAL allowed_directories = [...]` enumerates Arc's legitimate filesystem prefixes (storage roots + tier prefixes + import upload dir + compaction temp). 2. `SET GLOBAL enable_external_access = false` (one-way at runtime). 3. Verified by reading back the flag. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. ### Workarounds - Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules. - Temporary mitigation: add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go` pending 2026.06.1. ### Credits Reported by Alex Manson ([@NeuroWinter](https://github.com/NeuroWinter), https://neurowinter.com/) on 2026-05-19.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/basekick-labs/arcgo | <0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 | 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard