Answer in brief
CVE-2026-47735 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in Arc has an authenticated arbitrary local-file read via DuckDB I/O functions that bypasses RBAC table-level checks. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps Basekick-Labs/arc (generic), github.com/basekick-labs/arc (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps Basekick-Labs/arc (generic), github.com/basekick-labs/arc (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| Basekick-Labs/arcgeneric | < 2026.06.1 | Not reported |
| github.com/basekick-labs/arcgo | <0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 | 0.0.0-20260520141557-91bdc29d1a02 |
Published upstream
Aug 21, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 11, 2026
Arc is an open, SQL-native time-series database for telemetry. Prior to version 26.06.1, Arc's user-SQL validator (`internal/api/query.go:ValidateSQLRequest`) blocked only `read_parquet(` and `arc_partition_agg(` via regex denylist. The broader DuckDB I/O function family — `read_csv_auto`, `read_csv`, `read_json`, `read_json_auto`, `read_text`, `read_blob`, `glob`, `parquet_metadata`, `parquet_schema`, `read_xlsx`, etc. — was not blocked. RBAC table-reference extraction inspected only `FROM`/`JOIN` clauses, so scalar table functions in the `SELECT` list slipped past both layers. This is fixed in 2026.06.1 via a structural sandbox at the DuckDB layer. After lockdown, DuckDB refuses to open any file outside the allowlist and refuses further `INSTALL`/`LOAD`. Already-loaded extensions remain callable. Some workarounds are available. Restrict API access to known-trusted networks via firewall rules or, as a temporary mitigation, add `read_csv*`/`read_json*`/`glob` etc. to `dangerousSQLPattern` in `internal/api/query.go`.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.