Answer in brief
CVE-2026-48035 records a High severity (CVSS 7.1) vulnerability in @hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps @hulumi/baseline (npm), @hulumi/baseline (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps @hulumi/baseline (npm), @hulumi/baseline (npm). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @hulumi/baselinenpm | >=0 <1.4.0 | 1.4.0 |
| @hulumi/baselinenpm | <1.4.0 | 1.4.0 |
Published upstream
Jun 10, 2026
Evidence: source:nvd:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 24, 2026
Evidence: source:nvd:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 11, 2026
**Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)** #### Summary The S3 bucket that `AccountFoundation` creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened: 1. **No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket.** The startup-hardened tier hard-coded `objectLock: false` on the audit bucket. (The reason was real — bucket-wide Object Lock blocks an AWS Config write-then-delete probe — but the fix was a sledgehammer that disabled WORM for all objects, not just the probe key.) 2. **`forceDestroy` was forwarded to the audit bucket.** Nothing prevented a downstream stack from setting `logBucketForceDestroy: true`, which made `pulumi destroy` purge every audit-log object on teardown. 3. **Sandbox tier dropped everything.** Sandbox-tier `AccountFoundation` created its audit bucket with `tier: "sandbox"`, which skipped Object Lock, server access logging, AND the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` (the independent immutable mirror) — leaving sandbox accounts with no audit immutability at all. #### Impact Consumers using `AccountFoundation` could ship an AWS account whose CloudTrail / Config audit logs were deletable by any S3-delete-capable principal — while believing the startup-hardened tier guaranteed tamper-resistance. Sandbox-tier deployments had no audit immutability at all (defects 1 and 3 compounded). #### Patches Upgrade to `@hulumi/[email protected]`. A single invariant in `SecureBucket` now fires whenever the bucket actually backs CloudTrail/Config delivery (i.e. `awsServiceLogDelivery.cloudTrail === true || .config === true`): - refuses `forceDestroy: true` on the startup-hardened tier; - emits the CloudTrail-Lake `EventDataStore` regardless of parent tier (so sandbox accounts regain immutable audit capture); - adds a deny-`s3:DeleteObject*` bucket-policy statement scoped to the CloudTrail and Config history/snapshot prefixes (a retention floor on the audit objects). The deny excludes the AWS Config `ConfigWritabilityCheckFile` probe key so Config's write-then-delete still works, which is why bucket-wide Object Lock is intentionally NOT re-enabled. #### Workarounds Replicating audit logs out-of-account to an Object-Locked archive bucket partially mitigates while you upgrade. #### Resources - [PR #178](https://github.com/kerberosmansour/hulumi/pull/178) (Cluster C); see CHANGELOG `### Migration` for the `forceDestroy` behaviour change.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.