### Impact `AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival. Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). ### Patches Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `>= 0.149.12`. ### Workarounds There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules. ### Resources - [PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751), fix - [RFC 6762 §18.5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6762#section-18.5), [CWE-400](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html)
### Impact `AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival. Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). ### Patches Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `>= 0.149.12`. ### Workarounds There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules. ### Resources - [PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751), fix - [RFC 6762 §18.5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6762#section-18.5), [CWE-400](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html)
Update zeroconf to 0.149.12 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanpython-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood affects zeroconf (pip). Severity is medium. ### Impact `AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival. Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). ### Patches Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `>= 0.149.12`. ### Workarounds There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules. ### Resources - [PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751), fix - [RFC 6762 §18.5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6762#section-18.5), [CWE-400](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html)
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| zeroconfpip | <0.149.12 | 0.149.12 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate zeroconf to 0.149.12 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanpython-zeroconf: Unbounded TC-deferred queue allows LAN-local memory exhaustion via spoofed-source flood affects zeroconf (pip). Severity is medium. ### Impact `AsyncListener.handle_query_or_defer` retained every truncated (TC-bit) incoming query in `self._deferred[addr]` and armed a per-addr timer in `self._timers[addr]` that flushed the reassembled query within ~500 ms (RFC 6762 §18.5). Neither the per-addr list nor the number of distinct `addr` keys was capped, and the dedup check (`for incoming in reversed(deferred): if incoming.data == msg.data`) ran O(N) over the per-addr list on every arrival. Any unauthenticated host on the local link (UDP/5353, `224.0.0.251` / `ff02::fb`) can stream byte-distinct TC-flagged mDNS queries — each up to `_MAX_MSG_ABSOLUTE = 8966` bytes, with `DNSIncoming` retaining the raw `data` buffer plus parsed-record state. Trivially spoofed source IPs multiply the effect across `_deferred` / `_timers`, and the O(N) data compare burns CPU quadratically as each per-addr queue grows. On memory-constrained deployments (Home Assistant on Raspberry-Pi-class hardware is the canonical victim) sustained traffic OOM-kills the process; under lighter load, the per-arrival scan and event-loop scheduler starvation break unrelated zeroconf consumers (discovery, registration, ServiceBrowser callbacks). ### Patches Fixed in `zeroconf` 0.149.12 ([PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751)). Upgrade to `>= 0.149.12`. ### Workarounds There is no in-process workaround; upgrading is the fix. Otherwise, restrict mDNS (UDP/5353) to trusted Layer-2 segments via AP client isolation, guest-network separation, or host firewall rules. ### Resources - [PR #1751](https://github.com/python-zeroconf/python-zeroconf/pull/1751), fix - [RFC 6762 §18.5](https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6762#section-18.5), [CWE-400](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/400.html)
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in pip. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| zeroconfpip | <0.149.12 | 0.149.12 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard