Answer in brief
CVE-2026-48079 records a High severity (CVSS 7.4) vulnerability in OpenReception's logout page clears local access_token before server-side revocation, leaving duplicated tokens valid until expiry. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps open-reception/appointment-booking-software (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps open-reception/appointment-booking-software (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| open-reception/appointment-booking-softwaregeneric | < 1.0.2 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 6, 2026
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-48079 records a High severity (CVSS 7.4) vulnerability in OpenReception's logout page clears local access_token before server-side revocation, leaving duplicated tokens valid until expiry. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps open-reception/appointment-booking-software (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 7.4. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps open-reception/appointment-booking-software (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| open-reception/appointment-booking-softwaregeneric | < 1.0.2 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 6, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 6, 2026
OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, when a user navigates to the `/logout` page, the page's server-side load handler deletes the `access_token` cookie before calling `/api/auth/logout` via an internal `event.fetch()`. The internal fetch consequently runs without the auth cookie, so `apiAuthHandle` rejects it, the logout handler never executes, and `SessionService.revokeSession()` is never called for the current session. The DB session row remains valid until its natural expiry (one week by default). The user sees a successful logout (cookie gone, UI returns to login), but any party still holding a copy of the now-deleted access token can continue making authenticated API calls until the session naturally expires. The root cause is a simple ordering mistake. The same auth subsystem implements the correct order in `/api/auth/logout`: revoke the current DB session first, then delete the cookie. The page-level wrapper does the opposite. Version 1.0.2 initiates server-side logout before removing authentication cookies and first appears in version 1.0.2. Version 2.0.0 later replaces this with a race-free client-side logout flow.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.