Answer in brief
CVE-2026-48169 records a High severity vulnerability in PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps MervinPraison/praisonai-platform (generic), praisonai-platform (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps MervinPraison/praisonai-platform (generic), praisonai-platform (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| MervinPraison/praisonai-platformgeneric | < 0.1.4 | Not reported |
| praisonai-platformpip | <=0.1.2 | 0.1.4 |
Published upstream
Aug 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 7, 2026
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API have two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any workspace just by swapping UUIDs in their API requests. On top of that, every member management endpoint (add, update role, remove) only requires `min_role="member"`, which lets any workspace member promote themselves to owner and kick out the original owner. A low-privilege member of one workspace can steal data from every other workspace and take over any workspace they belong to. Both issues come from the same gap: the route layer pulls `workspace_id` from the URL and verifies membership, but the service layer ignores the workspace scope for resource lookups and ignores the caller's role level for member operations. The `require_workspace_member()` dependency does its job correctly. The problem is that the service layer doesn't use the information it provides. Version 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API patch the issue.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.
Answer in brief
CVE-2026-48169 records a High severity vulnerability in PraisonAI has Cross-Workspace IDOR and Privilege Escalation via Platform API. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps MervinPraison/praisonai-platform (generic), praisonai-platform (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
A CVSS score is not reported in the current record. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps MervinPraison/praisonai-platform (generic), praisonai-platform (pip). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| MervinPraison/praisonai-platformgeneric | < 0.1.4 | Not reported |
| praisonai-platformpip | <=0.1.2 | 0.1.4 |
Published upstream
Aug 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 7, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 7, 2026
PraisonAI is a multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API have two authorization failures that together break workspace isolation. The service layer for issues and projects performs global primary-key lookups without checking workspace ownership, so any authenticated user can read, modify, and delete resources in any workspace just by swapping UUIDs in their API requests. On top of that, every member management endpoint (add, update role, remove) only requires `min_role="member"`, which lets any workspace member promote themselves to owner and kick out the original owner. A low-privilege member of one workspace can steal data from every other workspace and take over any workspace they belong to. Both issues come from the same gap: the route layer pulls `workspace_id` from the URL and verifies membership, but the service layer ignores the workspace scope for resource lookups and ignores the caller's role level for member operations. The `require_workspace_member()` dependency does its job correctly. The problem is that the service layer doesn't use the information it provides. Version 0.1.4 of the PraisonAI Platform API patch the issue.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.