## Summary MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rather than normal typed MessagePack deserialization. Three related issues are covered by this advisory: 1. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson` recursively processes nested JSON arrays and objects in `FromJsonCore()` without consulting `MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth`. 2. `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` recursively consumes comma and colon separator characters, allowing even malformed JSON with long separator runs to consume one stack frame per character. 3. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` applies depth checks to arrays and maps, but the typeless extension branch for ext-100 recursively calls `ToJsonCore()` without applying `MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader)`. Each path can allow attacker-controlled input to exhaust the process stack and trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException` instead of failing with a catchable parse or serialization exception. ## Impact Applications are affected when they call MessagePack-CSharp JSON conversion APIs on attacker-controlled data. This includes gateways, diagnostics endpoints, migration tools, logging paths, and services that convert between external JSON and MessagePack payloads. For JSON-to-MessagePack conversion, deeply nested JSON arrays or objects can recurse through `FromJsonCore()` without applying the configured object graph depth limit. Separately, long runs of comma or colon separator characters can recurse through `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` before normal structural validation rejects the input. For MessagePack-to-JSON conversion, nested typeless extension wrappers can recurse through `ToJsonCore()` without the depth guard that the same function applies to arrays and maps. `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` does not fully mitigate these conversion paths because the missing checks occur inside JSON conversion and tokenization branches that do not consistently use the configured depth policy. ## Affected components - Package: `MessagePack` - APIs: `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson`, `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` - Internal routines: `FromJsonCore`, `ToJsonCore`, `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` - Data shapes: deeply nested JSON arrays/objects, long JSON separator runs, and nested typeless MessagePack extension values converted to JSON - Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092` ## Patches Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions. Upgrade guidance: 1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line. 2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions. The JSON-to-MessagePack fix should add explicit JSON nesting-depth accounting to `FromJsonCore`, using the configured maximum object graph depth or an equivalent limit, or rewrite the conversion to use an iterative bounded stack. The tokenizer fix should replace separator self-recursion in `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` with an iterative loop so consecutive commas, colons, and whitespace do not consume stack frames. The MessagePack-to-JSON fix should apply `DepthStep` and matching `reader.Depth--` cleanup around recursive `ToJsonCore()` calls made from the typeless extension branch, consistent with the existing array and map conversion branches. ## Workarounds Patching is recommended. Until a patched version is available, do not pass untrusted JSON directly to `ConvertFromJson`, and do not call `ConvertToJson` on untrusted MessagePack payloads that may contain typeless extension values. Validate JSON nesting depth with a parser that enforces depth limits before calling MessagePack-CSharp, reject malformed JSON before conversion, and apply strict input-size limits. Input-size limits reduce exposure but do not remove the recursive behavior in affected versions. ## References - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`: `ConvertFromJson` unbounded structural recursion - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`: `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` separator self-recursion - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092`: `ConvertToJson` ext-100 branch missing depth enforcement - CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion ## CVE split rationale These issues are grouped because they affect the same JSON conversion feature area and share the same failure mode: recursive conversion/tokenization paths do not consistently enforce depth or iteration bounds for attacker-controlled input. They are distinct from normal binary MessagePack skip recursion, dynamic union formatter depth accounting, DateTime stack allocation, and allocation-oriented denial-of-service issues.
## Summary MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rather than normal typed MessagePack deserialization. Three related issues are covered by this advisory: 1. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson` recursively processes nested JSON arrays and objects in `FromJsonCore()` without consulting `MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth`. 2. `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` recursively consumes comma and colon separator characters, allowing even malformed JSON with long separator runs to consume one stack frame per character. 3. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` applies depth checks to arrays and maps, but the typeless extension branch for ext-100 recursively calls `ToJsonCore()` without applying `MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader)`. Each path can allow attacker-controlled input to exhaust the process stack and trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException` instead of failing with a catchable parse or serialization exception. ## Impact Applications are affected when they call MessagePack-CSharp JSON conversion APIs on attacker-controlled data. This includes gateways, diagnostics endpoints, migration tools, logging paths, and services that convert between external JSON and MessagePack payloads. For JSON-to-MessagePack conversion, deeply nested JSON arrays or objects can recurse through `FromJsonCore()` without applying the configured object graph depth limit. Separately, long runs of comma or colon separator characters can recurse through `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` before normal structural validation rejects the input. For MessagePack-to-JSON conversion, nested typeless extension wrappers can recurse through `ToJsonCore()` without the depth guard that the same function applies to arrays and maps. `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` does not fully mitigate these conversion paths because the missing checks occur inside JSON conversion and tokenization branches that do not consistently use the configured depth policy. ## Affected components - Package: `MessagePack` - APIs: `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson`, `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` - Internal routines: `FromJsonCore`, `ToJsonCore`, `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` - Data shapes: deeply nested JSON arrays/objects, long JSON separator runs, and nested typeless MessagePack extension values converted to JSON - Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092` ## Patches Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions. Upgrade guidance: 1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line. 2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions. The JSON-to-MessagePack fix should add explicit JSON nesting-depth accounting to `FromJsonCore`, using the configured maximum object graph depth or an equivalent limit, or rewrite the conversion to use an iterative bounded stack. The tokenizer fix should replace separator self-recursion in `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` with an iterative loop so consecutive commas, colons, and whitespace do not consume stack frames. The MessagePack-to-JSON fix should apply `DepthStep` and matching `reader.Depth--` cleanup around recursive `ToJsonCore()` calls made from the typeless extension branch, consistent with the existing array and map conversion branches. ## Workarounds Patching is recommended. Until a patched version is available, do not pass untrusted JSON directly to `ConvertFromJson`, and do not call `ConvertToJson` on untrusted MessagePack payloads that may contain typeless extension values. Validate JSON nesting depth with a parser that enforces depth limits before calling MessagePack-CSharp, reject malformed JSON before conversion, and apply strict input-size limits. Input-size limits reduce exposure but do not remove the recursive behavior in affected versions. ## References - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`: `ConvertFromJson` unbounded structural recursion - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`: `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` separator self-recursion - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092`: `ConvertToJson` ext-100 branch missing depth enforcement - CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion ## CVE split rationale These issues are grouped because they affect the same JSON conversion feature area and share the same failure mode: recursive conversion/tokenization paths do not consistently enforce depth or iteration bounds for attacker-controlled input. They are distinct from normal binary MessagePack skip recursion, dynamic union formatter depth accounting, DateTime stack allocation, and allocation-oriented denial-of-service issues.
Update MessagePack to 2.5.301; MessagePack to 3.1.7 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanMessagePack-CSharp: JSON conversion APIs can recurse without consistent depth enforcement affects MessagePack (nuget), MessagePack (nuget). Severity is high. ## Summary MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rather than normal typed MessagePack deserialization. Three related issues are covered by this advisory: 1. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson` recursively processes nested JSON arrays and objects in `FromJsonCore()` without consulting `MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth`. 2. `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` recursively consumes comma and colon separator characters, allowing even malformed JSON with long separator runs to consume one stack frame per character. 3. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` applies depth checks to arrays and maps, but the typeless extension branch for ext-100 recursively calls `ToJsonCore()` without applying `MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader)`. Each path can allow attacker-controlled input to exhaust the process stack and trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException` instead of failing with a catchable parse or serialization exception. ## Impact Applications are affected when they call MessagePack-CSharp JSON conversion APIs on attacker-controlled data. This includes gateways, diagnostics endpoints, migration tools, logging paths, and services that convert between external JSON and MessagePack payloads. For JSON-to-MessagePack conversion, deeply nested JSON arrays or objects can recurse through `FromJsonCore()` without applying the configured object graph depth limit. Separately, long runs of comma or colon separator characters can recurse through `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` before normal structural validation rejects the input. For MessagePack-to-JSON conversion, nested typeless extension wrappers can recurse through `ToJsonCore()` without the depth guard that the same function applies to arrays and maps. `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` does not fully mitigate these conversion paths because the missing checks occur inside JSON conversion and tokenization branches that do not consistently use the configured depth policy. ## Affected components - Package: `MessagePack` - APIs: `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson`, `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` - Internal routines: `FromJsonCore`, `ToJsonCore`, `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` - Data shapes: deeply nested JSON arrays/objects, long JSON separator runs, and nested typeless MessagePack extension values converted to JSON - Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092` ## Patches Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions. Upgrade guidance: 1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line. 2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions. The JSON-to-MessagePack fix should add explicit JSON nesting-depth accounting to `FromJsonCore`, using the configured maximum object graph depth or an equivalent limit, or rewrite the conversion to use an iterative bounded stack. The tokenizer fix should replace separator self-recursion in `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` with an iterative loop so consecutive commas, colons, and whitespace do not consume stack frames. The MessagePack-to-JSON fix should apply `DepthStep` and matching `reader.Depth--` cleanup around recursive `ToJsonCore()` calls made from the typeless extension branch, consistent with the existing array and map conversion branches. ## Workarounds Patching is recommended. Until a patched version is available, do not pass untrusted JSON directly to `ConvertFromJson`, and do not call `ConvertToJson` on untrusted MessagePack payloads that may contain typeless extension values. Validate JSON nesting depth with a parser that enforces depth limits before calling MessagePack-CSharp, reject malformed JSON before conversion, and apply strict input-size limits. Input-size limits reduce exposure but do not remove the recursive behavior in affected versions. ## References - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`: `ConvertFromJson` unbounded structural recursion - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`: `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` separator self-recursion - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092`: `ConvertToJson` ext-100 branch missing depth enforcement - CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion ## CVE split rationale These issues are grouped because they affect the same JSON conversion feature area and share the same failure mode: recursive conversion/tokenization paths do not consistently enforce depth or iteration bounds for attacker-controlled input. They are distinct from normal binary MessagePack skip recursion, dynamic union formatter depth accounting, DateTime stack allocation, and allocation-oriented denial-of-service issues.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in nuget. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| MessagePacknuget | <2.5.301 | 2.5.301 |
| MessagePacknuget | >=3.0,<3.1.7 | 3.1.7 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate MessagePack to 2.5.301; MessagePack to 3.1.7 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanMessagePack-CSharp: JSON conversion APIs can recurse without consistent depth enforcement affects MessagePack (nuget), MessagePack (nuget). Severity is high. ## Summary MessagePack-CSharp's JSON conversion helpers contain multiple recursion paths that do not consistently enforce a depth limit. These paths are in the JSON conversion component rather than normal typed MessagePack deserialization. Three related issues are covered by this advisory: 1. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson` recursively processes nested JSON arrays and objects in `FromJsonCore()` without consulting `MessagePackSecurity.MaximumObjectGraphDepth`. 2. `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` recursively consumes comma and colon separator characters, allowing even malformed JSON with long separator runs to consume one stack frame per character. 3. `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` applies depth checks to arrays and maps, but the typeless extension branch for ext-100 recursively calls `ToJsonCore()` without applying `MessagePackSecurity.DepthStep(ref reader)`. Each path can allow attacker-controlled input to exhaust the process stack and trigger an uncatchable `StackOverflowException` instead of failing with a catchable parse or serialization exception. ## Impact Applications are affected when they call MessagePack-CSharp JSON conversion APIs on attacker-controlled data. This includes gateways, diagnostics endpoints, migration tools, logging paths, and services that convert between external JSON and MessagePack payloads. For JSON-to-MessagePack conversion, deeply nested JSON arrays or objects can recurse through `FromJsonCore()` without applying the configured object graph depth limit. Separately, long runs of comma or colon separator characters can recurse through `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` before normal structural validation rejects the input. For MessagePack-to-JSON conversion, nested typeless extension wrappers can recurse through `ToJsonCore()` without the depth guard that the same function applies to arrays and maps. `MessagePackSecurity.UntrustedData` does not fully mitigate these conversion paths because the missing checks occur inside JSON conversion and tokenization branches that do not consistently use the configured depth policy. ## Affected components - Package: `MessagePack` - APIs: `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertFromJson`, `MessagePackSerializer.ConvertToJson` - Internal routines: `FromJsonCore`, `ToJsonCore`, `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` - Data shapes: deeply nested JSON arrays/objects, long JSON separator runs, and nested typeless MessagePack extension values converted to JSON - Finding IDs: `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`, `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092` ## Patches Fixes are prepared and will be released in coordinated patch versions. Upgrade guidance: 1. Upgrade `MessagePack` to the patched version for your release line. 2. Upgrade companion MessagePack packages in the same dependency graph to the coordinated patched versions. The JSON-to-MessagePack fix should add explicit JSON nesting-depth accounting to `FromJsonCore`, using the configured maximum object graph depth or an equivalent limit, or rewrite the conversion to use an iterative bounded stack. The tokenizer fix should replace separator self-recursion in `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken()` with an iterative loop so consecutive commas, colons, and whitespace do not consume stack frames. The MessagePack-to-JSON fix should apply `DepthStep` and matching `reader.Depth--` cleanup around recursive `ToJsonCore()` calls made from the typeless extension branch, consistent with the existing array and map conversion branches. ## Workarounds Patching is recommended. Until a patched version is available, do not pass untrusted JSON directly to `ConvertFromJson`, and do not call `ConvertToJson` on untrusted MessagePack payloads that may contain typeless extension values. Validate JSON nesting depth with a parser that enforces depth limits before calling MessagePack-CSharp, reject malformed JSON before conversion, and apply strict input-size limits. Input-size limits reduce exposure but do not remove the recursive behavior in affected versions. ## References - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-090`: `ConvertFromJson` unbounded structural recursion - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-091`: `TinyJsonReader.ReadNextToken` separator self-recursion - `MESSAGEPACKCSHARP-092`: `ConvertToJson` ext-100 branch missing depth enforcement - CWE-674: Uncontrolled Recursion ## CVE split rationale These issues are grouped because they affect the same JSON conversion feature area and share the same failure mode: recursive conversion/tokenization paths do not consistently enforce depth or iteration bounds for attacker-controlled input. They are distinct from normal binary MessagePack skip recursion, dynamic union formatter depth accounting, DateTime stack allocation, and allocation-oriented denial-of-service issues.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in nuget. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| MessagePacknuget | <2.5.301 | 2.5.301 |
| MessagePacknuget | >=3.0,<3.1.7 | 3.1.7 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard