### Summary `oban_web` 2.12.0 through the current unpatched release exposes a `save-job` LiveView event handler that performs no authorization check, allowing any authenticated user (including those with `:read_only` access) to overwrite a queued job's `worker` field with any other `Oban.Worker` module present in the application. On the job's next execution attempt, Oban dispatches `perform/1` on the attacker-chosen module instead of the intended one. ### Details In `lib/oban/web/live/jobs/detail_component.ex`, the sibling event handlers for destructive actions all gate their side effects via `can?/2` (cancel, delete, retry). The `handle_event("save-job", params, socket)` clause added in 2.12.0 has no equivalent guard. It builds a `changes` map from the client-supplied params (including `worker`, `queue`, `priority`, `max_attempts`, `scheduled_at`, `tags`, `args`) and unconditionally dispatches `{:update_job, job, changes}` to the parent LiveView, which writes the changes to the database. The `disabled` attribute on the edit fieldset and button in the rendered HTML is advisory only. The Phoenix LiveView channel dispatches any `phx-event` pushed over the authenticated WebSocket regardless of what the DOM looks like, so the attacker pushes the event directly over the WebSocket without touching the UI. The attacker is constrained to substituting an existing `Oban.Worker` module already loaded in the application (no code injection). The impact depends on what workers are available in the target application. ### PoC 1. Obtain an authenticated session with at minimum `:read_only` access to the Oban.Web dashboard. 2. Open any job's detail panel to obtain its job ID. 3. Push a forged `save-job` event over the LiveView WebSocket with `"worker"` set to the desired target module name. 4. The server accepts the payload and updates the job row. On its next execution attempt, Oban invokes `perform/1` on the attacker-chosen module. ### Impact CVSS 4.0 score 5.3 (Medium). Any application running `oban_web` >= 2.12.0 that exposes the dashboard to users with less than full job-management privileges is affected. The only precondition is an authenticated session with `:read_only` access or higher. ## References * Introduction commit: https://github.com/oban-bg/oban_web/commit/a17bc8c31286c9d516e2892cf5483d1c95e65d6c * Patch commit: https://github.com/oban-bg/oban_web/commit/ab3c5d1d3eba06c62045f16f2cd7781c7752e248
### Summary `oban_web` 2.12.0 through the current unpatched release exposes a `save-job` LiveView event handler that performs no authorization check, allowing any authenticated user (including those with `:read_only` access) to overwrite a queued job's `worker` field with any other `Oban.Worker` module present in the application. On the job's next execution attempt, Oban dispatches `perform/1` on the attacker-chosen module instead of the intended one. ### Details In `lib/oban/web/live/jobs/detail_component.ex`, the sibling event handlers for destructive actions all gate their side effects via `can?/2` (cancel, delete, retry). The `handle_event("save-job", params, socket)` clause added in 2.12.0 has no equivalent guard. It builds a `changes` map from the client-supplied params (including `worker`, `queue`, `priority`, `max_attempts`, `scheduled_at`, `tags`, `args`) and unconditionally dispatches `{:update_job, job, changes}` to the parent LiveView, which writes the changes to the database. The `disabled` attribute on the edit fieldset and button in the rendered HTML is advisory only. The Phoenix LiveView channel dispatches any `phx-event` pushed over the authenticated WebSocket regardless of what the DOM looks like, so the attacker pushes the event directly over the WebSocket without touching the UI. The attacker is constrained to substituting an existing `Oban.Worker` module already loaded in the application (no code injection). The impact depends on what workers are available in the target application. ### PoC 1. Obtain an authenticated session with at minimum `:read_only` access to the Oban.Web dashboard. 2. Open any job's detail panel to obtain its job ID. 3. Push a forged `save-job` event over the LiveView WebSocket with `"worker"` set to the desired target module name. 4. The server accepts the payload and updates the job row. On its next execution attempt, Oban invokes `perform/1` on the attacker-chosen module. ### Impact CVSS 4.0 score 5.3 (Medium). Any application running `oban_web` >= 2.12.0 that exposes the dashboard to users with less than full job-management privileges is affected. The only precondition is an authenticated session with `:read_only` access or higher. ## References * Introduction commit: https://github.com/oban-bg/oban_web/commit/a17bc8c31286c9d516e2892cf5483d1c95e65d6c * Patch commit: https://github.com/oban-bg/oban_web/commit/ab3c5d1d3eba06c62045f16f2cd7781c7752e248
Update oban_web to 2.12.5 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanoban_web missing authorization check on `save-job` event handler affects oban_web (erlang). Severity is medium. ### Summary `oban_web` 2.12.0 through the current unpatched release exposes a `save-job` LiveView event handler that performs no authorization check, allowing any authenticated user (including those with `:read_only` access) to overwrite a queued job's `worker` field with any other `Oban.Worker` module present in the application. On the job's next execution attempt, Oban dispatches `perform/1` on the attacker-chosen module instead of the intended one. ### Details In `lib/oban/web/live/jobs/detail_component.ex`, the sibling event handlers for destructive actions all gate their side effects via `can?/2` (cancel, delete, retry). The `handle_event("save-job", params, socket)` clause added in 2.12.0 has no equivalent guard. It builds a `changes` map from the client-supplied params (including `worker`, `queue`, `priority`, `max_attempts`, `scheduled_at`, `tags`, `args`) and unconditionally dispatches `{:update_job, job, changes}` to the parent LiveView, which writes the changes to the database. The `disabled` attribute on the edit fieldset and button in the rendered HTML is advisory only. The Phoenix LiveView channel dispatches any `phx-event` pushed over the authenticated WebSocket regardless of what the DOM looks like, so the attacker pushes the event directly over the WebSocket without touching the UI. The attacker is constrained to substituting an existing `Oban.Worker` module already loaded in the application (no code injection). The impact depends on what workers are available in the target application. ### PoC 1. Obtain an authenticated session with at minimum `:read_only` access to the Oban.Web dashboard. 2. Open any job's detail panel to obtain its job ID. 3. Push a forged `save-job` event over the LiveView WebSocket with `"worker"` set to the desired target module name. 4. The server accepts the payload and updates the job row. On its next execution attempt, Oban invokes `perform/1` on the attacker-chosen module. ### Impact CVSS 4.0 score 5.3 (Medium). Any application running `oban_web` >= 2.12.0 that exposes the dashboard to users with less than full job-management privileges is affected. The only precondition is an authenticated session with `:read_only` access or higher. ## References * Introduction commit: https://github.com/oban-bg/oban_web/commit/a17bc8c31286c9d516e2892cf5483d1c95e65d6c * Patch commit: https://github.com/oban-bg/oban_web/commit/ab3c5d1d3eba06c62045f16f2cd7781c7752e248
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in erlang. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| oban_weberlang | >=2.12.0,<2.12.5 | 2.12.5 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate oban_web to 2.12.5 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanoban_web missing authorization check on `save-job` event handler affects oban_web (erlang). Severity is medium. ### Summary `oban_web` 2.12.0 through the current unpatched release exposes a `save-job` LiveView event handler that performs no authorization check, allowing any authenticated user (including those with `:read_only` access) to overwrite a queued job's `worker` field with any other `Oban.Worker` module present in the application. On the job's next execution attempt, Oban dispatches `perform/1` on the attacker-chosen module instead of the intended one. ### Details In `lib/oban/web/live/jobs/detail_component.ex`, the sibling event handlers for destructive actions all gate their side effects via `can?/2` (cancel, delete, retry). The `handle_event("save-job", params, socket)` clause added in 2.12.0 has no equivalent guard. It builds a `changes` map from the client-supplied params (including `worker`, `queue`, `priority`, `max_attempts`, `scheduled_at`, `tags`, `args`) and unconditionally dispatches `{:update_job, job, changes}` to the parent LiveView, which writes the changes to the database. The `disabled` attribute on the edit fieldset and button in the rendered HTML is advisory only. The Phoenix LiveView channel dispatches any `phx-event` pushed over the authenticated WebSocket regardless of what the DOM looks like, so the attacker pushes the event directly over the WebSocket without touching the UI. The attacker is constrained to substituting an existing `Oban.Worker` module already loaded in the application (no code injection). The impact depends on what workers are available in the target application. ### PoC 1. Obtain an authenticated session with at minimum `:read_only` access to the Oban.Web dashboard. 2. Open any job's detail panel to obtain its job ID. 3. Push a forged `save-job` event over the LiveView WebSocket with `"worker"` set to the desired target module name. 4. The server accepts the payload and updates the job row. On its next execution attempt, Oban invokes `perform/1` on the attacker-chosen module. ### Impact CVSS 4.0 score 5.3 (Medium). Any application running `oban_web` >= 2.12.0 that exposes the dashboard to users with less than full job-management privileges is affected. The only precondition is an authenticated session with `:read_only` access or higher. ## References * Introduction commit: https://github.com/oban-bg/oban_web/commit/a17bc8c31286c9d516e2892cf5483d1c95e65d6c * Patch commit: https://github.com/oban-bg/oban_web/commit/ab3c5d1d3eba06c62045f16f2cd7781c7752e248
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in erlang. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| oban_weberlang | >=2.12.0,<2.12.5 | 2.12.5 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard