### Description `Symfony\Component\Mailer\Bridge\Mailomat\Webhook\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it. PHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side. Mailomat's [documented webhook security](https://api.mailomat.swiss/docs/#tag/webhook-security) pins SHA-256; the parser did not. ### Resolution `MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` now requires the signature header to be of the form `sha256=<hex>` and verifies the signature with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the configured secret using a constant-time comparison. Any other algorithm declared on the wire (including the HMAC primitives PHP would otherwise accept) is rejected. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/bdfe9fe0d94d33dfaca0bc2fe0b00b54767b0c88) for branch 7.4 (and forward-ported to 8.0 and 8.1). ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Omar Alshammari, Essam Alanazi and Alwaleed Alshammari for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
### Description `Symfony\Component\Mailer\Bridge\Mailomat\Webhook\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it. PHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side. Mailomat's [documented webhook security](https://api.mailomat.swiss/docs/#tag/webhook-security) pins SHA-256; the parser did not. ### Resolution `MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` now requires the signature header to be of the form `sha256=<hex>` and verifies the signature with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the configured secret using a constant-time comparison. Any other algorithm declared on the wire (including the HMAC primitives PHP would otherwise accept) is rejected. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/bdfe9fe0d94d33dfaca0bc2fe0b00b54767b0c88) for branch 7.4 (and forward-ported to 8.0 and 8.1). ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Omar Alshammari, Essam Alanazi and Alwaleed Alshammari for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
Update symfony/mailomat-mailer to 7.4.13; symfony/mailomat-mailer to 8.0.13; symfony/symfony to 7.4.13; symfony/symfony to 8.0.13 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanSymfony: Mailomat Mailer Webhook Parser Reads the HMAC Algorithm from the Request: Signature Algorithm Downgrade affects symfony/mailomat-mailer (composer), symfony/mailomat-mailer (composer), symfony/symfony (composer), symfony/symfony (composer). Severity is medium. ### Description `Symfony\Component\Mailer\Bridge\Mailomat\Webhook\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it. PHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side. Mailomat's [documented webhook security](https://api.mailomat.swiss/docs/#tag/webhook-security) pins SHA-256; the parser did not. ### Resolution `MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` now requires the signature header to be of the form `sha256=<hex>` and verifies the signature with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the configured secret using a constant-time comparison. Any other algorithm declared on the wire (including the HMAC primitives PHP would otherwise accept) is rejected. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/bdfe9fe0d94d33dfaca0bc2fe0b00b54767b0c88) for branch 7.4 (and forward-ported to 8.0 and 8.1). ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Omar Alshammari, Essam Alanazi and Alwaleed Alshammari for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| symfony/mailomat-mailercomposer | >=7.2.0,<7.4.13 | 7.4.13 |
| symfony/mailomat-mailercomposer | >=8.0.0,<8.0.13 | 8.0.13 |
| symfony/symfonycomposer | >=7.2.0,<7.4.13 | 7.4.13 |
| symfony/symfonycomposer | >=8.0.0,<8.0.13 | 8.0.13 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate symfony/mailomat-mailer to 7.4.13; symfony/mailomat-mailer to 8.0.13; symfony/symfony to 7.4.13; symfony/symfony to 8.0.13 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanSymfony: Mailomat Mailer Webhook Parser Reads the HMAC Algorithm from the Request: Signature Algorithm Downgrade affects symfony/mailomat-mailer (composer), symfony/mailomat-mailer (composer), symfony/symfony (composer), symfony/symfony (composer). Severity is medium. ### Description `Symfony\Component\Mailer\Bridge\Mailomat\Webhook\MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` parses the `X-MOM-Webhook-Signature` request header as `algo=signature` and passes the wire-supplied `$algo` directly to `hash_hmac()` when verifying the request against the configured webhook secret. The request therefore selects the HMAC primitive used to authenticate it. PHP's `hash_hmac()` enforces only that the chosen algorithm is HMAC-compatible. That set still includes primitives with known cryptanalysis (`md4`, `md5`, `ripemd128`, `tiger128,3`, … — e.g. existential forgery of HMAC-MD4, Contini & Yin, ASIACRYPT 2006). This is the canonical algorithm-confusion shape, analogous to JWT `alg=none` / `alg=HS256` downgrades: any future cryptographic weakness in any HMAC primitive PHP exposes becomes immediately exploitable against a Mailomat webhook receiver, the moment an attacker is in a position to compute a signature for that primitive, without a code change on the Symfony side. Mailomat's [documented webhook security](https://api.mailomat.swiss/docs/#tag/webhook-security) pins SHA-256; the parser did not. ### Resolution `MailomatRequestParser::validateSignature()` now requires the signature header to be of the form `sha256=<hex>` and verifies the signature with HMAC-SHA256 keyed by the configured secret using a constant-time comparison. Any other algorithm declared on the wire (including the HMAC primitives PHP would otherwise accept) is rejected. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/bdfe9fe0d94d33dfaca0bc2fe0b00b54767b0c88) for branch 7.4 (and forward-ported to 8.0 and 8.1). ### Credits Symfony would like to thank Omar Alshammari, Essam Alanazi and Alwaleed Alshammari for reporting the issue and Nicolas Grekas for providing the fix.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| symfony/mailomat-mailercomposer | >=7.2.0,<7.4.13 | 7.4.13 |
| symfony/mailomat-mailercomposer | >=8.0.0,<8.0.13 | 8.0.13 |
| symfony/symfonycomposer | >=7.2.0,<7.4.13 | 7.4.13 |
| symfony/symfonycomposer | >=8.0.0,<8.0.13 | 8.0.13 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard