Answer in brief
CVE-2026-48791 records a Low severity (CVSS 2.0) vulnerability in Sigstore Java has a vulnerability with bundle verification of integratedTime. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps sigstore/sigstore-java (generic), dev.sigstore:sigstore-java (maven). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 2.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps sigstore/sigstore-java (generic), dev.sigstore:sigstore-java (maven). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| sigstore/sigstore-javageneric | = 2.0.0 | Not reported |
| dev.sigstore:sigstore-javamaven | =2.0.0 | 2.1.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 12, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Sep 9, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 30, 2026
sigstore-java is a sigstore java client for interacting with sigstore infrastructure. Version 2.0.0 erroneously removed verification of the integrated (Rekor entry) time) against the Fulcio certificate. Version 2.1.0 re-added this verification with enhancements that adhere to the Sigstore verification spec. The old sigstore-conformance test for this check was built incorrectly. This vulnerability impacts only users verifying bundles with `dev.sigstore:sigstore-java:2.0.0`. Older versions are not affected; it is fixed in `dev.sigstore:sigstore-java:2.1.0` A malicious actor may exploit this if they were able to access a users system and exfiltrate the temporary private key used during signing and then reuse an old fulcio certificate later without requiring direct access to the user's credentials. Users may protect themselves by re-verifying their artifacts using the newest sigstore-java or another current sigstore client. Transparency logs may also be audited for unauthorized signatures for a suspected reused identity.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.