Answer in brief
CVE-2026-49099 records a Medium severity (CVSS 5.3) vulnerability in Apache Camel-Salesforce: Non-Camel-prefixed Exchange header constants bypass the HTTP header filter. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce (maven), org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce (maven), org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce (maven). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 5.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce (maven), org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce (maven), org.apache.camel:camel-salesforce (maven). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| org.apache.camel:camel-salesforcemaven | >=4.0.0,<4.14.8 | 4.14.8 |
| org.apache.camel:camel-salesforcemaven | >=4.15.0,<4.18.3 | 4.18.3 |
| org.apache.camel:camel-salesforcemaven | >=4.19.0,<4.21.0 | 4.21.0 |
Published upstream
Jul 6, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 28, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 6, 2026
Improper Neutralization of Special Elements in Output Used by a Downstream Component ('Injection'), Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key vulnerability in Apache Camel Salesforce Component. The camel-salesforce producer resolves its operation parameters - the SOQL query, the SOSL search, the target SObject name and id, the Apex REST URL and method, and the Apex query parameters - from Exchange message headers, reading the header in preference to the value configured on the endpoint (AbstractSalesforceProcessor.getParameter() reads the header first and uses the endpoint configuration only as a fallback). The control-header constants in SalesforceEndpointConfig (for example SOBJECT_QUERY = sObjectQuery, SOBJECT_SEARCH = sObjectSearch, SOBJECT_NAME = sObjectName, SOBJECT_ID = sObjectId, APEX_URL = apexUrl, APEX_METHOD = apexMethod, and the apexQueryParam. prefix) used plain, non-Camel-prefixed values. Because these names do not start with the Camel / camel prefix, HttpHeaderFilterStrategy - which blocks only the Camel header namespace on the HTTP boundary - let them pass from an inbound HTTP request straight into the Exchange. In a route that bridges an HTTP consumer (for example platform-http) into a salesforce: producer, any HTTP client could therefore set these headers and override what the route intended - supplying its own SOQL query or SOSL search to read data from any SObject the connected Salesforce user can access, overriding the target SObject name and id for CRUD operations, or redirecting an Apex REST call to a different endpoint and HTTP method (including destructive methods) with injected query parameters. All such operations run with the full permissions of the Salesforce connected (integration) user, which is typically broad. No credentials are required from the attacker when the bridging consumer is unauthenticated. This issue affects Apache Camel: from 4.0.0 before 4.14.8, from 4.15.0 before 4.18.3, from 4.19.0 before 4.21.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 4.21.0, which fixes the issue. If users are on the 4.14.x LTS releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.14.8. If users are on the 4.18.x releases stream, then they are suggested to upgrade to 4.18.3. After upgrading, routes that set Salesforce operation parameters via the raw header names must use the CamelSalesforce* names (for example CamelSalesforceSObjectQuery and CamelSalesforceApexUrl) instead of the old sObject* / apex* values; the endpoint-option spelling is unchanged. For deployments that cannot upgrade immediately, strip the Salesforce control headers from any untrusted ingress before the salesforce: producer (for example removeHeaders('sObject*') and removeHeaders('apex*') at the start of the route), and set the query, SObject and Apex parameters from a trusted source.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.