Answer in brief
CVE-2026-49257 records a Critical severity (CVSS 10.0) vulnerability in mcp-pinot: Unauthenticated tool invocation via default oauth_enabled=False + host 0.0.0.0 bind. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps mcp-pinot-server (pip), mcp-pinot-server (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 10.0. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps mcp-pinot-server (pip), mcp-pinot-server (pypi). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| mcp-pinot-serverpip | <=3.0.1 | 3.1.0 |
| mcp-pinot-serverpypi | >=0 <3.1.0 | 3.1.0 |
Published upstream
Jun 18, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 16, 2026
Evidence: source:ghsa:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 22, 2026
## Resolution Fixed in [v3.1.0](https://github.com/startreedata/mcp-pinot/releases/tag/v3.1.0), released 2026-05-25. The fix was merged in [PR #95](https://github.com/startreedata/mcp-pinot/pull/95) at commit [`1c7d3f9`](https://github.com/startreedata/mcp-pinot/commit/1c7d3f9cd384854bf72c127d230bdb32299475ad). The fix changes the default HTTP bind host to `127.0.0.1`, refuses non-loopback HTTP/HTTPS exposure unless OAuth is enabled, makes Helm exposure opt-in and OAuth-gated, and adds parser-backed single-statement read-only validation for `read-query`. ## CVSS evaluation Reviewed on 2026-05-25. The advisory remains **Critical** with `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` = **10.0**. Rationale: | Metric | Value | Reason | |---|---|---| | AV | Network | The default HTTP server bound to `0.0.0.0:8080` and accepted remote HTTP requests. | | AC | Low | Exploitation required only a direct MCP tool call. | | PR | None | OAuth was disabled by default. | | UI | None | No user interaction was required. | | S | Changed | The vulnerable MCP server used its server-side credentials to act on the separate Pinot cluster security boundary. | | C | High | Unauthenticated callers could read table data and cluster metadata through server-side Pinot credentials. | | I | High | Unauthenticated callers could create or update schemas and table configs where the server-side account had those privileges. | | A | High | Expensive queries and configuration mutations could degrade or disrupt Pinot availability. | # Unauthenticated tool invocation via default oauth_enabled=False + host 0.0.0.0 bind ## Summary `mcp-pinot` v3.0.1 (and earlier) defaults to running an HTTP MCP server bound to `0.0.0.0:8080` with no authentication enabled. All MCP tools, including SQL query execution, schema creation, and table-config mutation, are reachable by any network-adjacent caller. The server proxies these calls using server-side Pinot credentials, producing a confused-deputy condition that yields full read/write access to the configured Pinot cluster. ## Affected versions - All releases on `main`, confirmed in tags v2.1.0 through v3.0.1. - Affected files: `mcp_pinot/server.py`, `mcp_pinot/config.py`. ## Root cause Three defaults compose to produce unauthenticated network exposure: **1. Auth is opt-in and defaults to off** (`mcp_pinot/config.py:64,328`): ```python @dataclass class ServerConfig: ... oauth_enabled: bool = False ... def load_server_config() -> ServerConfig: return ServerConfig( ... oauth_enabled=os.getenv("OAUTH_ENABLED", "false").lower() == "true", ... ) ``` **2. Auth construction is gated by `oauth_enabled`** (`mcp_pinot/server.py:26-46`): ```python _auth = None if server_config.oauth_enabled: oauth_config = load_oauth_config() token_verifier = JWTVerifier(...) _auth = OAuthProxy(...) mcp = FastMCP("Pinot MCP Server", auth=_auth) ``` When `oauth_enabled` is false (default), `_auth` stays `None` and `FastMCP` registers all `@mcp.tool` endpoints with no authentication. **3. Default bind is all interfaces on a well-known port** (`mcp_pinot/config.py:60-61`): ```python host: str = "0.0.0.0" port: int = 8080 ``` The HTTP transport in `server.py:263-268` uses these values directly. Any operator following the README's HTTP transport instructions (`uv pip install`, `.env` from `.env.example`, run) ends up with a network-reachable MCP server with no auth. ## Confused-deputy The Pinot client uses server-side credentials loaded from environment variables (`mcp_pinot/config.py:285-294, 300-315`). When an unauthenticated MCP caller invokes `read_query` or any other tool, the request is executed with the server's `PINOT_TOKEN` or `PINOT_USERNAME`/`PINOT_PASSWORD`, which is typically a privileged service account. The MCP server effectively launders the caller's lack of identity into the server's privileges against the upstream cluster. ## Exposed tools All 14 tools in `mcp_pinot/server.py` are exposed without auth in the default configuration: | Tool | Impact when unauthenticated | |---|---| | `read_query` | Arbitrary SELECT against any table allowed by server-side filter (or all tables if no filter) | | `list_tables` | Enumerate cluster schemas | | `table_details`, `segment_list`, `segment_metadata_details`, `tableconfig_schema_details`, `index_column_details`, `get_schema`, `get_table_config` | Read cluster metadata | | `create_schema`, `update_schema` | Create or mutate Pinot schemas | | `create_table_config`, `update_table_config` | Create or mutate table configurations | | `reload_table_filters` | Reload server filter file; response leaks `previous_filters` and `new_filters` lists | | `test_connection` | Cluster diagnostics including host, port, scheme, database, and auth-mode | ## Reproduction Minimal reproduction against a default-configured `mcp-pinot` v3.0.1 instance running on `http://victim:8080/mcp`: ```bash # 1. Enumerate tables (no Authorization header) curl -X POST http://victim:8080/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "jsonrpc":"2.0", "method":"tools/call", "params":{"name":"list_tables","arguments":{}}, "id":1 }' # 2. Read arbitrary table contents (server forwards using its own Pinot credentials) curl -X POST http://victim:8080/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "jsonrpc":"2.0", "method":"tools/call", "params":{ "name":"read_query", "arguments":{"query":"SELECT * FROM <table> LIMIT 100"} }, "id":2 }' # 3. Create a new schema (write privileges) curl -X POST http://victim:8080/mcp \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{ "jsonrpc":"2.0", "method":"tools/call", "params":{ "name":"create_schema", "arguments":{ "schemaJson":"{\"schemaName\":\"attacker_schema\",\"dimensionFieldSpecs\":[{\"name\":\"id\",\"dataType\":\"STRING\"}]}" } }, "id":3 }' ``` ## Severity (CVSS 3.1) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` = **10.0 Critical** | Metric | Value | Reason | |---|---|---| | AV (Attack Vector) | Network | Server defaults to bind on `0.0.0.0:8080` | | AC (Attack Complexity) | Low | No special conditions, single HTTP request | | PR (Privileges Required) | None | No authentication required in default config | | UI (User Interaction) | None | Direct unauthenticated call | | S (Scope) | Changed | Vulnerable MCP component grants access to a separate Pinot cluster (different security authority) | | C (Confidentiality) | High | Full read of any table data the server-side account can reach | | I (Integrity) | High | Schema and table-config writes via `create_schema`, `update_schema`, `create_table_config`, `update_table_config` | | A (Availability) | High | Heavy queries, malformed configs, or schema overrides can degrade or break the cluster | If the operator restricts the bind address to `127.0.0.1` via `MCP_HOST`, AV drops to `Local` and the score reduces. But this is not the documented default. ## Suggested remediation Two independent hardenings, both recommended: **A. Refuse to start in an insecure default**, in `server.py` `main()`, fail-closed when: - `transport != "stdio"` - `server_config.oauth_enabled` is `False` - `server_config.host` is not a loopback address (e.g. not in `{"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"}`) Sample: ```python def _is_loopback(host: str) -> bool: return host in {"127.0.0.1", "::1", "localhost"} def main(): ... if server_config.transport != "stdio" and not server_config.oauth_enabled and not _is_loopback(server_config.host): raise SystemExit( "Refusing to start: HTTP transport bound to non-loopback host " f"({server_config.host}) without OAuth. Set OAUTH_ENABLED=true or " "set MCP_HOST=127.0.0.1 for local-only access." ) ... ``` **B. Default `oauth_enabled` to `True`** and require explicit opt-out for local development. This matches the principle of secure-by-default for network-facing services. **C. Document the threat model** in README under a "Production deployment" section, including: - Explicit warning that the server should not be exposed to untrusted networks without OAuth - Recommendation to set `MCP_HOST=127.0.0.1` for stdio/local-only deployments ## Resources - `mcp_pinot/server.py` lines 26-46, 248-269 - `mcp_pinot/config.py` lines 56-65, 318-330 - FastMCP `auth` parameter behavior when `None`: https://github.com/jlowin/fastmcp - The Register, May 13 2026: MCP database flaws across Doris, Pinot, RDS ## Reporter Independent security researcher. Disclosed via GitHub Security Advisory, 2026-05-23.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.