## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-46339 (unauthenticated RCE via unprotected MCP plugin routes) introduced a local-only access gate in `src/dashboardGuard.js` that restricts spawn-capable routes (`/api/mcp/*`, `/api/tunnel/*`, `/api/cli-tools/*`) to loopback requests. The gate determines "local" by inspecting the `Host` and `Origin` HTTP headers rather than the TCP source address. When 9router is deployed behind a reverse proxy, tunnel (Cloudflare Tunnel, Tailscale — both natively supported), or is subject to DNS rebinding, these headers are attacker-controlled, allowing the local-only gate to be bypassed. A second factor (CLI token or JWT cookie) is required by `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()`, but the CLI token is a deterministic HMAC of the machine ID (`getConsistentMachineId`), which is stable and predictable on cloud VMs. If the attacker can obtain or guess the machine ID (e.g., via another information disclosure, or on shared-tenant infrastructure), the full chain to MCP child process stdin injection is reachable. This is a variant / incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46339 — the same attack surface (remote → MCP child process stdin) remains reachable under specific but realistic deployment configurations. ## Root Cause `isLocalRequest()` at `src/dashboardGuard.js:93-101`: ```javascript function isLocalRequest(request) { if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get("host"))) return false; const origin = request.headers.get("origin"); if (origin) { try { if (!isLoopbackHostname(new URL(origin).hostname)) return false; } catch { return false; } } return true; } ``` This function trusts `Host` and `Origin` headers as proof of local origin. Both are attacker-controlled in any proxied deployment. The `LOOPBACK_HOSTS` set (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1`) is checked against these headers, not against the actual connection source IP. ## Attack Scenario ### Scenario 1: Cloudflare Tunnel / Tailscale Funnel 9router natively supports Cloudflare Tunnel and Tailscale (see `LOCAL_ONLY_PATHS` entries for `/api/tunnel/*`). When exposed via tunnel: 1. Attacker sends request to `https://<tunnel-domain>/api/mcp/<plugin>/sse` 2. Sets `Host: localhost:3000` and `Origin: http://localhost:3000` 3. `isLocalRequest()` returns `true` 4. `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()` then requires CLI token or (local + JWT) 5. CLI token is `getConsistentMachineId("9r-cli-auth")` — a deterministic HMAC of the machine's hardware/OS identifiers ### Scenario 2: DNS Rebinding 1. Attacker controls `evil.com` DNS, initially resolving to attacker IP 2. Victim's browser navigates to `evil.com` (or via iframe/redirect) 3. DNS rebinding switches `evil.com` → `127.0.0.1` 4. Subsequent fetch to `evil.com:3000/api/mcp/<plugin>/message` reaches 9router 5. `Host` header is `evil.com:3000` — this is **blocked** by the current check (not in LOOPBACK_HOSTS) 6. However, if the attacker uses `localhost:3000` as the request host via CORS or service worker tricks, and the browser sends `Host: localhost:3000`, the gate opens ### Exploitation (when CLI token is obtained) Once past the gate, the attacker can: 1. `GET /api/mcp/<plugin>/sse` — establish SSE session, get `sessionId` 2. `POST /api/mcp/<plugin>/message` — send arbitrary JSON-RPC to the child process stdin 3. The child process is one of: `npx`, `node`, `python`, `python3`, `uvx`, `bunx`, `bun` 4. Depending on the MCP plugin implementation, this can achieve arbitrary code execution on the host ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Deploy 9router behind a reverse proxy or tunnel 2. From a remote host, send: ```http GET /api/mcp/browser/sse HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:3000 Origin: http://localhost:3000 x-9r-cli-token: <machine-id-derived-token> ``` 3. Observe: SSE connection established, `endpoint` event received with message URL 4. POST arbitrary JSON-RPC to the message endpoint ## Impact An attacker who can reach a proxied/tunneled 9router instance and obtain the deterministic CLI token can bypass the local-only restriction and interact with MCP child processes (node, python, npx, etc.) via stdin. This achieves the same impact as CVE-2026-46339: remote code execution on the host. The severity is reduced from CVE-2026-46339's CVSS 10.0 because: - Requires proxied/tunneled deployment (not default localhost-only) - Requires obtaining the CLI token (deterministic but not trivially guessable without another primitive) ## Remediation 1. **Check actual source IP, not headers.** Use `request.ip`, `request.socket.remoteAddress`, or a trusted `X-Forwarded-For` header with known proxy configuration instead of `Host`/`Origin` for the local-only gate. 2. **Make CLI token non-deterministic.** Generate a random token on first run and persist it, rather than deriving from machine ID. Machine IDs are often predictable or discoverable on cloud infrastructure. 3. **Bind MCP routes to loopback at the network layer.** If MCP is local-only by design, the server should bind those routes to `127.0.0.1` only, not rely on middleware header checks. Credit: @snailsploit
## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-46339 (unauthenticated RCE via unprotected MCP plugin routes) introduced a local-only access gate in `src/dashboardGuard.js` that restricts spawn-capable routes (`/api/mcp/*`, `/api/tunnel/*`, `/api/cli-tools/*`) to loopback requests. The gate determines "local" by inspecting the `Host` and `Origin` HTTP headers rather than the TCP source address. When 9router is deployed behind a reverse proxy, tunnel (Cloudflare Tunnel, Tailscale — both natively supported), or is subject to DNS rebinding, these headers are attacker-controlled, allowing the local-only gate to be bypassed. A second factor (CLI token or JWT cookie) is required by `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()`, but the CLI token is a deterministic HMAC of the machine ID (`getConsistentMachineId`), which is stable and predictable on cloud VMs. If the attacker can obtain or guess the machine ID (e.g., via another information disclosure, or on shared-tenant infrastructure), the full chain to MCP child process stdin injection is reachable. This is a variant / incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46339 — the same attack surface (remote → MCP child process stdin) remains reachable under specific but realistic deployment configurations. ## Root Cause `isLocalRequest()` at `src/dashboardGuard.js:93-101`: ```javascript function isLocalRequest(request) { if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get("host"))) return false; const origin = request.headers.get("origin"); if (origin) { try { if (!isLoopbackHostname(new URL(origin).hostname)) return false; } catch { return false; } } return true; } ``` This function trusts `Host` and `Origin` headers as proof of local origin. Both are attacker-controlled in any proxied deployment. The `LOOPBACK_HOSTS` set (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1`) is checked against these headers, not against the actual connection source IP. ## Attack Scenario ### Scenario 1: Cloudflare Tunnel / Tailscale Funnel 9router natively supports Cloudflare Tunnel and Tailscale (see `LOCAL_ONLY_PATHS` entries for `/api/tunnel/*`). When exposed via tunnel: 1. Attacker sends request to `https://<tunnel-domain>/api/mcp/<plugin>/sse` 2. Sets `Host: localhost:3000` and `Origin: http://localhost:3000` 3. `isLocalRequest()` returns `true` 4. `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()` then requires CLI token or (local + JWT) 5. CLI token is `getConsistentMachineId("9r-cli-auth")` — a deterministic HMAC of the machine's hardware/OS identifiers ### Scenario 2: DNS Rebinding 1. Attacker controls `evil.com` DNS, initially resolving to attacker IP 2. Victim's browser navigates to `evil.com` (or via iframe/redirect) 3. DNS rebinding switches `evil.com` → `127.0.0.1` 4. Subsequent fetch to `evil.com:3000/api/mcp/<plugin>/message` reaches 9router 5. `Host` header is `evil.com:3000` — this is **blocked** by the current check (not in LOOPBACK_HOSTS) 6. However, if the attacker uses `localhost:3000` as the request host via CORS or service worker tricks, and the browser sends `Host: localhost:3000`, the gate opens ### Exploitation (when CLI token is obtained) Once past the gate, the attacker can: 1. `GET /api/mcp/<plugin>/sse` — establish SSE session, get `sessionId` 2. `POST /api/mcp/<plugin>/message` — send arbitrary JSON-RPC to the child process stdin 3. The child process is one of: `npx`, `node`, `python`, `python3`, `uvx`, `bunx`, `bun` 4. Depending on the MCP plugin implementation, this can achieve arbitrary code execution on the host ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Deploy 9router behind a reverse proxy or tunnel 2. From a remote host, send: ```http GET /api/mcp/browser/sse HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:3000 Origin: http://localhost:3000 x-9r-cli-token: <machine-id-derived-token> ``` 3. Observe: SSE connection established, `endpoint` event received with message URL 4. POST arbitrary JSON-RPC to the message endpoint ## Impact An attacker who can reach a proxied/tunneled 9router instance and obtain the deterministic CLI token can bypass the local-only restriction and interact with MCP child processes (node, python, npx, etc.) via stdin. This achieves the same impact as CVE-2026-46339: remote code execution on the host. The severity is reduced from CVE-2026-46339's CVSS 10.0 because: - Requires proxied/tunneled deployment (not default localhost-only) - Requires obtaining the CLI token (deterministic but not trivially guessable without another primitive) ## Remediation 1. **Check actual source IP, not headers.** Use `request.ip`, `request.socket.remoteAddress`, or a trusted `X-Forwarded-For` header with known proxy configuration instead of `Host`/`Origin` for the local-only gate. 2. **Make CLI token non-deterministic.** Generate a random token on first run and persist it, rather than deriving from machine ID. Machine IDs are often predictable or discoverable on cloud infrastructure. 3. **Bind MCP routes to loopback at the network layer.** If MCP is local-only by design, the server should bind those routes to `127.0.0.1` only, not rely on middleware header checks. Credit: @snailsploit
Monitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scan9router has an Incomplete Fix: Local-Only Access Gate Bypass in 9router via Host Header SpoofING affects 9router (npm). Severity is high. ## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-46339 (unauthenticated RCE via unprotected MCP plugin routes) introduced a local-only access gate in `src/dashboardGuard.js` that restricts spawn-capable routes (`/api/mcp/*`, `/api/tunnel/*`, `/api/cli-tools/*`) to loopback requests. The gate determines "local" by inspecting the `Host` and `Origin` HTTP headers rather than the TCP source address. When 9router is deployed behind a reverse proxy, tunnel (Cloudflare Tunnel, Tailscale — both natively supported), or is subject to DNS rebinding, these headers are attacker-controlled, allowing the local-only gate to be bypassed. A second factor (CLI token or JWT cookie) is required by `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()`, but the CLI token is a deterministic HMAC of the machine ID (`getConsistentMachineId`), which is stable and predictable on cloud VMs. If the attacker can obtain or guess the machine ID (e.g., via another information disclosure, or on shared-tenant infrastructure), the full chain to MCP child process stdin injection is reachable. This is a variant / incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46339 — the same attack surface (remote → MCP child process stdin) remains reachable under specific but realistic deployment configurations. ## Root Cause `isLocalRequest()` at `src/dashboardGuard.js:93-101`: ```javascript function isLocalRequest(request) { if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get("host"))) return false; const origin = request.headers.get("origin"); if (origin) { try { if (!isLoopbackHostname(new URL(origin).hostname)) return false; } catch { return false; } } return true; } ``` This function trusts `Host` and `Origin` headers as proof of local origin. Both are attacker-controlled in any proxied deployment. The `LOOPBACK_HOSTS` set (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1`) is checked against these headers, not against the actual connection source IP. ## Attack Scenario ### Scenario 1: Cloudflare Tunnel / Tailscale Funnel 9router natively supports Cloudflare Tunnel and Tailscale (see `LOCAL_ONLY_PATHS` entries for `/api/tunnel/*`). When exposed via tunnel: 1. Attacker sends request to `https://<tunnel-domain>/api/mcp/<plugin>/sse` 2. Sets `Host: localhost:3000` and `Origin: http://localhost:3000` 3. `isLocalRequest()` returns `true` 4. `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()` then requires CLI token or (local + JWT) 5. CLI token is `getConsistentMachineId("9r-cli-auth")` — a deterministic HMAC of the machine's hardware/OS identifiers ### Scenario 2: DNS Rebinding 1. Attacker controls `evil.com` DNS, initially resolving to attacker IP 2. Victim's browser navigates to `evil.com` (or via iframe/redirect) 3. DNS rebinding switches `evil.com` → `127.0.0.1` 4. Subsequent fetch to `evil.com:3000/api/mcp/<plugin>/message` reaches 9router 5. `Host` header is `evil.com:3000` — this is **blocked** by the current check (not in LOOPBACK_HOSTS) 6. However, if the attacker uses `localhost:3000` as the request host via CORS or service worker tricks, and the browser sends `Host: localhost:3000`, the gate opens ### Exploitation (when CLI token is obtained) Once past the gate, the attacker can: 1. `GET /api/mcp/<plugin>/sse` — establish SSE session, get `sessionId` 2. `POST /api/mcp/<plugin>/message` — send arbitrary JSON-RPC to the child process stdin 3. The child process is one of: `npx`, `node`, `python`, `python3`, `uvx`, `bunx`, `bun` 4. Depending on the MCP plugin implementation, this can achieve arbitrary code execution on the host ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Deploy 9router behind a reverse proxy or tunnel 2. From a remote host, send: ```http GET /api/mcp/browser/sse HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:3000 Origin: http://localhost:3000 x-9r-cli-token: <machine-id-derived-token> ``` 3. Observe: SSE connection established, `endpoint` event received with message URL 4. POST arbitrary JSON-RPC to the message endpoint ## Impact An attacker who can reach a proxied/tunneled 9router instance and obtain the deterministic CLI token can bypass the local-only restriction and interact with MCP child processes (node, python, npx, etc.) via stdin. This achieves the same impact as CVE-2026-46339: remote code execution on the host. The severity is reduced from CVE-2026-46339's CVSS 10.0 because: - Requires proxied/tunneled deployment (not default localhost-only) - Requires obtaining the CLI token (deterministic but not trivially guessable without another primitive) ## Remediation 1. **Check actual source IP, not headers.** Use `request.ip`, `request.socket.remoteAddress`, or a trusted `X-Forwarded-For` header with known proxy configuration instead of `Host`/`Origin` for the local-only gate. 2. **Make CLI token non-deterministic.** Generate a random token on first run and persist it, rather than deriving from machine ID. Machine IDs are often predictable or discoverable on cloud infrastructure. 3. **Bind MCP routes to loopback at the network layer.** If MCP is local-only by design, the server should bind those routes to `127.0.0.1` only, not rely on middleware header checks. Credit: @snailsploit
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| 9routernpm | <=0.4.55 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardMonitor this advisory for an available fix and review any installs of the affected package.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scan9router has an Incomplete Fix: Local-Only Access Gate Bypass in 9router via Host Header SpoofING affects 9router (npm). Severity is high. ## Summary The fix for CVE-2026-46339 (unauthenticated RCE via unprotected MCP plugin routes) introduced a local-only access gate in `src/dashboardGuard.js` that restricts spawn-capable routes (`/api/mcp/*`, `/api/tunnel/*`, `/api/cli-tools/*`) to loopback requests. The gate determines "local" by inspecting the `Host` and `Origin` HTTP headers rather than the TCP source address. When 9router is deployed behind a reverse proxy, tunnel (Cloudflare Tunnel, Tailscale — both natively supported), or is subject to DNS rebinding, these headers are attacker-controlled, allowing the local-only gate to be bypassed. A second factor (CLI token or JWT cookie) is required by `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()`, but the CLI token is a deterministic HMAC of the machine ID (`getConsistentMachineId`), which is stable and predictable on cloud VMs. If the attacker can obtain or guess the machine ID (e.g., via another information disclosure, or on shared-tenant infrastructure), the full chain to MCP child process stdin injection is reachable. This is a variant / incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46339 — the same attack surface (remote → MCP child process stdin) remains reachable under specific but realistic deployment configurations. ## Root Cause `isLocalRequest()` at `src/dashboardGuard.js:93-101`: ```javascript function isLocalRequest(request) { if (!isLoopbackHostname(request.headers.get("host"))) return false; const origin = request.headers.get("origin"); if (origin) { try { if (!isLoopbackHostname(new URL(origin).hostname)) return false; } catch { return false; } } return true; } ``` This function trusts `Host` and `Origin` headers as proof of local origin. Both are attacker-controlled in any proxied deployment. The `LOOPBACK_HOSTS` set (`localhost`, `127.0.0.1`, `::1`) is checked against these headers, not against the actual connection source IP. ## Attack Scenario ### Scenario 1: Cloudflare Tunnel / Tailscale Funnel 9router natively supports Cloudflare Tunnel and Tailscale (see `LOCAL_ONLY_PATHS` entries for `/api/tunnel/*`). When exposed via tunnel: 1. Attacker sends request to `https://<tunnel-domain>/api/mcp/<plugin>/sse` 2. Sets `Host: localhost:3000` and `Origin: http://localhost:3000` 3. `isLocalRequest()` returns `true` 4. `canAccessLocalOnlyRoute()` then requires CLI token or (local + JWT) 5. CLI token is `getConsistentMachineId("9r-cli-auth")` — a deterministic HMAC of the machine's hardware/OS identifiers ### Scenario 2: DNS Rebinding 1. Attacker controls `evil.com` DNS, initially resolving to attacker IP 2. Victim's browser navigates to `evil.com` (or via iframe/redirect) 3. DNS rebinding switches `evil.com` → `127.0.0.1` 4. Subsequent fetch to `evil.com:3000/api/mcp/<plugin>/message` reaches 9router 5. `Host` header is `evil.com:3000` — this is **blocked** by the current check (not in LOOPBACK_HOSTS) 6. However, if the attacker uses `localhost:3000` as the request host via CORS or service worker tricks, and the browser sends `Host: localhost:3000`, the gate opens ### Exploitation (when CLI token is obtained) Once past the gate, the attacker can: 1. `GET /api/mcp/<plugin>/sse` — establish SSE session, get `sessionId` 2. `POST /api/mcp/<plugin>/message` — send arbitrary JSON-RPC to the child process stdin 3. The child process is one of: `npx`, `node`, `python`, `python3`, `uvx`, `bunx`, `bun` 4. Depending on the MCP plugin implementation, this can achieve arbitrary code execution on the host ## Steps to Reproduce 1. Deploy 9router behind a reverse proxy or tunnel 2. From a remote host, send: ```http GET /api/mcp/browser/sse HTTP/1.1 Host: localhost:3000 Origin: http://localhost:3000 x-9r-cli-token: <machine-id-derived-token> ``` 3. Observe: SSE connection established, `endpoint` event received with message URL 4. POST arbitrary JSON-RPC to the message endpoint ## Impact An attacker who can reach a proxied/tunneled 9router instance and obtain the deterministic CLI token can bypass the local-only restriction and interact with MCP child processes (node, python, npx, etc.) via stdin. This achieves the same impact as CVE-2026-46339: remote code execution on the host. The severity is reduced from CVE-2026-46339's CVSS 10.0 because: - Requires proxied/tunneled deployment (not default localhost-only) - Requires obtaining the CLI token (deterministic but not trivially guessable without another primitive) ## Remediation 1. **Check actual source IP, not headers.** Use `request.ip`, `request.socket.remoteAddress`, or a trusted `X-Forwarded-For` header with known proxy configuration instead of `Host`/`Origin` for the local-only gate. 2. **Make CLI token non-deterministic.** Generate a random token on first run and persist it, rather than deriving from machine ID. Machine IDs are often predictable or discoverable on cloud infrastructure. 3. **Bind MCP routes to loopback at the network layer.** If MCP is local-only by design, the server should bind those routes to `127.0.0.1` only, not rely on middleware header checks. Credit: @snailsploit
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in npm. A high vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| 9routernpm | <=0.4.55 | Not reported |
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard