### Summary `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` fetches the content of option values server-side via `file_get_contents()` when the value looks like a URL, without restricting the URL scheme. The `attachment` option of `Pdf` is the reachable sink: any value that passes `isOptionUrl()` (`filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)`) is downloaded by the PHP process and embedded into the generated PDF. Because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts `http`, `https`, `ftp`, `file` and PHP stream wrappers such as `php://`, an attacker who can influence the `attachment` value reaches both a **Server-Side Request Forgery** primitive (e.g. internal HTTP endpoints, cloud metadata) and a **local file disclosure** primitive (`file://`, `php://filter/...`), with the fetched bytes exfiltrated as a PDF attachment. This is the same class of issue KnpLabs/snappy patched for its `xsl-style-sheet` option in [GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56](https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/security/advisories/GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56). The library is documented as a one-to-one substitute for KnpLabs/snappy and shares the same code shape. ### Affected versions `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` versions `<= 2.5.1`. Patched in: `2.6.0`. ### Privilege required Any caller that can influence the `attachment` option value handed to `Pdf::generate()` / `Pdf::getOutput()` / `setOption('attachment', ...)`. Typical reach paths: a value sourced from a request parameter, a per-tenant configuration row, or any user-controllable field that flows into the attachment list. ### Vulnerable code `src/Pdf.php` — `isOptionUrl()` accepts any well-formed URL regardless of scheme: ```php protected function isOptionUrl($option): bool { return false !== \filter_var($option, \FILTER_VALIDATE_URL); } ``` `src/Pdf.php` — `handleArrayOptions()` fetches the URL content for the `attachment` option: ```php $fetchUrlContent = 'attachment' === $option && $this->isOptionUrl($item); if ($saveToTempFile || $fetchUrlContent) { $fileContent = $fetchUrlContent ? \file_get_contents($item) : $item; $returnOptions[] = $this->createTemporaryFile($fileContent, $this->optionsWithContentCheck[$option] ?? 'temp'); } ``` `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` returns truthy for `http://`, `https://`, `ftp://`, `file://localhost/...`, and `php://filter/...`, so `\file_get_contents()` is invoked on attacker-chosen schemes with no allow-list. ### Proof of concept ```php <?php use Pontedilana\PhpWeasyPrint\Pdf; $pdf = new Pdf('/usr/local/bin/weasyprint'); // Attacker-controlled attachment value (e.g. from a request / tenant config): // SSRF: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ // Local file read: php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd $attachment = $_GET['doc']; $pdf->generate('page.html', 'out.pdf', [ 'attachment' => $attachment, ]); // The bytes fetched server-side by file_get_contents() are embedded in out.pdf, // allowing the attacker to read internal HTTP responses or local files. ``` ### Impact - **SSRF**: the server fetches arbitrary `http(s)`/`ftp` URLs, reaching internal-only services, link-local metadata endpoints, etc. - **Local file / wrapper disclosure**: `php://filter/...` (and similar) let an attacker read and exfiltrate local file content inside the generated PDF. - Affects any consumer that does not fully control the `attachment` option value. Note: passing a plain local path (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) or a `file://` path that resolves to an existing file is handled as a normal local attachment and is **not** the issue addressed here — that is the documented local-attachment feature (callers must not pass untrusted input to the option). The fix specifically removes the server-side fetch amplification through non-`http(s)` schemes. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (6.5, Medium) — adjust `PR`/`S`/`A` to the consuming application's reachability (e.g. `PR:N` if the attachment value is reachable from an unauthenticated surface). CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery); secondary CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname) for the wrapper-based file read. ### Suggested fix Restrict the schemes the library will fetch to an allow-list (`http`, `https` by default), and treat any other scheme as inline content instead of fetching it: ```php private array $allowedSchemes = ['http', 'https']; // new optional 4th constructor argument: ?array $allowedSchemes = null protected function isOptionUrl($option): bool { $url = \parse_url((string)$option); return false !== $url && isset($url['scheme']) && \in_array(\strtolower($url['scheme']), $this->allowedSchemes, true); } ``` A value with a non-allowed scheme (`file://`, `php://`, `ftp://`, ...) is then never passed to `file_get_contents()`. ### Credit Reported upstream to KnpLabs/snappy ([GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56](https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/security/advisories/GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56)); identified as applicable to `pontedilana/php-weasyprint`, which mirrors the same code.
### Summary `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` fetches the content of option values server-side via `file_get_contents()` when the value looks like a URL, without restricting the URL scheme. The `attachment` option of `Pdf` is the reachable sink: any value that passes `isOptionUrl()` (`filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)`) is downloaded by the PHP process and embedded into the generated PDF. Because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts `http`, `https`, `ftp`, `file` and PHP stream wrappers such as `php://`, an attacker who can influence the `attachment` value reaches both a **Server-Side Request Forgery** primitive (e.g. internal HTTP endpoints, cloud metadata) and a **local file disclosure** primitive (`file://`, `php://filter/...`), with the fetched bytes exfiltrated as a PDF attachment. This is the same class of issue KnpLabs/snappy patched for its `xsl-style-sheet` option in [GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56](https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/security/advisories/GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56). The library is documented as a one-to-one substitute for KnpLabs/snappy and shares the same code shape. ### Affected versions `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` versions `<= 2.5.1`. Patched in: `2.6.0`. ### Privilege required Any caller that can influence the `attachment` option value handed to `Pdf::generate()` / `Pdf::getOutput()` / `setOption('attachment', ...)`. Typical reach paths: a value sourced from a request parameter, a per-tenant configuration row, or any user-controllable field that flows into the attachment list. ### Vulnerable code `src/Pdf.php` — `isOptionUrl()` accepts any well-formed URL regardless of scheme: ```php protected function isOptionUrl($option): bool { return false !== \filter_var($option, \FILTER_VALIDATE_URL); } ``` `src/Pdf.php` — `handleArrayOptions()` fetches the URL content for the `attachment` option: ```php $fetchUrlContent = 'attachment' === $option && $this->isOptionUrl($item); if ($saveToTempFile || $fetchUrlContent) { $fileContent = $fetchUrlContent ? \file_get_contents($item) : $item; $returnOptions[] = $this->createTemporaryFile($fileContent, $this->optionsWithContentCheck[$option] ?? 'temp'); } ``` `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` returns truthy for `http://`, `https://`, `ftp://`, `file://localhost/...`, and `php://filter/...`, so `\file_get_contents()` is invoked on attacker-chosen schemes with no allow-list. ### Proof of concept ```php <?php use Pontedilana\PhpWeasyPrint\Pdf; $pdf = new Pdf('/usr/local/bin/weasyprint'); // Attacker-controlled attachment value (e.g. from a request / tenant config): // SSRF: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ // Local file read: php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd $attachment = $_GET['doc']; $pdf->generate('page.html', 'out.pdf', [ 'attachment' => $attachment, ]); // The bytes fetched server-side by file_get_contents() are embedded in out.pdf, // allowing the attacker to read internal HTTP responses or local files. ``` ### Impact - **SSRF**: the server fetches arbitrary `http(s)`/`ftp` URLs, reaching internal-only services, link-local metadata endpoints, etc. - **Local file / wrapper disclosure**: `php://filter/...` (and similar) let an attacker read and exfiltrate local file content inside the generated PDF. - Affects any consumer that does not fully control the `attachment` option value. Note: passing a plain local path (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) or a `file://` path that resolves to an existing file is handled as a normal local attachment and is **not** the issue addressed here — that is the documented local-attachment feature (callers must not pass untrusted input to the option). The fix specifically removes the server-side fetch amplification through non-`http(s)` schemes. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (6.5, Medium) — adjust `PR`/`S`/`A` to the consuming application's reachability (e.g. `PR:N` if the attachment value is reachable from an unauthenticated surface). CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery); secondary CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname) for the wrapper-based file read. ### Suggested fix Restrict the schemes the library will fetch to an allow-list (`http`, `https` by default), and treat any other scheme as inline content instead of fetching it: ```php private array $allowedSchemes = ['http', 'https']; // new optional 4th constructor argument: ?array $allowedSchemes = null protected function isOptionUrl($option): bool { $url = \parse_url((string)$option); return false !== $url && isset($url['scheme']) && \in_array(\strtolower($url['scheme']), $this->allowedSchemes, true); } ``` A value with a non-allowed scheme (`file://`, `php://`, `ftp://`, ...) is then never passed to `file_get_contents()`. ### Credit Reported upstream to KnpLabs/snappy ([GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56](https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/security/advisories/GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56)); identified as applicable to `pontedilana/php-weasyprint`, which mirrors the same code.
Update pontedilana/php-weasyprint to 2.6.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanPhpWeasyPrint vulnerable to SSRF and local file disclosure via the attachment option affects pontedilana/php-weasyprint (composer). Severity is medium. ### Summary `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` fetches the content of option values server-side via `file_get_contents()` when the value looks like a URL, without restricting the URL scheme. The `attachment` option of `Pdf` is the reachable sink: any value that passes `isOptionUrl()` (`filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)`) is downloaded by the PHP process and embedded into the generated PDF. Because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts `http`, `https`, `ftp`, `file` and PHP stream wrappers such as `php://`, an attacker who can influence the `attachment` value reaches both a **Server-Side Request Forgery** primitive (e.g. internal HTTP endpoints, cloud metadata) and a **local file disclosure** primitive (`file://`, `php://filter/...`), with the fetched bytes exfiltrated as a PDF attachment. This is the same class of issue KnpLabs/snappy patched for its `xsl-style-sheet` option in [GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56](https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/security/advisories/GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56). The library is documented as a one-to-one substitute for KnpLabs/snappy and shares the same code shape. ### Affected versions `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` versions `<= 2.5.1`. Patched in: `2.6.0`. ### Privilege required Any caller that can influence the `attachment` option value handed to `Pdf::generate()` / `Pdf::getOutput()` / `setOption('attachment', ...)`. Typical reach paths: a value sourced from a request parameter, a per-tenant configuration row, or any user-controllable field that flows into the attachment list. ### Vulnerable code `src/Pdf.php` — `isOptionUrl()` accepts any well-formed URL regardless of scheme: ```php protected function isOptionUrl($option): bool { return false !== \filter_var($option, \FILTER_VALIDATE_URL); } ``` `src/Pdf.php` — `handleArrayOptions()` fetches the URL content for the `attachment` option: ```php $fetchUrlContent = 'attachment' === $option && $this->isOptionUrl($item); if ($saveToTempFile || $fetchUrlContent) { $fileContent = $fetchUrlContent ? \file_get_contents($item) : $item; $returnOptions[] = $this->createTemporaryFile($fileContent, $this->optionsWithContentCheck[$option] ?? 'temp'); } ``` `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` returns truthy for `http://`, `https://`, `ftp://`, `file://localhost/...`, and `php://filter/...`, so `\file_get_contents()` is invoked on attacker-chosen schemes with no allow-list. ### Proof of concept ```php <?php use Pontedilana\PhpWeasyPrint\Pdf; $pdf = new Pdf('/usr/local/bin/weasyprint'); // Attacker-controlled attachment value (e.g. from a request / tenant config): // SSRF: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ // Local file read: php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd $attachment = $_GET['doc']; $pdf->generate('page.html', 'out.pdf', [ 'attachment' => $attachment, ]); // The bytes fetched server-side by file_get_contents() are embedded in out.pdf, // allowing the attacker to read internal HTTP responses or local files. ``` ### Impact - **SSRF**: the server fetches arbitrary `http(s)`/`ftp` URLs, reaching internal-only services, link-local metadata endpoints, etc. - **Local file / wrapper disclosure**: `php://filter/...` (and similar) let an attacker read and exfiltrate local file content inside the generated PDF. - Affects any consumer that does not fully control the `attachment` option value. Note: passing a plain local path (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) or a `file://` path that resolves to an existing file is handled as a normal local attachment and is **not** the issue addressed here — that is the documented local-attachment feature (callers must not pass untrusted input to the option). The fix specifically removes the server-side fetch amplification through non-`http(s)` schemes. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (6.5, Medium) — adjust `PR`/`S`/`A` to the consuming application's reachability (e.g. `PR:N` if the attachment value is reachable from an unauthenticated surface). CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery); secondary CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname) for the wrapper-based file read. ### Suggested fix Restrict the schemes the library will fetch to an allow-list (`http`, `https` by default), and treat any other scheme as inline content instead of fetching it: ```php private array $allowedSchemes = ['http', 'https']; // new optional 4th constructor argument: ?array $allowedSchemes = null protected function isOptionUrl($option): bool { $url = \parse_url((string)$option); return false !== $url && isset($url['scheme']) && \in_array(\strtolower($url['scheme']), $this->allowedSchemes, true); } ``` A value with a non-allowed scheme (`file://`, `php://`, `ftp://`, ...) is then never passed to `file_get_contents()`. ### Credit Reported upstream to KnpLabs/snappy ([GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56](https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/security/advisories/GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56)); identified as applicable to `pontedilana/php-weasyprint`, which mirrors the same code.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pontedilana/php-weasyprintcomposer | <=2.5.1 | 2.6.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL GuardUpdate pontedilana/php-weasyprint to 2.6.0 if you use the affected versions. Test the change in a non-production environment first.
Local check
hol-guard supply-chain scanPhpWeasyPrint vulnerable to SSRF and local file disclosure via the attachment option affects pontedilana/php-weasyprint (composer). Severity is medium. ### Summary `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` fetches the content of option values server-side via `file_get_contents()` when the value looks like a URL, without restricting the URL scheme. The `attachment` option of `Pdf` is the reachable sink: any value that passes `isOptionUrl()` (`filter_var(..., FILTER_VALIDATE_URL)`) is downloaded by the PHP process and embedded into the generated PDF. Because `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` accepts `http`, `https`, `ftp`, `file` and PHP stream wrappers such as `php://`, an attacker who can influence the `attachment` value reaches both a **Server-Side Request Forgery** primitive (e.g. internal HTTP endpoints, cloud metadata) and a **local file disclosure** primitive (`file://`, `php://filter/...`), with the fetched bytes exfiltrated as a PDF attachment. This is the same class of issue KnpLabs/snappy patched for its `xsl-style-sheet` option in [GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56](https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/security/advisories/GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56). The library is documented as a one-to-one substitute for KnpLabs/snappy and shares the same code shape. ### Affected versions `pontedilana/php-weasyprint` versions `<= 2.5.1`. Patched in: `2.6.0`. ### Privilege required Any caller that can influence the `attachment` option value handed to `Pdf::generate()` / `Pdf::getOutput()` / `setOption('attachment', ...)`. Typical reach paths: a value sourced from a request parameter, a per-tenant configuration row, or any user-controllable field that flows into the attachment list. ### Vulnerable code `src/Pdf.php` — `isOptionUrl()` accepts any well-formed URL regardless of scheme: ```php protected function isOptionUrl($option): bool { return false !== \filter_var($option, \FILTER_VALIDATE_URL); } ``` `src/Pdf.php` — `handleArrayOptions()` fetches the URL content for the `attachment` option: ```php $fetchUrlContent = 'attachment' === $option && $this->isOptionUrl($item); if ($saveToTempFile || $fetchUrlContent) { $fileContent = $fetchUrlContent ? \file_get_contents($item) : $item; $returnOptions[] = $this->createTemporaryFile($fileContent, $this->optionsWithContentCheck[$option] ?? 'temp'); } ``` `FILTER_VALIDATE_URL` returns truthy for `http://`, `https://`, `ftp://`, `file://localhost/...`, and `php://filter/...`, so `\file_get_contents()` is invoked on attacker-chosen schemes with no allow-list. ### Proof of concept ```php <?php use Pontedilana\PhpWeasyPrint\Pdf; $pdf = new Pdf('/usr/local/bin/weasyprint'); // Attacker-controlled attachment value (e.g. from a request / tenant config): // SSRF: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ // Local file read: php://filter/convert.base64-encode/resource=/etc/passwd $attachment = $_GET['doc']; $pdf->generate('page.html', 'out.pdf', [ 'attachment' => $attachment, ]); // The bytes fetched server-side by file_get_contents() are embedded in out.pdf, // allowing the attacker to read internal HTTP responses or local files. ``` ### Impact - **SSRF**: the server fetches arbitrary `http(s)`/`ftp` URLs, reaching internal-only services, link-local metadata endpoints, etc. - **Local file / wrapper disclosure**: `php://filter/...` (and similar) let an attacker read and exfiltrate local file content inside the generated PDF. - Affects any consumer that does not fully control the `attachment` option value. Note: passing a plain local path (e.g. `/etc/passwd`) or a `file://` path that resolves to an existing file is handled as a normal local attachment and is **not** the issue addressed here — that is the documented local-attachment feature (callers must not pass untrusted input to the option). The fix specifically removes the server-side fetch amplification through non-`http(s)` schemes. CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N (6.5, Medium) — adjust `PR`/`S`/`A` to the consuming application's reachability (e.g. `PR:N` if the attachment value is reachable from an unauthenticated surface). CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery); secondary CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname) for the wrapper-based file read. ### Suggested fix Restrict the schemes the library will fetch to an allow-list (`http`, `https` by default), and treat any other scheme as inline content instead of fetching it: ```php private array $allowedSchemes = ['http', 'https']; // new optional 4th constructor argument: ?array $allowedSchemes = null protected function isOptionUrl($option): bool { $url = \parse_url((string)$option); return false !== $url && isset($url['scheme']) && \in_array(\strtolower($url['scheme']), $this->allowedSchemes, true); } ``` A value with a non-allowed scheme (`file://`, `php://`, `ftp://`, ...) is then never passed to `file_get_contents()`. ### Credit Reported upstream to KnpLabs/snappy ([GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56](https://github.com/KnpLabs/snappy/security/advisories/GHSA-c5fp-p67m-gq56)); identified as applicable to `pontedilana/php-weasyprint`, which mirrors the same code.
AI coding agents often install or upgrade packages automatically in composer. A medium vulnerability in a dependency can be pulled into a project through a normal install or update without a human reviewing the change, expanding the blast radius from a single package to every agent workspace that depends on it.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| pontedilana/php-weasyprintcomposer | <=2.5.1 | 2.6.0 |
Fixed versions are reported by the source feed; confirm compatibility before updating.
Reported by GitHub Security Advisories (ghsa).
HOL Guard can help your team review package activity against supported protection paths.
Explore HOL Guard