Answer in brief
CVE-2026-49457 records a Critical severity (CVSS 9.1) vulnerability in QUIC has Broken TLS verification. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps quic (erlang), benoitc/erlang_quic (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 9.1. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps quic (erlang), benoitc/erlang_quic (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| quicerlang | <=1.4.3 | 1.4.4 |
| benoitc/erlang_quicgeneric | < 1.4.4 | Not reported |
Published upstream
Aug 14, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Aug 14, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 1, 2026
erlang_quic is a pure Erlang QUIC implementation. Prior to version 1.4.4, the QUIC client did not authenticate the server during the TLS 1.3 handshake. The CertificateVerify signature was not checked, the certificate chain was not validated, and the hostname was not compared against the certificate, so `verify` was effectively a no-op on the client. A man-in-the-middle on the network path could present any certificate and impersonate any server, defeating the confidentiality and integrity of the connection. HTTP/3 uses the same client and was equally affected. Handshakes authenticated by a PSK (session resumption) are not affected, because the peer is authenticated by the PSK binder and no certificate is sent. This is fixed in 1.4.4. The client now verifies the CertificateVerify signature, validates the certificate chain against the trust store (`cacerts` option, the operating system store by default), and checks the hostname. Client `verify` now defaults to on; set `verify => false` to accept any certificate (for example a self-signed test server). No known workarounds are available before 1.4.4. `verify => true` had no effect, and inspecting the certificate after connecting does not help because without the signature check the peer is never proven to own the certificate it presents.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.