Answer in brief
CVE-2026-49753 records a Medium severity (CVSS 6.3) vulnerability in HTTP response smuggling in Mint HTTP/1 client via lenient Content-Length parsing. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps mint (erlang), elixir-mint/elixir-mint/mint (generic), elixir-mint/mint (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 6.3. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps mint (erlang), elixir-mint/elixir-mint/mint (generic), elixir-mint/mint (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| minterlang | <1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
| elixir-mint/elixir-mint/mintgeneric | >=65e0e86d799a6d3b08e4372fccdd9747535e0dd6 <47e48027480228e4e32a0b4df39db497b4804921 | 47e48027480228e4e32a0b4df39db497b4804921 |
| elixir-mint/mintgeneric | >=0.1.0 <1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
Published upstream
Jun 2, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 20, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 10, 2026
Inconsistent Interpretation of HTTP Requests ('HTTP Request/Response Smuggling') vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/1 servers to desynchronise response framing on shared connections. Mint's HTTP/1 Content-Length parser, Mint.HTTP1.Parse.content_length_header/1 in lib/mint/http1/parse.ex, parses the header value with Integer.parse/1, which accepts an optional + or - sign prefix. The length >= 0 guard rejects negatives, but inputs such as +0 or +123 are returned as valid lengths. RFC 7230 specifies Content-Length = 1*DIGIT, with no sign character permitted. A fronting proxy or load balancer that strictly enforces the grammar will reject or reframe a header like Content-Length: +0, while Mint silently treats it as zero. When Mint reuses the socket (keep-alive, pipelining, or any pooled connection shared across requesters), the parser disagreement is a response-smuggling primitive: the proxy delimits the body one way, Mint another, and bytes from one response get attributed to the next. Where the same Mint connection is shared across trust boundaries, an attacker-controlled upstream can leak bytes into a different consumer's response stream. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.