Answer in brief
CVE-2026-49754 records a High severity (CVSS 8.2) vulnerability in HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood in Mint client via unbounded header-block accumulation. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps mint (erlang), elixir-mint/elixir-mint/mint (generic), elixir-mint/mint (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps mint (erlang), elixir-mint/elixir-mint/mint (generic), elixir-mint/mint (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| minterlang | <1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
| elixir-mint/elixir-mint/mintgeneric | >=596ca4304504be68939c4929e0831557097962b8 <b662d127d3028b5426c88d4c9cc7fe430491a10b | b662d127d3028b5426c88d4c9cc7fe430491a10b |
| elixir-mint/mintgeneric | >=0.1.0 <1.9.0 | 1.9.0 |
Published upstream
Jun 2, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 20, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jul 10, 2026
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling vulnerability in elixir-mint Mint allows attacker-controlled HTTP/2 servers to exhaust memory in a Mint client (HTTP/2 CONTINUATION flood). When Mint's HTTP/2 receive path observes a HEADERS frame without the END_HEADERS flag, the unparsed header-block fragment is parked in conn.headers_being_processed, and every subsequent CONTINUATION frame on that stream is appended to the accumulator. Nothing in the receive path caps the accumulator: there is no per-stream size limit, no CONTINUATION frame-count limit, and max_header_list_size is only enforced on outgoing requests, never on inbound header blocks (its default is :infinity). A malicious or compromised HTTP/2 server can stream an endless sequence of CONTINUATION frames (each up to the peer-advertised SETTINGS_MAX_FRAME_SIZE) and drive the client's iolist to arbitrary size, causing memory exhaustion and BEAM process death. A single connection to an attacker-controlled HTTP/2 endpoint is sufficient. This issue affects mint: from 0.1.0 before 1.9.0.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.