Answer in brief
CVE-2026-49755 records a High severity (CVSS 8.2) vulnerability in Decompression bomb DoS in Req via auto-decoded archive and compressed response bodies. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps req (erlang), wojtekmach/req (generic), wojtekmach/wojtekmach/req (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 8.2. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps req (erlang), wojtekmach/req (generic), wojtekmach/wojtekmach/req (generic). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Product | Affected versions | Fixed versions |
|---|---|---|
| cpe:2.3:a:wojtekmach:req:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | Not reported | Not reported |
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| reqerlang | >=0.1.0,<0.6.1 | 0.6.1 |
| wojtekmach/reqgeneric | >=0.1.0 <0.6.1 | 0.6.1 |
| wojtekmach/wojtekmach/reqgeneric | >=e37753741cbdc725e6aba3d977b380163bfc0ecb <* | * |
Published upstream
Jun 8, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Nov 20, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Aug 2, 2026
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) vulnerability in wojtekmach Req allows attacker-controlled HTTP servers to exhaust memory in a Req client via decompression-bomb response bodies. Req's default response pipeline includes Req.Steps.decode_body/1 and Req.Steps.decompress_body/1 in lib/req/steps.ex. decode_body/1 dispatches on the server-supplied content-type (or URL extension) and calls :zip.extract(body, [:memory]) for application/zip, :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory]) for application/x-tar, and :erl_tar.extract({:binary, body}, [:memory, :compressed]) for application/gzip / .tgz. Each returns the full decompressed archive contents as a [{name, bytes}] list in memory, with no per-entry or total size cap. decompress_body/1 walks the content-encoding header and chains :zlib/:brotli/:ezstd decoders, so a response advertising content-encoding: gzip, gzip, gzip inflates through multiple layers without bound. Both steps are enabled by default, no caller opt-in is required, and the attacker controls the content-type and content-encoding headers on their own server (or on any host reached via Req's automatic redirect following). A sub-megabyte response can expand to multiple gigabytes on the victim, crashing the BEAM process. This issue affects req: from 0.1.0 before 0.6.1.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.