Answer in brief
CVE-2026-49820 records a Medium severity (CVSS 4.7) vulnerability in Probo has an open redirect bypass via path normalization. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. The current feed maps getprobo/probo (generic), go.probo.inc/probo (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
Analysis pending evidence review
HOL Guard separates source facts from reviewed analysis. See the methodology.
CVSS is 4.7. The current sources do not mark it as known exploited. Treat this as a source-backed prioritization signal, not a statement about your environment.
Analysis status
Analysis pending evidence review
Factual feed record only; HOL analysis is not approved for indexing. Read the methodology.
The current feed maps getprobo/probo (generic), go.probo.inc/probo (go). Check affected ranges and fixed versions before updating.
| Package | Affected range | Fixed version |
|---|---|---|
| getprobo/probogeneric | <0.193.1 | 0.193.1 |
| go.probo.inc/probogo | <0.204.0 | 0.204.0 |
Published upstream
Aug 13, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordSource modified
Oct 24, 2026
Evidence: source:cvelist:source_dates:source-dates:recordFirst seen by HOL
Jun 30, 2026
Probo is a self-hostable governance, risk, and compliance (GRC) platform built for engineering and security teams. Probo's `saferedirect` package validates redirect URLs used across authentication flows (OIDC, SAML, session transfer, OAuth connectors, and trust-center magic links). Prior to version 0.19.3.1, the validator only inspected the second character of relative paths, so a URL like `/../\evil.com` passed validation because the second character is `.`. Go's `http.Redirect` normalizes this path to `/\evil.com` before setting the `Location` header. Browsers can interpret the backslash as a host separator and redirect the user to an external domain (`https://evil.com`), bypassing the intended same-origin restriction. This enables open-redirect phishing: an attacker can craft a `continue` parameter (or embed a malicious URL in a session-transfer token) that appears to originate from a trusted Probo domain but redirects victims elsewhere. This is fixed in `go.probo.inc/probo` 0.193.1 by normalizing relative paths with `path.Clean` before validation, rejecting backslashes (including percent-encoded `%5c`) anywhere in the path, and re-checking the normalized result for protocol-relative and backslash prefixes. Self-hosted deployments should upgrade to probod v0.194.1 or later. SaaS deployments on getprobo.com are patched. No practical workaround is available for self-hosted installations.
Quoted source text, attributed separately from HOL analysis.